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Chapter One 
Introduction 
“You are what you wear … don’t wear loafers. People will think, ‘Hey, there’s a 
loafer’,” “Candidates would do well … [to] pattern their appearances after Jack Lord, star 
of the television series ‘Hawaii Five-O’,” and “Be wary of the ‘influence-peddling’ 
image of cigars” were all campaign suggestions discussion at the 26th annual Illinois 
Judicial Conference in 1979 ("Illinois judges given campaigning tips," 1979). It is no 
wonder that judicial elections were once described as being “quiet, dignified affairs,” 
marked by little media coverage and low voter turnout rates (Streb, 2007b). Up until the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, campaigns for judicial offices were indeed quite boring (with 
some notable exceptions from time to time). 
Since the late 1970s, judicial elections have been transformed into expensive, 
professionalized campaigns featuring campaign messages more typical for legislative and 
executive campaigns. The majority of judges report that the trend in judicial elections is 
toward “rough and tumble” contests in which candidates are under intense pressure to 
raise money to support media-driven campaigns (Rottman, 2002). Advice given to judges 
now focuses on how to address issue questionnaires and how to navigate seemingly ever-
loosening campaign regulations (Reed, 2005). Judicial elections, which had been 
described as about as “exciting as watching a game of checkers played by mail” (Bayne, 
2000) are now characterized as being “noisier, nastier, and costlier” (Schotland, 1985, p. 
76). 
Contemporary judicial campaigns are cause for concern for two primary reasons: 
campaign speech and campaign financing, both of which may undermine the impartiality 
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of the courts and weaken the legitimacy of the judiciary. Although judicial campaigns 
were once strictly regulated, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White paved the way for greater deregulation efforts targeting campaign 
speech. Now, a judicial candidate can freely label himself as “pro-life” or “pro-choice” 
and engage in other campaign speech that calls into question the impartiality of the 
judiciary.   
This recent development is directly tied to the ongoing concern with how judicial 
candidates finance their campaigns. Candidates frequently receive contributions from 
lawyers and other parties who may appear before the court, begging the question, “Is 
justice for sale?”  This subject has received substantial attention from organizations, such 
as the American Bar Association and the Justice at Stake Campaign, as well as in popular 
culture, as in Bill Moyers’ documentary, “Justice for Sale,” and John Grisham’s 2008 
fictional work, “The Appeal.”   
In the 2009-2010 election cycle, judicial candidates for state high courts raised a 
total of $38.4 million, nearly half (43.8%) of which was spent on television advertising 
(Skaggs, Silva, Casey, & C. Hall, 2011). In 2012, over $29.7 million was spent on TV 
ads in judicial elections, more than any other single year (Bannon, Velasco, Casey, & 
Reagan, 2012). Given these trends in judicial elections, one wonders if future generations 
will observe a difference between the judiciary and the other branches of government or 
if the judiciary will fall victim to politicization.  Should the public lose faith in the 
judiciary, according to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the rule of law, the basis of a 
functional government, will be undermined (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, & Casey, 2010). 
Despite the great focus on judicial selection, as well as the judiciary in general, scholarly 
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research focused on judicial campaigns is lacking in a time when large-scale changes 
threaten the legitimacy of this political institution. This investigation seeks to shed more 
light on one important facet of the politics of the judiciary--judicial campaigns. What 
follows is an overview of this timely and important research project. 
Overview 
Chapter Two addresses the popular systems that states use to select their judges 
(appointment, elective systems, and merit selection). These systems reflect differing 
conceptualizations of the role of the judiciary and attempt to strike a balance between 
judicial independence and democratic accountability, both of which are key to the 
institutional legitimacy of the judiciary. Judicial selection has been the subject of an 
ongoing debate among legal scholars, and the last century has seen continuing 
controversy over judicial elections. Though a number of activists have called for reform 
and several states have seen referenda aimed at doing away with the election of judges, 
the overwhelming majority of state judges are chosen by the ballot rather than appointed 
as their federal counterparts are. 
Chapter Three examines the nature of “new-style” judicial campaigns, which are 
marked by an increased importance placed on paid campaign advertisements, contentious 
campaign communications, greater involvement on behalf of non-candidate groups 
(including political parties and interest groups), and escalating campaign expenditures.   
As the chapter details, few judicial candidates receive coverage from the news 
media. Judicial candidates must therefore depend more heavily upon paid campaign 
promotional communications including advertisements, to reach the electorate. 
Challengers and those in multi-county elections, especially, rely on paid advertising. 
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Although costly campaigns are nothing new for legislative and executive candidates, they 
pose unique problems for the judiciary, as judicial candidates must frequently turn for 
financial support to campaign contributors, many of whom are likely to come before the 
court after the election (e.g., lawyers, businesses, organizations, unions, etc.), bringing 
into question whether a judge can truly remain impartial in such circumstances. 
Along with the concerns raised by professionalized, high-cost judicial campaigns, 
the changes in campaign messages over the past decade have sounded alarms among the 
legal community. Judicial campaign speech regulations, although designed to promote 
the appearance of impartiality, have largely been nullified as a result of Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White (2002). The trend toward deregulation has left many speculating 
whether judicial campaigns will increasingly resemble campaigns for legislative or 
executive office. The main concern of critics is that as judicial campaigns become similar 
to campaigns for executive or legislative offices and the distinction of this branch of 
government will be erased, thereby undermining the public’s confidence in an impartial 
court system.   
Given the nature of new-style judicial campaigns, qualified candidates may 
refrain from running for judicial office in order to avoid such bitter contests. Should a 
significant number of qualified candidates respond in this way, democratic accountability, 
theoretically maximized under elective systems, would be diminished. Scholars and legal 
organizations have offered a number of campaign reform proposals over the years (e.g., 
public financing, voter guides, campaign oversight committees, etc.), but few have gained 
traction. As this chapter shows, more empirical research is needed to further our 
understanding of judicial campaigns and elections. 
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Chapter Four describes the methods used to address the research questions 
developed in Chapter Three. The chapter includes a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of two methods chosen to generate data concerning the questions—an online 
and hard copy survey of 490 candidates for a variety of judicial positions in 2012 and 
depth interviews conducted with 35 candidates. Specifics regarding the survey, including 
questionnaire design, item wording and distribution methods are presented. A discussion 
of the considerations guiding the choice of candidates for depth interviews and the topics 
for exploration is also provided. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the survey and provides analysis of the data 
gathered from the follow-up interviews.   
Chapter Six further discusses the results of the study in the broader context of 
judicial campaigns.   
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Chapter Two 
Judicial Selection Systems 
Unlike most nations, in the United States the great majority of judicial posts are 
filled via electoral competition. While federal judges are appointed to the bench (as 
stipulated by the US Constitution), states are free to select judges in the manner in which 
they see fit, and most choose to do so via election to office. Even so, a wide variety of 
methods of judicial selection characterizes the choices states have made. Well over 15 
different varieties of judicial selection systems, ranging from partisan elections to 
legislative appointment have been chosen across the 50 states (Schotland, 2007). These 
different systems demonstrate each state’s attempt to balance judicial independence and 
democratic accountability, both of which are crucial to maintaining institutional 
legitimacy and preserving the rule of law. This chapter discusses (a) the major issues with 
judicial selection, (b) the three general methods of judicial selection used by states, and 
(c) how well judicial independence and democratic accountability are maintained within 
these selection systems.   
Institutional Legitimacy 
How states choose to select their judges impacts not only the public’s support or 
trust in the judiciary (and thereby its legitimacy), which in turn affects the operation of 
the rule of law – one of the “most fundamental of requirements for government” (Benesh, 
2006, p. 697). To function, the court system requires public support, which is predicated 
upon public trust (Benesh, 2006). If the public loses faith in the court system, citizens 
may be less willing to participate in the system (both as juror and as litigant) (Roberts & 
Stalans, 1997) or to follow the rulings issued by the courts (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & 
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Rasinski, 1991). Disobedience and avoidance of legal obligations increase in line with the 
public’s declining respect for the law. Greater governmental force becomes necessary, 
but reliance on coercive power is resource-intensive and inefficient (Barnhizer, 2001). 
Legitimate institutions can gain authority from the public in a more effective manner, 
ensuring a stable society (Tyler, 2006). 
According to Gibson (2008b), political capital is necessary for political 
institutions to be effective, to have their decisions (e.g., rulings, laws, etc.) accepted by 
the public, and to be successful in implementation. As courts control neither the purse 
(i.e., the treasury) nor the sword (i.e., agents of state coercion, such as the military and 
police), they must instead generate authority through institutional legitimacy. The courts 
rely on the public’s perception that the judiciary is a legitimate institution whose 
decisions should be followed because they are “right.”  
Legitimacy is a normative concept, rooted in the legal/moral right to make 
decisions. Specifically, legitimacy is “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social 
arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just” (Tyler, 2006, p. 376). Legitimate 
institutions are “those with a widely accepted mandate to render judgments for a political 
community” (Gibson, 2008b, p. 61). Decisions from institutions perceived as legitimate 
are more likely to be accepted, ideally making institutions stable and effective to the 
benefit of all members of society (Tyler, 2006).  
 Citizens do not inherently perceive the courts as separate from the other branches 
of government. The judiciary gains legitimacy the more it appears to the public to be 
distinct from other political institutions. Whereas other institutions serve various interests 
(the official’s self-interest or the public’s), the judiciary is designed to be insulated and 
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impartial. Legitimizing judicial symbols (e.g., impartiality and insulation from political 
pressure) help citizens distinguish the courts from other institutions and create the 
appearance that the courts are indeed distinct and therefore “worthy of more respect, 
deference, and obedience” (Gibson, 2008b, p. 61). 
How states choose to select judges has an impact on the public’s faith in the 
judiciary as selection systems inherently favor either judicial independence or democratic 
accountability. Those who value democratic accountability will not be satisfied with 
appointive systems; those who value judicial independence will dismiss elective systems. 
Consistent with Schotland (1985), the only agreement we can reach is that no system can 
accommodate both goals entirely.  
Three General Judicial Selection Systems 
 In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Louis Brandeis described the states as 
“laboratories” of democracy. The states certainly are fulfilling their role as sites for 
experimentation when it comes to judicial selection. Three broad selection systems have 
developed over the history of the United States: appointive systems, elective systems, and 
merit selection (otherwise known as the Missouri Plan or the merit plan). 
Appointive systems. Traditionally, state judges were selected through 
appointment by state legislatures with or without executive confirmation. Such systems 
were popular for two reasons: (a) the lack of a clearly defined role of the judiciary and (b) 
the public’s distrust of the colonial judges who were selected by and beholden to the 
King of England (Croley, 1995). Legislatures, often actively opposed to the Crown, were 
generally better regarded than colonial governors, who like judges, were appointed by the 
King. Public faith in legislatures declined in the wake of increased legislative activity in 
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the 19th century, much of which was perceived as special favors that did not serve the 
public’s interests. The view that the judiciary, through popular control, could serve as an 
effective check on the other branches of government gained popular momentum 
(Hanssen, 2004). 
Elective systems. Although appointive systems were common after the 
Revolution, a few states (including Georgia, Indiana, and Vermont) chose to select judges 
through elective means (Croley, 1995). From the 1840s on, following a newfound 
fondness for popular control advanced within the “Jacksonian” era of politics, several 
new and existing states1adopted popular elections as the means of judicial selection 
(Baum, 1986). Reformers, though, were not necessarily cut from the same cloth as the 
Jacksonians – they sought a court that would be independent of the legislature’s pressure 
and thereby better able to serve as a distinct branch of government, capable of providing 
an adequate balance rather than a court that represented and responded to public opinion 
(Hanssen, 2004). 
Aside from independence, reformers sought a more productive court. Elections, 
they reasoned, would exert enough pressure on the judiciary to motivate judges to better                                                         1 States that switched to partisan elections between 1846 and 1909 included: New York 
(1847), Illinois (1848), Kentucky (1850), Michigan (1850), Missouri (1850), 
Pennsylvania (1850), Indiana (1851), Maryland (1851), Ohio (1851), Tennessee (1853), 
Iowa (1857), Alabama (1867), North Carolina (1868), Arkansas (1874), Texas (1876), 
Florida (1887), Georgia (1896), and Louisiana (1904) (Hanssen, 2004).  States that joined 
the Union after 1846 with partisan elections as the original judicial selection system 
included: Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), Minnesota (1858), Oregon (1859), 
Kansas (1861), West Virginia (1863), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1867), Colorado (1876), 
Montana (1889), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Washington (1889), Idaho 
(1890), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), and Oklahoma (1907) (Hanssen, 2004)  States 
that joined the Union after 1846 with non-partisan elections as the original judicial 
selection system included: Arizona (1912) and New Mexico (1912) (Hanssen, 2004).  For 
a detailed timeline of state judicial selection methods, see Hanssen (2004), Table 1 (pp. 
442-443). 
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serve the public (Hanssen, 2004). The judiciary itself was also partly responsible for the 
push for popular control of state courts. The formalization of the judiciary’s role in 
policymaking in Marbury v. Madison (1803) (wherein Chief Justice Marshall declared, 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” 
(p. 177).) sparked public concern over the power of judges who were not directly 
accountable to the people (Geyh, 2003). Reformers also believed that elections would 
result in higher quality judges as the judiciary would be independent from other political 
institutions (i.e., cronyism would be eliminated) (Dimino, 2005). 
Critics of judicial elections were numerous. For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville 
(trans. 1969), writing in Democracy in America, noted: 
Certain constitutions make the members of courts elected and submit them to 
frequent reelections. I dare to predict that sooner or later these innovations will 
have dire results and that one day it will be perceived that by so diminishing the 
independence of the magistrates, not only has the judicial power been attacked, 
but the democratic republic itself. (p. 269) 
Despite opposition from such leaders, judicial elections gained in popularity 
during the latter half of the 19th century. In 1832, Mississippi became the first state that 
elected all of its judges. By the end of the Civil War, 24 of the 34 states had adopted 
popular election systems for some or all of their judges (Berkson & Caufield, 1980/2004). 
Every state entering the Union between 1846 and 1958 adopted elective judiciaries 
(Croley, 1995).   
Although initially judicial elections were partisan in nature, nonpartisan elections 
were adopted by several states to combat issues stemming from “party politics.” In 1878, 
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the American Bar Association publicly addressed the undesirable influence of party 
politics and denounced partisan elections in favor of non-partisan contests. Critics of 
partisan judicial elections argued that election results were subject to manipulation and 
elected judges served the party rather than the public (Hanssen, 2004). The public’s 
views of judges also shifted: they were now seen as corrupt and incompetent (Berkson & 
Caufield, 1980/2004). Though partisan judicial elections had been adopted with limited 
opposition some, including delegates to the 1853 Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention, described the widespread adoption of partisan judicial elections as a failure 
(Berkson & Caufield, 1980/2004). Nonpartisan popular judicial elections became the 
selection system of choice for new states and several existing states beginning in the early 
1910s2 (Baum, 1986), though nonpartisan judicial elections appeared as early as 1873 in 
Cook County, Illinois. 
Despite the populist appeal of an elected judiciary, several states and prominent 
leaders grew disenchanted with nonpartisan elections as a way to increase democratic 
accountability and enhance judicial independence. Roscoe Pound famously addressed the 
American Bar Association in 1906 and voiced his own criticism of elective systems, 
namely the transformation of judges into politicians and the resulting destruction of the 
“traditional respect” for the judiciary (Berkson & Caufield, 1980/2004).  
                                                        2 States that adopted non-partisan elections included: North Dakota (1910), California 
(1911), Ohio (1911), Minnesota (1912), Washington (1912), Nebraska (1913), Wisconsin 
(1914), Nevada (1915), Wyoming (1915), South Dakota (1916), Oregon (1932), Idaho 
(1935), Montana (1935), Michigan (1943), Maryland (1952), Tennessee (1952), and Utah 
(1952). States that joined the Union after 1846 with non-partisan elections as the original 
judicial selection system included: Arizona (1912) and New Mexico (1912) (Hanssen, 
2004).  For a detailed timeline of state judicial selection methods, see Hanssen (2004), 
Table 1 (pp. 442-443). 
12  
As early as 1908, the members of the South Dakota Bar Association voiced their 
dissatisfaction with their own nonpartisan elective system. By 1927, three states that had 
adopted nonpartisan judicial elections decided to abandon them. William Howard Taft, as 
well as a number of prominent lawyers, voiced dissatisfaction with the popular election 
of judges. Taft, speaking before the Cincinnati Bar Association, claimed that the notion 
of men campaigning for a judicial office was so “disgraceful” and “shocking” that it 
should be condemned.   
Merit selection. Although creating a judiciary separate from the powers of state 
government was a goal of reformers in the mid-19th century, insulating judges from 
political influence became a growing concern in the early part of the 20th century. The 
American Judicature Society (AJS), formed in 1913, drafted a number of reform 
proposals, including a new method of judicial selection designed to combat the issues 
elective systems generated. The proposed system (commonly referred to as merit 
selection or the Missouri Plan) combined elements of pre-existing selection systems in 
order to balance both judicial independence and democratic accountability. The Missouri 
Plan consists of several steps. First, an independent commission compiles a list of 
nominees for judgeship. Next, the state’s governor chooses a new judge from the list, 
who assumes the judicial post. At a later date—usually two years after appointment--, the 
public has the opportunity to either approve or disapprove of the selected judge in a 
retention election. Typical ballots include language such as, “Shall Judge ________ be 
retained in office?” and voters are given “yes” and “no” response options. A judge who is 
successfully retained then serves a full term; those who are not retained are removed from 
office and the selection process to fill the vacant seat begins again. 
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Missouri was the first to adopt this system in 1940, so this hybrid system is 
typically referred to as the “Missouri Plan,” though it is also frequently known as “merit 
selection” or the “Kales plan” (named after Albert M. Kales, one of the founders of the 
AJS who devised the plan) (Berkson & Caufield, 1980/2004). Changes to states’ judicial 
selection systems since 1950 have largely involved the adoption of merit selection 
systems3 (Baum, 1986). 
Balancing Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability 
The methods by which we select judges have progressed over the years in tandem 
with the expectations of the role of judges in society. However, no single method has 
proven entirely satisfactory. Part of this conundrum can be explained by our competing 
ideas as to what we want judges to do (Pozen, 2008). We expect “good judges,” but 
“good judging,” is “like pornography: It’s hard to define, and most people believe they 
know it when they see it” (Alsdorf, 2003 p. 198). Based on how our states select judges, 
one develops an odd, often conflicting set of expectations about the role of judges in our 
government. As Kritzer (2007) notes,  
We want judges to exercise their independent judgment, so long as they are not 
too independent. We also want judges to be accountable to the public. We value 
judicial independence, just not too much of it. We want judges to ‘call ‘em like 
they see’em,’ provided that ‘they don’t see’em too differently from the way we 
see’em. (pp. 423-424) 
                                                        3 States that adopted the Missouri plan for at least some of their judges after 1950 
include: Kansas (1958), Alaska (1959), Hawaii (1959), Iowa (1962), Nebraska (1962), 
Colorado (1966), Oklahoma (1967), Utah (1967), Indiana (1968), Florida (1972), 
Wyoming (1973), Arizona (1974), Maryland (1976), South Dakota (1981), and New 
Mexico (1989) (Hanssen, 2004).  
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Ideally, the judiciary keeps the legislature and executive in check, upholds the US 
Constitution, and ensures that the majority does not undermine the rights of marginalized 
populations. At the same time, the judiciary should respect the powers of the other 
branches of government and administer the laws they create. Those who hold public 
office should be held accountable for their actions. Although the judiciary is not formally 
charged with such a responsibility, there is the desire that the judiciary should represent 
the public (i.e., members of the judiciary should reflect the diversity of the populace). In 
sum, there are two primary roles that judges fulfill: the role of an appropriately 
independent, impartial protector and the role of an accountable, representative, unique 
policymaker. 
Judicial independence. As the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments grant the right to a fair trial, judges should act both 
independently from public opinion and political institutions and impartially (i.e., judges 
should be objective and unbiased).  As Carrington (1998) noted, 
Courts and judges are the bulwark against the disintegration of the mutual trust 
sustaining the life of democratic government. They are our ‘last best hope’ that 
the Republic will not be overrun by the greed, mendacity, brutality, moral 
arrogance, prejudice, and petty hatreds, … the inescapable stuff of the dark side of 
human nature … To fulfill that hope requires our judges to be independent. (p. 80) 
However, obtaining truly independent and impartial judges is an impossible task. 
Instead, Geyh (2003) suggests we strive for an “appropriately independent” judiciary. 
According to his view, “no one suggests that judges should be so completely free from 
influence or control that they may pursue avocations as outlaws or libertines, whenever 
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the spirit moves them” (p. 52). This goal, however, is inadequately defined: how 
independent is too independent? Ultimately, the states decide how to define and obtain 
appropriately independent through policy and choice of selection system. 
Public opinion. As appointed judges do not secure their positions through popular 
vote, the influence of public opinion and campaign donors is minimized; therefore, 
judicial independence (relative to the public) is enhanced. Appointed judges are more 
likely to overturn lower courts’ rulings in death penalty cases even in states whose 
residents strongly favor the death penalty (Brace & M.G. Hall, 1997). Appointed judges 
are less predictable because they are less likely to respond to political pressure. Lowered 
pressure manifests in appointees’ longer terms and higher retention rates (Hanssen, 1999).   
Although judicial independence is enhanced in appointive systems, it is not 
absolute. Judges who serve lifetime appointments remain susceptible (to a degree) to the 
power of public opinion. Mishler and Sheehan (1993) show that the public mood and the 
ideological sentiment of US Supreme Court decisions are indeed linked in a reciprocal 
relationship, though decisions lag behind public sentiment.   
Elected judges are more susceptible to the climate of public opinion. Public 
opinion not only influences the types of cases judges hear, but also how judges rule. State 
supreme court justices who face the electorate are less likely to hear cases involving the 
controversial topic of abortion (Brace & M.G. Hall, 1990, 1999). Elected judges are also 
more inclined to hear cases involving “David and Goliath”-type scenarios (i.e., cases 
involving one litigant who has a great deal of resources and one litigant who is resource 
poor) due to their populist appeal. “[C]ourts standing as a barrier against majority tyranny 
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and as protector of the downtrodden is one the most popular images in American politics” 
(Brace & M.G. Hall, 2001, p. 395).   
Judges who face an electorate are also susceptible to the public’s influence when 
it comes to deciding cases. Judges who anticipate a run for reelection fear being criticized 
for being “weak on crime” and respond accordingly by issuing tougher sentences as the 
election nears (Huber & Gordon, 2004). Using data regarding murders in Chicago from 
1870 to 1930, Brooks and Raphael (2002) show that defendants who faced an elected 
trial judge in an election year were 15% more likely to receive the death penalty than 
those who faced an appointed judge. Judges who face retention elections and who serve 
in states with more favorable views of capital punishment are less likely to overturn 
lower courts’ rulings in death penalty cases (Brace & Boyea, 2008). 
Elected judges also actively avoid situations in which they could be singled out 
for criticism when seeking reelection. Elected justices serving states that generally favor 
capital punishment (e.g., Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Kentucky) are more 
likely to uphold death sentences issued by lower courts (M.G. Hall, 1995). Likewise, 
M.G. Hall’s (1987) examination of the Louisiana Supreme Court showed that justices 
who desired to remain in office, who held differing views than the electorate, and who 
were in the minority on prominent issues were less likely to voice disagreement with the 
Court’s decisions in cases involving controversial issues. 
Public opinion can also have indirect effects on the judiciary. This was the case 
with Justice Penny White, a Tennessee Supreme Court Justice. White joined the majority 
in an unpopular decision in 1996 that stipulated a new sentencing proceeding of a 
criminal case involving an individual who had been convicted for the rape and assault of 
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an elderly woman. The Tennessee Conservative Union launched a campaign opposing the 
retention of White (among other Justices). Campaigning against the opposition was 
difficult for White, as judges are prohibited from defending their previous decisions 
(although they can discuss their record in general, they cannot discuss specific rulings). 
Despite her efforts, she was swiftly defeated (Reid, 1999). Traut and Emmert (1998), 
noting the indirect power public opinion can have over the composition of the courts and 
their subsequent rulings, concluded: 
The retention election process allowed the public to register disapproval of 
judicial decision making by voting sitting justices out of office. When the public 
removed Justices Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin, Governor Deukmejian was able to 
alter the court’s composition and, ultimately, to change the direction of the court’s 
death penalty policy. (p. 1178) 
Campaigning. Although not a concern for appointive systems, some aspects of 
campaigning dampen judicial independence in both elective and merit selection systems.  
Though one might initially assume retention elections are marked by a lack of 
campaigning (as there are no challengers in a retention election), nearly half (47.4%) of 
all judges up for retention engaged in some campaigning activities between 1980 and 
1992 (Aspin, 1998). Although a fair share of trial court contests are uncontested (30.8%) 
or uncompetitive (28.7%), most candidates face competitive elections (41.5%). The 
majority of contests for state supreme court are competitive (68.2%), with few 
uncontested races (9.1%) (Abbe & Herrnson, 2002). Candidates who face competition are 
more likely to engage in campaign activities, though little is known as to how many 
candidates actively campaign. 
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The campaign process may damage the legitimacy of the judiciary in a number of 
ways. First, judicial candidates, including judges facing retention elections, may 
communicate political views that can mar the public’s perception of an impartial 
judiciary. For example, a judge who runs as a “pro-life” candidate may not appear 
impartial if and when a case involving abortion arises. Issues related to judicial candidate 
speech and impartiality are explored further in Chapter Three. 
Second, the need for campaign funds presents a problem for judicial candidates 
because the public believes the judicial decision-making process favors campaign 
contributors (Barnhizer, 2001). Those who believe campaign donations influence judicial 
decisions have lower levels of trust in the judiciary (Rottman, 2002). 
Attorneys represent an obvious group from which to solicit campaign donations, 
as judicial candidates are likely to have come into contact with a number of them. 
Attorneys are a source of substantial levels of campaign funds. However, their 
involvement in judicial campaigns is controversial. Individual lawyers, in fact, are a 
substantial source of funds for judicial candidates (Dubois, 1986a; Eisenstein, 2000). On 
the other hand, contributions are often small and come from many attorneys. Without 
such funds, judicial candidates are unable to adequately reach the electorate with their 
campaign messages (Siciliano, 1991). Supporters of attorney contributions argue that 
attorneys are well-positioned to assess the qualifications of candidates. Also, the diffuse 
nature of funding from attorneys makes it difficult for a judge to effectively show 
favoritism toward a specific party.   
The fear that judges appear to be influenced by contributing attorneys is not 
unfounded. Contributors to judicial campaigns donate not only to “sure winners” – a lot 
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of them also contribute to “sure losers” who are sitting judges. Contributors expect their 
dollars to translate into outcomes aside from the candidate’s electoral success, even if 
judicial partiality is not one of them (Nicholson & Nicholson, 1994). Even candidates 
who run unopposed are recipients of substantial contributions (Nicholson & Weiss, 1986). 
Lawyers engage in these questionable tactics to “level the playing field” as other lawyers 
are likely to attempt to gain favor from judges (Siciliano, 1991). Candidates themselves 
are actively involved in this quid pro quo scenario as judicial candidates “[craft] 
messages that signal to the contributors that the candidates are willing to provide what the 
donors want in exchange for their money” (Barnhizer, 2001). 
Judges often favor campaign donors who appear before them in court. Elected 
judges are 12% more likely to favor business groups who donated campaign funds 
compared to judges selected by other means (Kang & Shepherd, 2011). When the 
magnitude of the contribution difference increases, so, too, does the likelihood the donor 
will be favored by the supported judge (McLeod, 2008). Cann (2007) compared the 
Supreme Court of Georgia’s decisions in 2003 against the contributions made to the 
Court’s justices and concluded that a mere contribution of $2,000 basically secured the 
outcome of a case so long as the other attorney contributed no more than the average 
donation (between $145 and $260).  
The ability to buy judge-made policy is not truly an issue if we accept the 
argument from legal realists that judges make policy. Although linkages may exist 
between candidates’ donors and how they rule as judges, such known connections do not 
necessarily explain why judges rule in the way that they do. It is entirely possible that 
keenly aware campaign donors contribute to a candidate knowing the candidate’s views 
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and how those views might translate in terms of rulings (Ware, 1999). A pro-business 
judicial candidate may receive a number of donations from business groups, but this does 
not necessarily demonstrate justice being bought. Though it would be “highly premature 
to assert absolutely a direct causal relationship between campaign contributions and 
decisions,” McCall (2003) writes, “perhaps at the very least, it would also be inaccurate 
to treat elected justices as devoid of politically motivated behavior. The results suggest 
that decisions and dollars are related” (p. 330).  
Democratic accountability. Although the task of crafting laws is generally 
associated with the legislature, judges also play a role in the development of policy. This 
role has become more pronounced in recent years as decisions made by judges have more 
impact on the populace now than they did in previous generations. The courts, as Dimino 
(2005) reviewed, have had tremendous effects in how our country approaches societal 
problems stemming from race, family relations, sexual intimacy, criminal justice, tort 
liability, education, elections, and religion. As Schotland (1985) suggested, one only need 
consider controversial rulings regarding criminal, environmental, and school bussing 
issues to have a good idea as to why the public has shown more interest in the judiciary. 
To update Schotland’s suggestion, consider the more recent controversy over tort reform 
in the 1990s, the OJ Simpson murder case, and the Terri Schiavo case, which actually 
prompted the Florida legislature to enact a law countering the court order to remove the 
feeding tube from Schiavo, who was in a persistent vegetative state.   
The political aspect of the judiciary is not lost on the public: 78% of registered 
voters feel that “political” described judges “very well” (34%) or “well” (44%). Despite 
21  
some of the shortcomings with judicial elections (as discussed in the following sections), 
81% of the public is supportive of an elected judiciary (Rottman, 2002). 
Public involvement. Although public participation is the hallmark of a democratic 
society, appointive systems operate on the basis that the public is unable to act in its own 
self-interest. Citizens are indeed unable to adequately monitor the performance of 
specific judges in any “rational or robust way” (Pozen, 2008, p. 293). From this 
perspective, public participation is not desirable, as the public is unable to select the 
candidate who will better serve the public’s interest. Limiting the public’s involvement 
with the selection process, therefore, is essential to ensuring a functioning judiciary. On 
the other hand, appointive systems eliminate the public’s involvement in a political 
institution that is directly involved in the policymaking process, which is antithetical to 
democracy.   
Merit selection systems face similar criticism as they can create the appearance of 
favoritism as an elite set of individuals (or simply the governor) has the power to choose 
who is to become judge. The common criticism, “a judge is a lawyer who has a politician 
for a friend,” (Troutman, 2008, p. 1762) may be an especially appropriate description of 
such selection systems. The role of the elites in the nomination and selection process 
raises a number of concerns, including: (a) “panel-loading” (i.e., stacking the list of 
nominees so that it is clear which one the governor will select with the inclusion of others 
for “window-dressing”), (b) “panel-rigging” (i.e., creating a list of nominees with no real 
viable nominee, e.g., including one political friend of the governor, one enemy of the 
governor, and one from an opposing party), and (c) “panel-wiring” (i.e., the governor’s 
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preferences are relayed to commissioners and a panel is created based around those 
preferences) (Sobocinski, 2006). 
Elections, on the other hand, enhance judicial legitimacy as they remind the 
public that political institutions, including state courts, are accountable to them (Gibson, 
Gottfried, Delli Carpini, & Jamieson, 2011). Voters, it seems, are capable of holding 
current judges accountable for as a state’s murder rate rises, incumbent judges are more 
likely to be voted out of office (Streb & Frederick, 2008). However, judicial elections 
face a number of bleak political realities.   
Voters do not receive adequate amounts of information about judicial candidates, 
and thus many simply do not participate in judicial elections. Johnson, Shaefer, and 
McKnight (1978) found that less than 15% of the people they surveyed could even recall 
the name of one candidate for the state supreme court or court of criminal appeals. In 
uncontested elections, this figure fell between 2.5% and 4.9% depending on the state. 
Voters, according to Rottman (2002), simply do not have an adequate amount of 
information about judicial candidates, which is why they do not participate in judicial 
elections. Nearly half of those surveyed reported having only a little information (35%) 
or no information at all (14%) concerning judicial candidates. The most common reason 
cited for not participating in judicial elections was not having enough information about 
the candidates (cited by 18% of those surveyed). 
Ballot roll-off (i.e., voters abstaining from casting votes in specific electoral 
contests despite coming out to the polls) is a common feature of most judicial contests. 
Between 1980 and 2000, ballot roll-off for state supreme court elections averaged 
anywhere from as low as 6.3% to as high as 59.2% depending on the state. Roll-off is the 
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result of both voter fatigue (in the case of ballots that contain a great number of electoral 
contests) and lack of information about the candidates. Voter participation levels in 
retention elections are dismal, falling well below the rates associated with both partisan 
and nonpartisan elections (Dubois, 1979b). Ballot roll-off across states that held major 
trial court retention elections between 1964-1984 averaged anywhere from 31.9% to 
41.9% (W.K. Hall & Aspin, 1987).  
Voters in state supreme court elections frequently cite “general impressions” of 
the candidate as their primary reason for casting ballots for a specific candidate (Hojnacki 
& Baum, 1992a). Voting cues are also gleaned from the ballots themselves. In partisan 
contests, party labels that appear next to judicial candidate’s names decrease roll-off 
(Dubois, 1979a).   
In the absence of partisan labels, voters may obtain partisan information from 
other sources. Labor unions, for instance, are capable of providing substitute information 
to union members in nonpartisan races (Hojnacki & Baum, 1992b). Though limited to 
California’s Superior Court, occupational labels (three-word designations that appear on 
ballots that describe the candidate’s occupation, such as “Businessman, Farmer, 
Legislator”) serve as a powerful source of information for voters, often providing more of 
a benefit to candidates than increased campaign spending (Dubois, 1984).  
Name recognition also serves as a powerful influence. Candidates who share a 
name with another famous politician or citizen are likely to see a boost in their overall 
vote share (Schotland, 1985). A candidate’s name may be used as an indicator of the 
office-seeker’s gender, race, and ethnicity (Matson & Fine, 2006). Female candidates 
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tend to be perceived as more ideologically liberal than male candidates of the same 
political party; voters who hold this perception vote accordingly (McDermott, 1997).   
The “friends and neighbors” effect is also prevalent in retention elections as 
voters in such elections typically come from the judge’s home county. Although friends 
and neighbors are more likely to vote than those outside of the judge’s home county (roll-
off rates in home county elections are 24% compared to 32% in non-home county 
elections), they are not more likely to vote the affirmative (Aspin & W.K. Hall, 1987). 
Thielemann (1993) refers to this phenomenon as the “friends and enemies” effect 
wherein supporters and opponents are activated by the presence of a home county 
candidate. 
Candidate quality. As judges are involved in the policymaking process, states 
may desire a judiciary whose members reflect the diversity of interests found within the 
general public. There appears to be some support for the notion that elected 
representatives, taken together, should reflect the demographic makeup of the populace 
(particularly in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity) (Solimine, 2002). Justice Clarence 
Thomas noted the “intuitive” appeal of representatives proportionally reflective of the 
electorate (“Holder v. Hall,” 1994). However, the US District Court Northern District of 
Georgia concluded that the judiciary was not a “representative body” in Stokes v. Fortson 
(1964). The district judges concluded,  
Judges … are not representatives in same sense as are legislators or the executive. 
Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular 
constituency.  Moreover there is no way to harmonize selection of these officials 
on a pure population standard with the diversity in type and number of cases 
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which will arise in various localities, or with the varying abilities of judges and 
prosecutors to dispatch the business of the courts. An effort to apply a population 
standard to the judiciary, would, in the end, fall of its own weight. (p. 577)  
Regardless, the diversity of the court is a pressing concern for many scholars (e.g., Casey, 
2010).   
The interest in a diverse court stems from the notion that a diverse government 
would ideally reflect the needs and interests of the diverse public. This holds true for the 
judiciary as judicial decision-making is influenced by the judges’ background 
characteristics and experiences (Epstein, Knight, & Martin, 2003). Women are expected 
to be more sensitive to legal issues that men do not face as frequently (e.g., sexual 
harassment) (Williams, 2007). Likewise, we can expect that judges of diverse racial and 
ethnic backgrounds are similarly sensitive to issues that are more salient for people of 
varying racial and ethnic backgrounds.  
However, whether a diverse court system enhances perceived institutional 
legitimacy remains to be seen. Both women and racial/ethnic minorities have lower levels 
of institutional support for state courts (Cann & Yates, 2008), which might be explained 
by a perceived lack of representation in the state courts. However, the evidence regarding 
the public’s desire for a “representative” judiciary does not support such conclusions. 
Across different levels of knowledge of the judiciary, voters remain “undecided” when it 
comes to the notion that more ethnic and racial minorities should serve on the bench 
(Lovrich, Sheldon, & Wasmann, 1988).   
 Overall, research suggests women’s representation in state courts of last resort has 
increased in the past few decades. In 1980, less than 3% of justice positions on state 
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courts of last resort were held by women; in 1993, this figure was closer to 15% (Alozie, 
1996). When women run for intermediate appellate court judgeships, they often perform 
better than male candidates (particularly in open seat contests) (Frederick & Streb, 2008). 
However, when compared to men, women candidates do have some disadvantages, most 
notably in their bids for reelection. Female judges may not, as Reid (2004) suggests, be 
able to use their incumbency status to pave the way for electoral success. Reid’s (2004) 
examination of district court races between 1994 and 1998 found that women incumbents, 
on average, received 51.91% of the overall vote, whereas their male incumbent 
counterparts gained a slightly higher percentage (52.84%) despite the fact that female 
incumbents were far better fundraisers (total receipts for female incumbents averaged 
$31,584 compared to $28,647 – the average total receipts from male incumbents). 
Although the trend suggests greater representation for women in the judiciary, only one-
third of judicial candidates in 2007-2008 were women; men continue to dominate judicial 
elections (Casey, 2010). 
On the other hand, few judges and candidates for judicial office are members of 
racial or ethnic minority groups. Although African Americans have gained representation 
in state courts of last resort (comprising 9% of all state supreme court justices), members 
of other racial and ethnic minorities are greatly underrepresented relative to the general 
population (American Bar Association, 2010). Casey’s (2010) analysis of all state 
judicial elections from 2007-2008 showed that only one out of every eight judicial 
candidates were members of a racial or ethnic minority group.   
Supporters of appointive or merit selection systems claim qualified individuals 
may be more inclined to seek a judicial position as the problems with politics are 
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diminished (if not entirely removed) within such systems. The time and money 
requirements to reach office are reduced or removed; candidates for appointment or 
selection are (ideally) judged on their professional experiences and record rather than 
their campaigns. Appointive systems draw upon eligible candidates for judicial office, a 
much larger pool than those who are eligible and willing to run for office, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of selecting the most highly qualified for office. The 
opportunities for women and minorities to reach the bench are also greater under non-
elective systems (Sanders, 1995).   
Electoral competition. Aside from the quality of candidates recruited through 
elective systems, accountability can be conceptualized as the product of electoral 
competition with the presence of challengers as one empirical indicator. Contestation, at 
least in state supreme court elections, increased from 1980 to 2000: at least three of every 
four incumbents faced challengers when seeking reelection. Relative to the US House of 
Representatives, state supreme court seats are competitive in terms of the incumbent 
defeat rate (M.G. Hall, 2007).   
Although elections for positions on state courts of last resort are often competitive, 
contests at lower levels of the judiciary may be less so. Solimine (2002) notes that though 
races for Ohio Supreme Court are highly competitive, races for lower courts in the state 
are often uncontested. Fewer than half of the races for courts of appeals and trial courts 
include more than one candidate and those that are contested are mostly open seat races. 
Re-election rates for incumbents facing challengers are high. Incumbent judges in the 
lower courts of Ohio boast an 80% electoral success rate.   
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Another influence over competitiveness is the impact of incumbency. The 
presence of an incumbent judge on the ballot in both major and minor trial courts greatly 
inhibits the likelihood of challengers entering the race (Volcansek, 1981). Advantages 
enjoyed by incumbents may discourage potential opposition from entering the race. First 
and foremost, incumbents have a clear advantage when it comes to fundraising (Bonneau, 
2007a). However, in the case of courts of last resort, compared to challenger spending, 
incumbent spending is less effective at securing votes. That said, challengers must 
outspend incumbents to overcome a number of non-monetary advantages incumbents 
possess (e.g., name recognition, existing connections to campaign donors, etc.) (Bonneau, 
2007b; Bonneau & Cann, 2011). Although incumbents may have higher visibility, 
recognition is not necessarily an asset to their campaigns for reelection, as being well 
known does not mean that the judge is subsequently well liked (or supported).  
A third influence over competitiveness stems from whether or not the election is 
partisan. A higher proportion of partisan elections are competitive compared to 
nonpartisan elections. Between 1980 and 1994, 61.1% of partisan elections featured 
challengers, whereas only 44.2% of nonpartisan elections did (M.G., 2001). Partisan 
contests may feature more contested elections as political parties desire a presence in 
elections.  
Judges facing retention are rarely unsuccessful. Between 1964 and 1994, a mere 
50 judges (1.3% of the 3,912 who stood for retention during this time period) were 
defeated (Aspin, W.K. Hall, Bax, & Montoya, 2000). The public, it appears, is largely 
unwilling to cast “no” votes in retention elections because of the uncertainty of who 
might be appointed to take the place of the current sitting judge. A slightly less-than-
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mediocre judge might end up being replaced by a foul, nefarious one. As Geyh (2003) 
noted, when it comes to retention elections, “there is no choice to make between 
competing candidates or viewpoints, no race to follow, no opportunity to pick a new 
winner, and no political party to support” (Geyh, 2003, p. 55).   
The Enduring Pervasiveness of Judicial Elections 
 As of 2012, 43 states require at least some of those who seek a judgeship or seek 
to retain judicial office to face the electorate in partisan, nonpartisan, or retention 
elections (American Judicature Society, 2012)4. The pervasiveness of direct popular 
involvement in the selection and retention of judges does not, however, extend beyond 
America’s borders. In fact, America is the only advanced democracy that elects a 
significant portion of its judiciary (Pozen, 2008).  
Although groups, such as the ABA, notable politicians, and several states have 
been vocal in their opposition to the practice, attempts to replace elective systems have 
failed in many states, including South Dakota, Florida, Michigan, and Louisiana, which 
had considered constitutional amendments to implement merit selection in 1997, 1999, 
and 2003 (Streb & Frederick, 2007). Those who have the opportunity to select and/or 
retain judges prefer to keep it that way despite the flaws associated with elective systems.  
Regardless, direct public involvement in the selection or retention of judges is 
likely to remain popular, given the historically slow pace with judicial selection reforms. 
The effort to do away with judicial elections stretches back to Roscoe Pound’s 1906 
milestone speech, which outlined several causes for the public’s dissatisfaction with the 
                                                        4 States where the public is not directly involved in the selection and/or retention of any 
and all state judges include:  Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Virginia. 
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courts, including public opinion’s influence in the administration of justice. Roy 
Schotland (1998), a critic of contemporary judicial campaigns, laments: “one would 
hardly suspect that more sweat and ink have been spent on getting rid of judicial elections 
than on any other single subject in the history of American law” (p. 150). And yet, here 
we are over a century after Pound’s speech, with many states continuing the often-
criticized, yet ever-popular tradition of selecting or retaining judges by election. 
As discussed in the following chapter, judicial campaigns have changed in the 
past few decades, which calls into question how well systems that require judicial 
candidates and judges to rely on the public to gain and maintain office balance judicial 
independence and democratic accountability. Rather than being “unremarkable, quiet, 
dignified affairs” (Caufield, 2007, p. 36), campaigns for judicial office have become 
“noisier, nastier, and costlier” (Schotland, 1985, p. 76). Campaign costs have skyrocketed, 
campaign messages have become more politically charged, negative advertising is 
becoming more and more commonplace, and external groups have become more 
influential in the selection of judges. Judicial independence is threatened as a result of 
these so-called “new-style” campaigns and therefore the institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary is jeopardized. 
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Chapter Three 
New-Style Judicial Campaigns 
Judicial campaigns have not been without their fair share of controversy over the 
years. Shortly after Kentucky adopted judicial elections in the 19th century, the 
commonwealth bore witness to a string of some of the most controversial contests. 
Thomas F. Hargis’ three attempts at securing judicial office were plagued by distasteful 
campaign tactics. Hargis’ opponents accused him of bribing judicial convention delegates, 
manipulating judicial records, and dishonorably refusing a challenge to duel (for shame!) 
(Ireland, 1995).   
The most common concerns over contemporary judicial campaigns state that 
judicial elections have become bitter battles, featuring potentially harmful candidate 
speech, greater involvement from non-candidate groups (e.g., political parties and interest 
groups), and escalating campaign expenses. During in the latter half of the 21st century, 
scholars began investigating a number of emerging trends, including the escalating costs 
of campaigning (Dubois, 1986a, 1986b; Schotland, 1985) and changes in campaign 
communications (Gary, 1981; Kiovsky, 1986). Critics express concern that “costly, 
intense, politicized” judicial campaigns erode the public’s goodwill toward state courts 
(Cann & Yates, 2008). New-style campaigns occur primarily in contests for appellate 
courts, including state supreme courts and other courts of last resort (Champagne, 2002a). 
It is unclear whether contests for lower courts exhibit similar qualities. Although legal 
scholars and organizations (e.g., the American Bar Association, the Brennan Center for 
Justice, and the Justice at Stake Campaign) have expressed concern over the diffusion of 
new-style judicial campaigns, empirical evidence is lacking in several key areas. 
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Communication Methods   
In order for candidates to be successful, they must communicate with the public. 
This can be accomplished through three different channels: earned (“free”) media (e.g., 
news media coverage), paid media (promotional communications such as television 
advertising), and direct communications (e.g., direct mail and door-to-door campaigning).   
Earned (“free”) media. News media organizations provide voters with crucial 
information about candidates and contests. Media enhance democratic accountability by 
informing the public. The more voters know about the candidates for office, the more 
likely they are to participate in the election (Hojnacki & Baum, 1992). Media can also 
affect the public’s perception of the judiciary by acting as a “watchdog” over candidate 
malfeasance in office and during the campaign. 
 The 2000 Ohio Supreme Court election demonstrates the role journalism can have 
in judicial elections. Citizens for a Strong Ohio, an interest group funded by anonymous 
donors, aired several misleading ads that suggested incumbent Justice Resnick was biased 
and claimed she reversed a verdict due to the desires of her campaign donors. The ads 
were extremely deceptive, but Ohio’s laws barred Resnick from discussing previous court 
decisions, so she was unable to adequately respond to the mischaracterizations. Although 
weekly and alternative publications failed to cover this contentious race (only 12 out of 
300, or 4%, published editorial commentaries about the race), daily papers published a 
number of editorials focused on the ads that were running in the state (64.7% of all 
editorials discussed controversial television ads). Opinion pieces frequently described the 
ads as “unfair” (48% of all articles related to the campaign or election); however, few 
articles discussed the high cost of the ads (20.6%), the anonymous nature of the source of 
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funds for the ads (32.4%), or possible reform efforts (11.8%) (Hendrickson & Hale, 
2004). After a series of hearings, the Ohio Elections Commission disciplined Citizens for 
a Strong Ohio for the content of the ads (Ohio Elections Commission, 2005). 
For the most part, judicial contests receive almost no coverage. The average 
campaign for state supreme court between 2000 and 2004 was covered in less than 10 
stories – about 8 times less than the amount of stories devoted to races for the U.S. Senate 
(Schaffner & Diascro, 2007). Unfortunately, even when races received attention, the 
coverage was less than ideal. A significant portion of stories (24.4%) appeared on the 
editorial page. Most news stories were not prominently featured (58.6% did not appear on 
the front page or first section) and the contests were not the focal point for a number of 
stories (39.2%). The majority of stories focused on who was likely to win or lose (78.8% 
of stories) rather than any substantive information about the candidates (48.5% of stories).   
There are a number of reasons judicial elections fail to generate significant news 
coverage. First, judicial candidates must compete for newspaper space alongside other 
candidates in other contests. Second, mass consolidation of news organizations has 
resulted in far less attention paid to local news, including elections (Schaffner & Diascro, 
2007). Lastly, the number of reporters and editors employed by news organizations has 
decreased in recent years as a result of diminishing revenues, which have also limited the 
capacity for organizations to publish enterprise or investigative stories. Instead, 
journalists focus on covering staged events, press releases, and advertisements (Schaffner 
& Diascro, 2007). This is particularly problematic in the case of judicial candidates as 
they face speech restrictions unique to the judiciary that prevent them from campaigning 
in the same manner as their legislative and executive counterparts. However, as speech 
  34  
restrictions are loosening (discussed later in this chapter), candidates are positioned to 
generate more coverage (Rottman & Schotland, 2005).  
Candidates can use a number of techniques to improve their chances of receiving 
coverage. Not all publicity is good publicity, though. In order to gain coverage, 
candidates submit press releases, inform correspondents of their campaign schedule, 
invite correspondents to campaign events, solicit and plan interviews, and participate in 
debates. Unlike paid advertisements and some forms of direct communications, 
candidates have limited control over the content of earned media. Candidates who find 
themselves embroiled in scandal can expect greater news coverage, though it will not be 
to their liking.   
Both the volume and nature of press attention to a campaign affect the 
relationship between candidates and the news media. Candidates who feel that the media 
are against them, as many Republican candidates do (Herrnson, 1994), may become 
cynical of their chances of reaching office and may forego future bids for election, 
removing qualified candidates from the pool of potential judges. A candidate who 
receives minimal press coverage may find running against a well-known incumbent 
difficult, if not impossible, and choose to forgo any attempt at running for office. Thus, it 
is important to understand judicial candidates’ perspectives regarding the news media. 
We therefore pose the following research question: 
RQ1: How important is the news media for judicial candidates? 
 Paid media. Even though candidates for public office frequently use campaign 
advertisements, the public views them as poor information sources. Those who vote in 
judicial elections claim to gain information from rather inexpensive sources including 
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voter guides, friends and family members, recommendations from attorneys, results of 
various bar association polls, newspaper editorials, meetings with the candidates, door-to-
door contacts with the candidates, and small neighborhood meetings (Bonneau, 2005). 
Despite such reports, paid media are crucial for candidates attempting to reach a large 
audience. 
 Candidates’ use of television advertising draws attention to judicial campaigns 
but the content of ads raises a number of concerns. As Brandenburg and Schotland (2008) 
note, “TV ads are as likely to educate voters about judicial qualifications as they are to 
provide nutritional information about french [sic] fries” (pp. 1241-1242). Carrington 
(1998) offers a similar critique: 
The political advertisement inserted into commercial television reaches large 
audiences of persons who are not seeking political information and are in an 
uncritical frame of mind. If well done with art, music, and a voice sounding like 
Walter Cronkite, the advertised message ‘melts down’ so that the viewer 
assimilates disinformation without being aware of its source. (p. 81)  
Besides being devoid of substantive information, television ads are often criticized for 
misrepresenting facts and preying upon voters’ fears. Proponents of judicial selection 
reform reference a long line of television ads from judicial campaigns going back to the 
1980s to demonstrate the need for comprehensive campaign reform (Brandenburg & 
Schotland, 2008). 
Television is a useful medium for relaying visual information to large audiences. 
Images can carry strong emotional appeals and can have a powerful impact compared to 
plain text (Herrnson, 1994). Aside from visual information conveyed in ads, candidates 
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also like television advertising as it allows for a high degree of control over the message 
content. However, due to the high cost of television ads, campaigns may settle on less 
attractive ad purchases, such as pre-emptible ads and ads airing during off-peak times.   
Television ads are often a necessity for campaigns for appellate and supreme 
court judgeships (Abbe & Herrnson, 2002). “The formula is simple,” Honorable Pamela 
Willis Baschab (2002) writes, “Money = T.V. ads = name recognition = election victory” 
(p. 829).  Although her formula is an oversimplification, there is a pattern of high 
margins of victory in areas where televised ads are used (Champagne, 2002b).  
It is no surprise then that television advertising has become commonplace in 
judicial elections. Although only 4 states witnessed TV ads for judicial candidates in 
2000, in 2004, ads ran in 15 states, 10 of which saw them for the first time (Rottman & 
Schotland, 2005). The increase in the presence of TV ads has driven up the cost of 
campaigning for judicial office. Figure 3.1 shows the dramatic increase in campaign costs 
since 1989. Though there are fluctuations depending on the year of the election, the 
overall trend is upward. Between 2000 and 2009, a total of 537 candidates for state 
supreme court raised over $206 million for their campaigns. This figure represents more 
than twice the amount of funds raised between 1990 and 1999. Of the 22 states that 
choose to elect their supreme court judges, 20 saw record spending between 2000 and 
2010 (Sample, et al., 2010; Skaggs, et al., 2011).  
Candidates are required to raise tremendous amounts of contributions to support 
their media-driven campaigns. As Figure 3.2 shows, television ads make up a substantial 
expenditure for campaigns; within this past decade, $93.6 million was spent on 214,105 
airings (Sample, et al., 2010; Skaggs, et al., 2011). This trend is continuing as over $29.7 
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Figure 3.1. Aggregate State Supreme Court Fundraising, 1989-2012. 
 
Note. Data compiled from Sample, et al. (2010), Skaggs, et al. (2011), and Bannon et al. 
(2012). 
 
Figure 3.2. TV Spending in State Supreme Court Races, 2000-2010. 
  
Note. Data compiled from Sample, et al. (2010), Skaggs, et al. (2011), and Bannon et al. 
(2012). 
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million was spent on television ads in state supreme court races in 2012, breaking the 
previous single-year record of $19.9 million set in 2008. Interest groups and political 
parties accounted for 61.4% ($20.7 million) of television ad expenditures in these races. 
In 2011-12, interest groups alone accounted for $15.4 million spent in judicial elections, 
up substantially from the $9.8 million spent in 2003-04 (Bannon et al., 2012). Television 
spending during primary elections totaled more than $7 million, and for the first time, ads 
supportive of judges standing for retention aired in Florida and Oklahoma (Bannon et al., 
2012).  
Escalating judicial campaign costs are a concern due to the source of campaign 
contributions. The increased need for campaign funds has, according to Brandenburg and 
Schotland (2008), “left judges feeling trapped in a bad system, forced to raise money 
from the attorneys and parties appearing before them, and constantly looking over their 
shoulder at interest groups and their demands” (pp. 1239-1240). Candidates who accept 
campaign contributions from parties with close connections with the courts weaken the 
judiciary’s institutional legitimacy; the public is none too keen on candidates accepting 
contributions from parties who could no doubt shape the judge’s decision-making process 
(Gibson, 2008b, 2009; Gibson & Caldeira, 2012). 
Other forms of paid media advertising, such as radio and newspaper advertising, 
are also popular means to distribute campaign messages. Radio is relatively inexpensive 
and can reach narrowly targeted segments of the electorate as stations are designed to 
attract smaller, more homogenous audiences relative to broadcast television audiences. 
Newspaper advertising generates a larger reach compared to radio and newspaper readers 
are more likely to vote than audiences for other media (Herrnson, 1994). In 1999, both 
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radio and newspaper ads have been popular with low- and high-spending candidates 
(using $50,000 as the defining threshold) for state legislative offices. Radio ads were 
used by 44% of low-spending candidates and 67% of high-spending candidates. 
Newspaper ads were more popular; 70% of low-spenders and 74% of high-spenders used 
them in their campaigns (Faucheux & Herrnson, 1999). 
Given the challenges these media have faced recently (e.g., decreasing revenues, 
consolidation, and smaller audiences), candidates may be less likely to purchase ads in 
the traditional mass media, and those that do may find them to be less effective than they 
were in the past. However, given their continued use among those likely to vote 
advertising in traditional media may still be an attractive option for judicial candidates.  
Direct communications. Other campaign communications are more direct in 
nature (e.g., direct mailings, mass telephone calls, etc.). Although paid media advertising 
offers candidates a high degree of control, direct communications vary in terms of the 
control candidates have in terms of the content of their messages. Some forms maintain a 
high degree of control (e.g., yard signs, campaign literature, direct mailings, and 
websites), whereas others open the door for more interactive, less tightly controlled 
communications (e.g., debates, pages on social networking sites, and door-to-door 
campaigning).   
Traditional direct communication techniques include direct mail, distributing 
campaign literature (e.g., pamphlets), telephone calls, billboards, yard signs, and door-to-
door campaigning. Although direct mail and campaign literature can be effective at 
soliciting both campaign donations and votes (Herrnson, 1994), it is less image-based 
than television advertising and it is more likely to be tossed aside as “junk mail.” 
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Telephone calls can be used by campaigns to gather information about voters and 
mobilize supporters through providing up-to-date information about campaign events. 
Billboards and yard signs can be an inexpensive way to gain name recognition in a 
community, though they face space limitations and are unable to carry in-depth, lengthy 
messages. Direct person-to-person campaign communications are more effective at 
political persuasion, though they are also the most time- and labor-intensive. Although 
relatively inexpensive, such communications require an army of volunteers capable of 
canvassing entire communities (Herrnson, 1994). Regardless, candidates for lower level 
offices frequently use and recognize such inexpensive, direct communications as 
important campaign methods (Abbe & Herrnson, 2002). In the late 1990s, direct mail, 
literature drops, and billboards and signs were the most popular campaigning methods for 
state legislative candidates, with more than 70% of candidates employing such methods 
(Faucheux & Herrnson, 1999). 
Candidates may be more willing to engage in less expensive, contemporary 
communications media, such as the Web, e-mail, or social networking sites as “modern 
information technology allows judicial candidates to deliver vast amounts of information 
to a rapidly growing segment of the electorate, free of economic or strategic constraints” 
(Iyengar, 2002, pp. 698-699). In the past, candidates for lower level offices found 
websites to be important components of their campaign (Abbe & Herrnson, 2002), 
though given the rise of social media, static “broadcast-style” websites may be less 
important for modern campaigns. 
New media provide both a number of opportunities and drawbacks. Websites can 
provide information about candidates and include more image-based communications 
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than traditional direct communications. E-mail can be used in a similar manner as direct 
mailings and telephone calls by issuing timely information and action alerts. Social media 
sites can be used to not only mobilize supporters through providing information about 
campaign events, but also as a means to interact with the public, though candidates may 
not desire time-intensive interactions with a lower degree of control over content 
(Stromer-Galley, 2006). However, judicial candidates may be more eager than other 
candidates to use new media due to the inexpensive nature of such communications. 
Given the changes in the available means by which candidates can disseminate 
messages amongst the public and the dearth of knowledge regarding contemporary 
judicial campaign communications, the following research questions are advanced: 
RQ2a: What campaign communication methods do judicial candidates use? 
RQ2b: How effective do judges consider various campaign communications media? 
RQ3:  How do candidates select which campaign communication methods to use? 
Campaign Messages   
Judicial candidates have typically stressed their qualifications for office (e.g., 
education, legal experience, etc.) in campaign messages. Campaign promises or 
discussions of “hot button” issues has largely been absent from their campaigns as 
judicial elections are subject to speech regulations. Both the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which outlines ethical behavior for practicing attorneys, and the American 
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC), which applies to the 
judiciary, guide candidates’ behavior on the campaign trail. In the past decade, however, 
deregulation efforts have been successful; judicial candidates are now able to engage in 
(some forms of) speech similar to both legislative and executive candidates. The 
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following section examines these changes and their impact on contemporary judicial 
campaigns. 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In order to preserve the legitimacy of the 
judiciary, states have adopted regulations designed to guide would-be judges’ campaign 
conduct.  Following controversy over the activities of a federal judge, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) established the Canons of Judicial Ethics, a forerunner to the MCJC, 
in 1924. Although the Canons were initially a set of guidelines lacking legal recourse, 
states enacted legislation modeled after the ABA’s Canons complete with sanctions for 
violators. The Canons were left untouched by the ABA until 1972, when the ABA drafted 
the MCJC, which was intentionally created so that states would pattern their own 
regulations based on it. The MCJC was revised in 1990 to provide explicit guidelines for 
both judges and judicial candidates alike (Carwile, 2007). The Code has since seen a raft 
of revisions; it was amended in 1997, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2010 (American Bar 
Association, 2011). Although the majority of Canons deal with current judges, the MCJC 
has included a number of provisions concerning judicial candidates, including the now 
defunct Announce Clause, the Pledges or Promises Clause, the (Appear to) Commit 
Clause (which was combined with the Pledges or Promises Clause in 2003), the 
Misrepresentation Clause, and other regulations concerning partisan political activities 
and solicitation of campaign funds. 
The Announce Clause. Since 1924, judicial candidates have been barred from 
announcing their views on disputed policy issues. The 1972 version of the MCJC 
contained a provision that prohibited candidates for judicial office from “[announcing] 
his or her views on disputed legal issues” ("Republican Party of Minnesota v. White," 
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2002). This Clause was removed from the 1990 version of the MCJC, though not every 
state revised their regulations to match the updated MCJC. Minnesota’s Announce Clause, 
maintained well after the 1990 version of the MCJC, led to a U.S. Supreme Court case 
that ultimately invalidated the regulation. 
The Pledges or Promises Clause. The 1972 and 1990 versions of the MCJC 
prohibit judicial candidates from making “pledges or promises” related to their conduct in 
office aside from promising impartial performance. The 2003 version of the Code 
combined this Clause with the (Appear to) Commit Clause.   
The (Appear to) Commit Clause. The (Appear to) Commit Clause, which 
replaced the Announce Clause, explicitly prohibited judicial candidates from making 
“statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court” (American Bar 
Association, 1990). This clause was combined with the Pledges or Promises Clause in 
2003. 
Misrepresentation Clause. According to the 2011 edition of the Code, candidates 
for judicial office are prohibited from “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
make any false or misleading statement” (American Bar Association, 2011). Previous 
versions of the MCJC specifically prohibited candidates from knowingly misrepresenting 
facts concerning themselves or opponents. 
Partisan political activities. The ABA has had guidelines concerning judicial 
candidate’s partisan political activities since 1924. The 2011 edition of the MCJC 
specifies that judicial candidates shall not: (a) “act as a leader in, or hold an office in, a 
political organization,” (b) “make speeches on behalf of a political organization,” (c) 
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“publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for any public office,” (d) “solicit funds for, pay 
an assessment to, or make a contribution to a political organization or a candidate for 
public office,” (e) “attend or purchase tickets for dinners or other events sponsored by a 
political organization or a candidate for public office,” (f) “publicly identify himself or 
herself as a candidate of a political organization,” and (g) “seek, accept, or use 
endorsements from a political organization.” 
Solicitation of campaign funds. Under the MCJC, judicial candidates are 
prohibited from personally soliciting campaign funds. A candidate can, however, 
establish a campaign committee that can solicit contributions on the candidate’s behalf.   
A decade of deregulation. Although the MCJC stayed largely unchanged for 
several decades, states have revised their own regulations in the wake of a number of 
court battles over the Canons. The shortcomings of the Canons, as well as the legal 
challenges and changes, are discussed in the following sections. 
Pre-White criticisms and challenges. Prior to the Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White (2002) (discussed in the following section), several legal scholars (e.g., Burke, 
1993; Carwile, 2007; Colman, 1993; Rowe, 1995; Snyder, 1987) speculated over the 
constitutionality of the Canons given how they restrict political speech, which has been 
traditionally highly valued in American society and protected by the courts. Aside from 
their legality, commentators question the practicality of the Canons. It is difficult for 
candidates to comply with several of the regulations, particularly in partisan elections as 
the mere act of associating oneself with a political organization gives the appearance of a 
candidate implicitly committing to specific politicized issues. Other regulations may not 
go far enough in their goal of protecting the image of the judiciary. Allowing candidates 
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to establish committees to raise campaign funds does little to protect the image of 
candidates as the public does not recognize a distinction between the candidate and the 
committee charged with the task of soliciting campaign contributions (Cameron, 2003). 
 Lastly, the Canons may unintentionally detract from democratic accountability. 
Critics often suggest the restrictions on judicial candidate speech are responsible for the 
failure of judicial elections (i.e., high rates of ballot roll-off, low levels of voter 
knowledge of the candidates, etc.). “Without judicial free speech,” Stott (2009) writes, 
“the electorate cannot accurately choose the best candidate, and the purpose of the 
election is thwarted” (p. 481). Voters, critics argue, have a right to hear what a candidate 
believes is important. As Spargo (2005) notes,  
We as voters do not have the right to hear what a judicial candidate wants to say 
about why he or she wants to be a judge and what they would do if they were 
elected. We get the candidate’s name, rank, and serial number, and maybe a 
photograph of them with their dog, or whatever or whoever they pose with, and 
that is the end of it. (p. 631) 
Kiovsky (1986) offered one of the earliest critiques of campaign speech restrictions, 
suggesting that the regulations assume the public is “politically immature” and that public 
confidence in the judiciary is “too fragile to withstand” the type of speech found in other 
electoral contests.   
These criticisms are not without evidence. Although the majority of judges (64%) 
are satisfied with the amount and type of restrictions on judicial campaign speech, nearly 
one in three feel as though there are “too many restrictions” (Rottman, 2002). Speech 
restrictions not only make it difficult for the candidate to connect to the electorate, but 
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they also limit the extent of news coverage judicial elections receive (Foley, 1995). 
Adding to this, the majority of judges across all levels of the judiciary report that the 
MCJC prevents judges from responding to unfair or misleading criticisms (Rottman, 
2002).  
Incumbent judges may actually prefer speech regulations out of self-interest as 
they prevent challengers from voicing dissent with the incumbent’s previous judicial 
rulings or from stating that they would reach different conclusions in similar cases heard 
before the court (Layman, 2006). It comes as no surprise, then, that challengers are less 
likely to enter electoral contests in states that have regulations similar to the Announce 
Clause, the Pledges or Promises Clause, the (Appear to) Commit Clause, and regulations 
concerning partisan political activities (Peters, 2009). 
Up until 1990, the Canons were largely unchallenged; however, a series of court 
cases culminated in a Supreme Court ruling that has opened the door for greater 
deregulation efforts. One of the first cases in a long line of deregulation efforts involved 
Florida’s Announce Clause, which was found overly broad in 1990. A year later, courts 
in Arkansas and Kentucky found sections of their states’ respective codes similarly 
violated candidates’ First Amendment rights. Likewise, The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board found that both Illinois’s 
Announce Clause and Pledges or Promises Clause failed to strike an acceptable balance 
between a candidate’s right to free speech and the public’s interest in an impartial 
judiciary. However, not all courts have arrived at the same conclusion. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld Pennsylvania’s Announce Clause in Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Board (Besser, 2003). Although a number of cases have dealt with 
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individual state regulations concerning judicial candidate speech, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in White, which invalidated Minnesota’s version of the Announce 
Clause, has caused the most concern for supporters of the Canons.   
The White decision. White stemmed from Gregory Wersal’s campaigns for the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1996 and 1998. During his 1998 campaign, Wersal filed 
suit in Federal District Court, claiming that he was so fearful of violating the state’s 
Announce Clause that he had no other option than to ignore questions from the media and 
the public. The Minnesota Republican Party joined in the suit, noting that due to the legal 
restrictions placed on Wersal, they were unable to learn his views and therefore unable to 
support or oppose his candidacy. Although the District Court held that the Announce 
Clause did not violate the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court saw otherwise. 
Minnesota’s regulation was designed to serve a compelling public interest – 
judicial impartiality. However, the Court took issue with the lack of an adequate 
definition of “impartiality” (not only was a definition absent in the MCJC and 
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct, the previous courts who heard the case also failed 
to provide a definition). The Court considered three potential definitions of impartiality 
(impartiality as the “lack of bias for or against a party before the court,” impartiality as 
the “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view,” and impartiality 
as “open mindedness”) and found Minnesota’s Announce Clause was overbroad or 
underinclusive at serving each definition of impartiality.  Thus, the Court reasoned: 
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…the announce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his views on any 
specific nonfanciful legal question within the province of the court for which he is 
running … [The] announce clause both prohibits speech on the basis of its content 
and burdens a category of speech that is “at the core of our First Amendment 
freedoms” – speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. 
("Republican Party of Minnesota v. White," 2002, pp. 773-774) 
Shockwaves from White. Professional and activist groups, such as the ABA and 
the Justice at Stake Campaign, have decried White, claiming it will provide the basis for 
deregulating judicial campaigns. By removing speech restrictions, they reason, judicial 
campaigns will become similar to the rough and tumble campaigns for high-ranking 
legislative and executive offices. As the former President of the ABA, Robert E. Hirshon, 
argued,  
[White] is a bad decision. It will open up a Pandora’s box. We are now going to 
have judicial candidates running for office by announcing their position on 
particular issues. They will know that the voters will evaluate their performance 
in office on how closely their rulings comport with those positions. (Walsh, 2002, 
p. A10) 
Their concerns are not without merit. Although White was specific to Minnesota’s 
Announce Clause, “the broader message of the decision made clear that the States [sic] 
would need to ensure that their Codes of Judicial Conduct allowed sufficient latitude to 
protect the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates …” (Caufield, 2005, pp. 625-
626). White has indeed paved the way for deregulation efforts; a number of courts have 
turned to the rationale presented in White for guidance in cases involving state 
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restrictions on judicial candidate speech. On remand, the Eighth Circuit en banc 
(sometimes referred to as White II) not only invalidated Minnesota’s Announce Clause, 
but also the state’s prohibitions on partisan activities and personal solicitation of 
campaign contributions.   
Although White was a narrowly defined decision that only dealt with Minnesota’s 
Announce Clause, states reacted by revising their own Codes. Missouri, Pennsylvania, 
Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Florida either revised their 
Codes or issued advisory opinions to clarify the White decision and discuss the 
implications for their own Codes (Caufield, 2005). Other states took the opportunity to 
further remove other canons. Borrowing from Eakins and Swenson (2007), states can be 
grouped into five categories based on their reaction to White: (a) noncompliance (i.e., 
maintained Announce Clause), (b) slow compliance (i.e., removed Announce Clause 
more than two years after White), (c) compliance (i.e., removed Announce Clause within 
two years after White), (d) limited expansion (i.e., removed only their (Appear to) 
Commit Clause or only their (Appear to) Commit Clause and Announce Clause), (e) 
expansion (i.e., removed Pledges or Promises Clause and/or (Appear to) Commit Clause), 
and (f) unresponsive (i.e., maintained (Appear to) Commit Clause or Pledges or Promises 
Clause) (see Table 3.1).   
As Table 3.1 implies, courts have struggled with the constitutionality of campaign 
regulations in the wake of White. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
invalidated two provisions (the Misrepresentation Clause and the prohibition of 
personally soliciting campaign contributions) in Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct in 
Weaver v. Bonner. However, although the District Court in Spargo v. New York State  
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Commission on Judicial Conduct initially found New York’s regulations regarding a 
candidate’s partisan political activity to be overly broad and unconstitutional, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s 
decision (Caufield, 2005). Courts in New York have upheld regulations concerning 
political conduct of judicial candidates and the Pledges or Promises Clause (Brody, 2004).  
Aside from challenges from judicial candidates themselves, interest groups are 
also actively involved in changing regulations concerning judicial elections. The Family 
Trust Foundation, a conservative group based in Lexington, Kentucky, filed a lawsuit in 
Federal District Court over the constitutionality of the state’s (Appear to) Commit Clause. 
The group had distributed an issues questionnaire to judicial candidates but found that 
most candidates declined to complete the questionnaire out of a concern that they would 
be violating Kentucky’s Code of Judicial Conduct. The District Court ruled that the 
Clause was unconstitutional – a decision that was later upheld on appeal (Caufield, 2005). 
Scholars have offered a number of predictions concerning the impact White will 
have on judicial elections. As a result of the potential for contentious elections and 
negative campaigns, the amount of qualified candidates who chose to run for judge might 
diminish. Voter turnout may also decline, as voters may not respond positively to 
aggressive, expensive judicial campaigns. However, few studies demonstrate the types of 
disastrous effects of White that reformers often advance. Bonneau and M.G. Hall (2009) 
found no evidence of fewer challengers in judicial contests following the White decision. 
Likewise, citizen participation has not declined, nor have campaign expenditures 
increased (at least in the two years following the decision). Quality challengers (i.e., 
challengers with previous judicial experience) are not less likely to toss their hats in the 
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ring for state supreme court justice following White (Bonneau, M.G. Hall, & Streb, 2011). 
However, these scholars admit that their findings are limited to the few election cycles 
following White. Their findings are also limited to the few research questions they sought 
to answer (Has electoral contestation and the caliber of candidates decreased since White? 
Have incumbents become more vulnerable? Has campaign spending increased? Has 
ballot roll-off increased?), which reflect only a minority of the concerns over White’s 
effects. 
New-style judicial campaign messages. Although critics of White predict a 
deluge of controversial campaign speech, simply removing campaign speech regulations 
does not necessarily mean candidates will rush out and start engaging in previously 
prohibited speech. Laws are but one force that regulate human behavior; markets, 
architecture (through the physical burdens placed upon us through “real space” and all of 
its objects), and norms also influence human behavior (Lessig, 2006).   
There are number of reasons to expect candidates to refrain from engaging in 
controversial speech. First, the culture of judicial campaigns is one that inherently curtails 
such campaign messages as voters expect different behavior from judicial candidates than 
they do from legislators and executives. Likewise, the culture of the legal community is 
one that promotes professional conduct. Law schools and bar associations instill 
particular values in the legal community that, at least for most judicial candidates, do not 
fade once the campaign begins. Second, some candidates may not understand what is 
now legally allowed in campaigns and may choose to err on the side of caution and avoid 
controversial speech. Lastly, candidates may perceive that the electorate is more attuned 
to traditional campaign speech focused on the candidate’s qualifications for office.   
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Despite these reasons, the professionalization of contemporary judicial campaigns 
remains a concern. Campaign consultants are commonly criticized for encouraging and 
promoting negative campaign tactics. Francia and Herrnson’s (2007) survey of 2,946 
candidates for state and local offices (10% of whom ran for judicial office) found that 
candidates who hire professional campaign consultants are more likely to find negative 
campaign tactics acceptable, particularly if they are in uncompetitive contests. That said, 
few judicial candidates for lower office (25%) have paid campaign staff and most (62%) 
refrain from hiring campaign consultants (Arbour & McKenzie, 2010). It is unclear 
whether candidates in more recent elections turn to professionals for campaign advice or 
how candidates develop their campaign communications. Therefore, the following 
research question is put forward:  
RQ4: How do candidates develop campaign messages? 
Although some forms of judicial campaign speech are thought to decrease 
institutional legitimacy, empirical evidence is minimal and conflicting. To date, James 
Gibson’s vignette experiments appear to be the only investigations undertaken to take on 
the task of testing the impact campaign speech has on the judiciary’s legitimacy. 
Likewise, little is known regarding if and how candidates incorporate negative speech in 
their own campaigns. 
Policy talk. Gibson (2008b) tested a number of experimental vignettes and their 
influence over Kentuckians’ perceptions of the judiciary. Within each vignette, different 
aspects were manipulated, such as whether the candidate accepted or rejected campaign 
contributions, made policy statements, or used attack ads (see Appendix A for exact 
wording of vignettes). Although accepting campaign contributions from both litigants 
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and interest groups and using attack ads decreased the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy, 
communications related to the candidate’s policy views or specific policy commitments 
did not appear to influence the public’s perception of the judiciary’s legitimacy.  
Gibson (2009) replicated this experiment using a nationally representative sample 
and found similar results: policy talk of any form did not detract from the judiciary’s 
perceived legitimacy. Further analysis, however, revealed that policy talk decreases the 
judiciary’s legitimacy in states that do not elect or retain judges through elections. 
Respondents with no experience with judicial campaigns are more likely to find both 
statements that reveal the candidate’s views on policy and policy promises objectionable 
and therefore call into question the fairness and impartiality of the courts. 
Although Gibson’s work suggests that judicial candidates can speak their minds 
without significant consequences, the vignettes used by Gibson (2008b, 2009) may not 
accurately reflect real policy talk and commitments, thereby making the validity of the 
manipulations suspect. The key language used in the vignettes (“He promises that, if re-
elected, he will decide [cases involving abortion, lawsuit abuse, and the use of the death 
penalty] in the way that most people in Kentucky/[State] want them decided.”) is not 
consistent with the types of communications feared to detract from institutional 
legitimacy. The vignettes do not specify the candidate’s particular views on these issues. 
This is entirely different from a candidate expressing her specific views on abortion (i.e., 
labeling herself “pro-choice” or “pro-life”). It is possible that if the manipulation had 
included such language, some respondents (particularly those with opposing views) 
would question the impartiality of the judge.   
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Gibson (2008a) addressed these concerns by revising the vignettes and testing 
them with another sample of Kentuckians (see Appendix A for the exact wording of the 
revised survey questions). Surprisingly, the majority of the study’s participants with 
“cold feelings” toward abortion activists (51.4%) believed a judge who issues a statement 
saying the constitution grants abortion rights could rule in an abortion case in a fair and 
impartial manner. However, a judge who says, “I will change abortion law” was 
evaluated much more critically by respondents with “cold” and “warm” feelings toward 
pro-abortion activists (of which, only 35% and 36.9% respectively felt the judge could 
remain fair and impartial in an abortion case). Thus, a judge relaying her constitutional 
ideology is less threatening to the legitimacy of the judiciary than specific policy 
promises, leading Gibson to conclude, “…it seems that relatively small differences in 
campaign statements can have significant consequences for public assessments of judges 
and the judiciary” (p. 911). 
General policy-related announcements may come dangerously close to policy 
commitments, which are still prohibited in many states. Securing desirable endorsements 
from political groups, such as the National Rifle Association, can be tricky as such 
groups routinely ask candidates policy-oriented questions that could run afoul of state 
regulations. A seemingly simple question such as, “As a judge, would you uphold the 
rights of gun owners?” asks candidates – beyond merely announcing their views – to 
commit to a particular viewpoint.   
It is unclear as to whether candidates, across all levels of the judiciary, are 
focusing on issue positions. Prior to White, Abbe and Herrnson (2002) found issue 
positions were a component of many judicial campaigns in the 1998 elections (15.9% of 
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trial court campaigns and 21.7% of appellate and supreme court campaigns), though few 
candidates (8%) reported that such messages were the primary focus of their campaign. 
Following White, Arbour and McKenzie (2010) found candidates for lower courts in 
2008 were far less concerned with emphasizing issue-based themes; a mere 5% of 
candidates included such campaign messages.   
Aside from ascertaining how frequently candidates emphasize issue positions in 
their campaigns, it is also important to investigate what issues candidates stress. Weiss 
(2006) suggests the media encourage candidates to focus campaign messages on crime in 
response to public fears stoked by heavy media focus on violent crime. As television 
viewers, particularly heavy viewers, adopt the ultra-violent reality presented on the 
screen (Gerbner & Gross, 1976), judicial candidates must focus their campaigns on being 
“tough on crime” to gain traction with voters. Arbour and McKenzie (2011) found court 
administration issues or crime and sentencing issues were the predominant theme 
reported by 57% of lower court candidates in 2008. 
Historically, candidates have preferred to focus on their own experience and 
qualifications rather than issue positions. Prior to White, candidates for state supreme 
court in 1996 reported that their campaigns focused on their qualifications for office, 
family values, endorsements, as well as crime (Minzner, 1999). The picture does not 
seem to have changed much in recent years. Candidates report that experience and 
qualifications for office were the dominant theme for over half (51%) of the lower court 
campaigns in the 2008 election cycle (Arbour & McKenzie, 2010). Depending on the 
election cycle, candidates may or may not be more willing to discuss controversial issues 
and issues related to crime. Therefore, the following research question is posed: 
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RQ5: How do judicial candidates address issue positions in their campaigns? 
Negative campaigning. If maintaining the integrity of the judiciary is desirable, 
scholars should take note of negative campaigning as such ads have the potential to 
decrease the judiciary’s legitimacy. When it came to evaluating attack ads that aired in 
2006, Kentuckians took issue with one judicial campaign ad in particular, which 
concluded by asking, “Is he a judge, or just another politician?” Gibson (2008a) 
concluded this specific line of the ad is what set it apart from other attack ads:  
My suspicion is that this statement cues the respondents to think, ‘This ad sounds 
like politics as usual, politics as I have seen in other political races, and exactly 
the sort of politics of which I disapprove’ … The other ads may be caustic, but 
this ad seems to portray judges as run-of-the-mill politicians and therefore 
detracts from their impartiality. (p. 914)  
The evidence suggests that most people are comfortable with some judicial campaign 
activity typically found in legislative or executive contests (e.g., general statements of 
policy positions, contrast ads), though there is some expectation that judicial candidates 
adhere to a higher ethical standard.   
Attack ads are frequently sponsored by non-candidate groups. In 2012, 26% of 
ads purchased by outside groups and 21% of the ads purchased by political parties were 
negative in tone. Candidates themselves rarely engage in such campaigning; only 12% of 
ads purchased by candidates in 2012 were negative (Bannon et al., 2012). Caufield 
(2007) found the proportion of attack ads varied with the election cycle (in 2002, 20.8% 
of ads were attack ads, only 8.3% were in 2004). Francia and Herrnson’s (2007) survey 
of 2,946 US Congressional and statewide candidates found a majority of candidates 
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thought it appropriate to bring up issues related to legal or financial infractions (e.g., 
failure to pay child support, an opponent’s recent bankruptcy), though other issues (e.g., 
marital infidelity, cocaine or marijuana use as a youth) were deemed more inappropriate. 
Given these inconsistent findings and the lack of research related to the candidates’ 
perspectives on such controversial campaign tactics, the following research question is 
advanced: 
RQ6: What are judicial candidates’ attitudes toward negative campaigning? 
Consequences of Campaigning 
Given the noisy, nasty, and costly nature of new-style judicial campaigns, 
democratic accountability may be hindered as qualified candidates may simply “drop out” 
of the pool of potential candidates (Schotland, 2002). Although Gibson’s work examined 
the impact judicial campaign activity has on the public’s perception of the legitimacy of 
the judiciary, no empirically based investigations could be located that examined the 
effect campaigning has on the candidates themselves.   
Some candidates may find the “rough-and-tumble” world of judicial campaigns 
repellent but others may enjoy participating in largely deregulated campaigns as they 
allow candidates to communicate more effectively with the electorate. Judicial elections 
may be attractive to qualified candidates who are not afraid of public scrutiny; such 
candidates are no doubt a boon for democrats who favor a court held accountable by and 
to the public. Schultz (2006) suggests post-White judicial elections may actually inspire a 
“greater diversity of candidates” in judicial elections. How or why that may be the case is 
left unexplained, though.   
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Given the lack of systematic research concerning the ups and downs candidates 
experience while campaigning, and whether some candidates remove themselves from 
the pool of potential judges and why, the following research questions are advanced: 
RQ7a: What aspects of the campaign do judicial candidates find rewarding? 
RQ7b: What aspects of the campaign do judicial candidates find troubling? 
Crafting a Better System 
 Scholars and organizations have proposed a number of reforms designed to curtail 
the ill effects of new-style judicial campaigns. Noticeably absent from reform efforts are 
measures aimed at regulating candidate speech. Efforts to further regulate judicial 
candidate speech are unlikely as “White is not going away; the current Court is virtually 
certain not to overrule it” (Brown, 2008, p. 1611). However, the sheer availability of a 
number of other proposals indicates the potential for a new generation of judicial 
campaign reforms. Potential reforms can be categorized as being voluntarist, 
informational, or structural in nature (Stern, 2008). The following section discusses some 
of the more popular reforms that have been proposed. 
 Voluntarist reforms. Not all reform proposals necessarily require the force of 
law to have a desired effect. As discussed previously in this chapter, law is but one source 
of behavioral influence. Two widely discussed reforms fall under the voluntarist 
category: voluntary campaign restrictions and public financing. 
 Voluntary campaign agreements. Rather than relying on prohibitions on judicial 
candidate speech, candidates could reach voluntary agreements with one another to 
conduct their campaigns in a manner consistent with the expectations of the judiciary. 
Judicial oversight committees (discussed later in this section) could ask judicial 
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candidates to voluntarily commit to conducting a fair campaign that “reflects the dignity 
and integrity of judicial office and the independence of the judiciary” (Fortune & White, 
2008, p. 236). Judges are nearly unanimous in their support for such voluntary measures; 
a recent survey showed that 93% of current judges support such efforts (Rottman, 2002). 
Support for this voluntary reform may have changed following the White decision. A 
more recent, post-White study is necessary to determine the answer given the potential for 
more volatile campaign communications. 
Public financing. Public financing has also been suggested as a possible 
voluntary reform (candidates cannot be forced to accept public funds for their campaigns), 
going back at least four decades and counting (Beechen, 1974). Some states, such as 
North Carolina, have implemented campaign finance systems designed to reduce the 
corrupting power of campaign donors by making public funds available to candidates. 
Judicial campaigns in North Carolina are funded through taxpayer contributions and 
lawyer fees. Although the initial year was wrought with problems (the campaign fund 
was underfunded), proposals have been issued to strengthen the effectiveness of public 
financing (Bend, 2005).   
There are a number of advantages to making public funds available to judicial 
candidates. Aside from enhancing judicial independence, public financing could promote 
democratic accountability by allowing candidates who lack the necessary financial 
resources to enter electoral contests. Candidates could focus their campaigns on 
informing the public of their qualifications for office rather than devoting substantial time 
and effort soliciting campaign donors. Although some suggest incumbents would benefit 
from public financing systems that set limits on the amount of funding available to 
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candidates, such reforms do not inherently favor incumbents. As Goldberg (2003) argues, 
the real incumbent advantage rests with raising funds; in a publicly financed contest, the 
ability to connect to a wide network of campaign donors is irrelevant.   
Public financing does have some limitations, however. First, public funds do not 
reduce the problems associated with the growing involvement of non-candidate groups, 
who could continue to dominate judicial elections. Wealthy campaign donors can still 
have a substantial influence over judicial elections as they can divert campaign 
contributions to PAC groups. Aside from having no discernible effect on the involvement 
of non-candidate groups, the logistics of public financing can be troublesome. Some 
jurisdictions are more costly than others and some are inherently more competitive than 
others; creating a “one-size fits all” campaign financing system would raise concerns 
over the fairness and effectiveness of such policies. 
Although campaign finance is a concern shared by judges and the public, not 
everyone agrees on public financing. Abbe and Herrnson (2003) find that most judicial 
candidates from 1996 through 2000 were concerned about the manner in which 
campaigns are financed, but they were divided when it came to the possibility of making 
public funds available to candidates. A number of judges felt that the current campaign 
finance system was either broken and needed to be replaced (23.7%) or that it had 
problems and needed to be changed (48.4%). A mere 6.1% of judges felt that the system 
should not be changed. An overwhelming majority (62.4%) felt that campaign costs 
discouraged qualified candidates from running for office. However, when it came to 
public funding, though many (48.7%) felt that such funding would improve elections, 
there were stark differences between Democrats and Republicans (66% of Democrats 
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said it would improve elections whereas 57% of Republicans said public funding would 
actually worsen elections). However, given the significant increase in campaign 
expenditures over the past decade, the opinions of recent candidates may differ. Public 
financing systems may have more support from candidates than it did prior to White. 
 Informational reforms. Aside from voluntary reform proposals, a number of 
reforms have been suggested in order to provide more solid, accurate, and useful 
information to the public. Such proposals include voter guides, ballot labels, and 
campaign oversight committees. 
Voter guides. Distributing voter guides and pamphlets is a popular reform 
proposal.  Guides would contain information about the candidates, which would ensure 
that voters have access to at least some information about candidates beyond the scant 
news media coverage and paid campaign advertisements from candidates and non-
candidate groups. Guides could contain candidate-provided information, such as a 
statement of qualifications. Guides could be mailed to voters or provided through online 
sites, at polling places, or other venues. Aside from candidate-provided information, 
voter guides could also include campaign finance reports, which could provide details 
regarding candidates’ campaign contributions. 
There is strong public support for voter guides; at least one survey showed that 
they were the preferred source of information about judicial candidates (Lovrich & 
Sheldon, 1983). Judges are not necessarily as enthusiastic (Rottman, 2002). This may be 
due to the perceived lack of control over the content of voter guides. However, given the 
potential for low-cost, widespread availability through online distribution, candidates 
may be more receptive toward voter guides. 
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Ballot labels. Including information on the ballot itself, such as incumbency 
status and previous legal experience (through inclusion of occupational labels), can act as 
a powerful source of information for voters in judicial elections. Ballot labels can also 
prove beneficial to candidates, even more so than campaign spending, newspaper or bar 
endorsements, and inclusion in the voters’ pamphlet (Dubois, 1984). However, most 
ballots simply list the candidates’ names (party affiliations are included in partisan races). 
Candidates’ attitudes towards ballot labels remain unknown.  
Campaign oversight committees. Some states have responded to the deregulation 
of judicial campaigns by forming committees designed to promote honorable judicial 
campaigns. For example, in 2006, the Washington Committee for Ethical Judicial 
Campaigns was formed through a coalition of the American Judicature Society, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, the Constitution Project, the Justice at 
Stake Campaign, the League of Women Voters, and the National Center for State Courts. 
This nonpartisan, volunteer organization is focused on providing information to the press 
and the public. Although the Committee lacks legal authority, they can ask candidates to 
pull offensive ads and they can bring to light unethical campaign conduct through issuing 
public statements, thereby acting as a deterrent (Eckley, 2008).   
Based on the suggestions of Salokar (2007), committees could also host 
workshops designed to communicate the ethics of campaigning. Advisory boards could 
help candidates by providing specific advice to candidates on how to address issues that 
arise on the campaign trail. Committees could also conduct judicial performance 
evaluations that could be made available to the public, thereby improving the public’s 
knowledge of the performance of incumbent judges. Judges could be evaluated based on 
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different metrics related to the judge’s legal ability, integrity and impartiality, written and 
oral communication skills, professionalism and temperament, and administrative 
capabilities, as suggested by the ABA. States could determine what measures would most 
adequately assess these criteria (for examples of how states have done so, see White, 
2009).   
Relative to other reform proposals, the public and judges have been less 
supportive of independent committees (Rottman, 2002), although the last decade has 
perhaps shifted the prevailing opinion.   
 Structural reforms. Lastly, a number of structural reforms have been proposed 
over the years. Proponents of structural reforms argue that states could revise aspects of 
judicial positions and elections. 
 Recusal and disqualification rules. The right to have one’s case heard by an 
unbiased, impartial judge is rooted in the U.S. Constitution and has been upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Judicial bias is such a serious concern that if proven it requires an 
automatic reversal. Judges who may appear to be biased are charged with the 
responsibility to disqualify themselves from the case, although litigants can move to have 
the judge disqualified as well. Following a decade of some of the costliest campaigns 
(funded in part by parties that come before the court), many have called for stricter 
recusal and disqualification standards.   
 Current recusal and disqualification rules may be ineffective in light of modern 
judicial campaigns. Gibson and Caldeira (2012) show that although recusal does indeed 
improve public support for the judiciary in cases where there is a conflict of interest, it 
does not restore it the level of support when there is no conflict of interest. Also, without 
65  
mandatory disclosure rules, moving to have a judge disqualified from a case is difficult, 
especially when campaign donations are from interest groups (e.g., PACs) supported 
through anonymous donors (Carrington, 1998).  Stott (2009) suggests strengthening 
recusal rules by assigning recusal motions to other judges. This proposed reform would 
remove the current system of self-recusal, which relies on judges to acknowledge a need 
to recuse themselves. 
Reformers also suggest judges who announce their views on an issue or accept 
contributions from a party step aside in cases that involve that issue or party in order to 
ensure the appearance of impartiality. However, how one conceives of judicial 
impartiality determines whether disqualification in these cases is necessary or practical. If 
a judge presides over a case involving an issue that she has written about in law review 
journals, does that provide the grounds for disqualification? A judge who previously 
challenged a precedent while teaching a law school course might also raise some 
eyebrows if the judge hears a case involving that same issue. In both cases, judges would 
have a difficult time keeping an “open mind” (to borrow from one of the Court’s 
proposed definitions of “impartiality” in White). The same would be true for a judge 
hearing a case involving an issue that he had previously ruled on; he is unlikely to 
radically depart from his previous ruling. The administrative burdens of locating truly 
impartial judges may simply prove too great to meet the needs of this reform.   
 Aside from issues of necessity and practicality, stricter recusal rules may actually 
undermine democratic values. If a judge is elected based on his stances on issues, but is 
then forced to recuse himself when a case comes before the court that deals with one or 
more of those issues, the people are denied their choice: their right to know a judge’s 
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position on an issue is useless if that judge is barred from ever ruling on cases that 
involve that issue. An outspoken, elected judge may find herself sitting out of a number 
cases, thereby depriving voters of their selected judge. This judge may find her chances 
of reelection difficult to say the least, as issue groups would no doubt highlight the 
judge’s absences (Aabramson & Lee, 2004). 
 In other cases, stricter recusal rules may actually impede impartial justice. For 
instance, requiring judges to recuse themselves in cases where a party before the court 
contributed significant funds sounds reasonable on its face, but as Chemerinsky (1998) 
notes, there are some unintended consequences with this proposal. Attorneys may find it 
beneficial to contribute significant funds to undesirable judges so that they never have to 
face them in the courtroom. Attorneys would actually be discouraged from contributing 
any significant funds to judges they favor as those judges would automatically be 
disqualified from cases they bring before the court. 
  Regulating non-candidate groups. Non-candidate groups are increasingly 
involved in elections for appellate and supreme court judgeships (Arbour & McKenzie, 
2010) as they recognize how influential these levels of the judiciary can be in the policy-
making process. Commenting on the 1990 elections in Ohio, an AFL-CIO official noted, 
“We figured out a long time ago that it’s easier to elect seven judges than to elect 132 
legislators” (Heagarty, 2002, p. 20). Abbe and Herrnson (2002) show that contests for 
lower courts between 1996 and 1998 did see some low-level involvement on behalf of 
local parties, trial lawyers, and labor groups, but few candidates reported any 
involvement from business, civil rights, or abortion groups.   
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Interest groups have had a long, controversial history in judicial elections. 
Champagne (2001) argues, “they are essential to the functioning of a pluralist democracy;” 
(pp. 1391-1392) however, they do present a number of issues. Although they are often a 
source of funding for candidates and can help communicate a candidate’s qualifications 
for office, they hold a distinct advantage in that they are largely unregulated and have 
access to larger sources of capital. The growth in national-level interest groups over the 
last century has sparked concern as such groups depend on candidates to fulfill their 
agendas and candidates rely on interest groups for campaign support. 
Aside from providing campaign funds, interest groups frequently broadcast 
campaign communications independently from candidates. Non-candidate groups paid 
for nearly half (49%) of the ads in the 2000 judicial elections (Champagne, 2002b). Since 
then, groups have dominated the airwaves; 61% of the ads in 2012 were purchased by 
non-candidate groups (Bannon et al., 2012).  
Although their expenditures may be a boon for candidates they support, they can 
also detract from the focus of the candidate’s campaign. Candidates may find themselves 
at odds with “supportive” interest groups who use distasteful or unethical tactics. 
Although groups are not directly a part of the campaign, voters are likely to perceive 
some association between the quiet candidate and the mud slinging interest group.   
Although interest groups have the potential to fulfill democratic ideals, the 
communications environment may not be adequate to facilitate the “marketplace of ideas.”  
Interest groups may effectively co-opt elections; as Goldberger (2003) notes:  
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… an extremely wealthy interest group has the enhanced power to change minds 
and to change votes when it can inundate an election campaign with immense 
quantities of reasonably persuasive communication that overwhelm the 
communications of others. In such an extreme situation, the competing message 
of a comparatively impecunious adversary is much less likely to be heard. It will 
be communicated far less frequently and heard by fewer listeners. (p. 13) 
National-level organizations can easily co-opt state elections. After the Iowa 
Supreme Court extended marriage rights to same-sex couples in Varnum v. Brien, large, 
national-level interest groups, including the National Organization for Marriage and the 
American Family Association, funded massive media campaigns marked by misleading 
advertisements, which suggested that judges had “imposed their own values,” that they 
had “legislated from the bench” and that the foundation of American life was in peril due 
to “activist judges.” In the following election cycle, three of the Iowa justices failed to 
receive enough votes to be retained and were ousted from office as a result. As judges are 
prohibited from discussing previous rulings, the justices removed from office were 
unable to counter the messages flooding the market from national organizations. 
Political parties are also active in judicial campaigns, in both partisan and non-
partisan elections. Such involvement may be problematic as “judges,” Streb (2007a) 
writes, “are expected to be above politics. When a judge puts on her robe and walks into 
a courtroom, she is not a Democrat or Republican; she is an impartial interpreter of the 
law” (p. 96). Even though nonpartisan elections were the answer to judicial elections 
dominated by political parties, partisan politics seem to find their way into electoral 
contests. Although parties take a more active role in partisan contests, they actively 
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recruit candidates in non-partisan elections, as well as arrange fundraising events, 
contribute money to candidates, distribute posters and/or yard signs, coordinate with 
candidate campaign organizations, endorse candidates, conduct “get out the vote” efforts, 
and organize campaign events, door-to-door canvassing efforts, and telephone campaigns 
(Streb, 2007a).   
Non-candidate groups have been able to take such a prevalent presence in 
elections due to the express advocacy standard developed in Buckley v.Valeo. Whereas 
express advocacy is subject to stricter government regulations, issue advertising is not. 
Ads that express advocacy include language such as, “Vote for candidate x” or “Vote 
against candidate y.” Simply removing this type of language magically transforms the ad 
into an issue ad and reduces the government’s ability to regulate it. So far, proposed 
legislation to limit third party involvement in elections has yet to gain legal ground as 
such proposals have failed to advance a valid public interest, be narrowly tailored, or 
avoid vagueness (Baran, 2002).   
However, a number of proposals remain on the table. Goldberger (2003) suggests 
limiting the amount of expenditures from non-candidates, thereby inhibiting PACs, 
wealthy speakers, or other non-candidates from essentially taking over an election. The 
express advocacy standard could be replaced by one that accounts for interest group 
advertising, most of which does not explicitly advocate for or against a candidate but 
nonetheless influences the outcome of an election. This would be a difficult, if not 
impossible, task as such revisions would require overturning previous U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions. 
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 Campaign finance reform. Aside from making public funds available to judicial 
candidates, states could also reform campaign financing by limiting campaign 
contributions and campaign expenditures, as well as enacting stronger disclosure rules. 
Whereas Grannis (1987) describes recusal as the “pound of cure,” the “ounce of 
prevention” she suggests lies with regulating campaign contributions. Limiting 
contribution amounts could reduce the influence donors have over judges. However, 
contribution limits that restrict individual contributions and fail to limit aggregate 
contributions reduce the effective power regulations have at ensuring judicial 
independence from campaign donors. Larger law firms could come out in droves with 
large donations, whereas smaller firms would be capped at a smaller amount. Although 
contribution limits would increase judicial independence, they would diminish 
democratic accountability. Challengers, particularly minorities and women, are unlikely 
to have more connections to potential donors compared to incumbents. Lastly, although 
both judges and the public at large are supportive of some campaign finance reform 
proposals (i.e., disclosure), there is less support for limiting campaign donations 
(Rottman, 2002). 
More specifically, attorney contributions could be prohibited or limited, thereby 
reducing their influence over elected judges. An outright prohibition on attorney 
contributions, though, would hinder democratic ideals as candidates rely on these donors, 
who are typically more knowledgeable about candidates for judicial office. On the other 
hand, as Barnhizer (2001) suggests, attorney contributions could be pooled together in a 
collective fund made available to all judicial candidates in an election. 
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Limiting campaign expenditures could limit the potential for all out negative 
campaigns waged through paid media. However, limiting a candidate’s expenditures 
decreases the effectiveness of a challenger’s campaign as challengers receive a higher 
rate of return on campaign expenditures compared to incumbents (Bonneau, 2007b; 
Bonneau & Cann, 2011). Voluntary limits, as suggested by Longan (2005), may also be 
advisable, though it is unknown as to whether expecting candidates to come to a 
voluntary agreement on campaign expenditure limits is realistic.   
Stricter disclosure rules have been suggested, as current regulations are limited 
because complete disclosure is not required. Candidates can simply report donations from 
527s and 501(c)(4)s (“stealth” PACs) without having to identify individual contributors 
to such groups. Stronger disclosure rules could promote the appearance of judicial 
impartiality as the public would be made aware of who contributed to the judge’s 
campaign, thereby pressuring judges to recuse themselves when significant contributors 
come before the court or to refuse contributions from some sources. 
Candidate speech. However unlikely, speech regulations concerning judicial 
candidate speech could be further refined and imposed. Whether judicial candidates 
would favor such reforms is unknown, though given the criticism of White from the legal 
community, it is possible that candidates would favor a return to regulation.     
Judicial selection. Aside from changes in election policy, states can adopt 
entirely different selection systems; however, efforts to adopt the merit plan or appointive 
selection systems have been unsuccessful. Calls for such reform have existed since the 
early 20th century, and yet 43 states choose to select and/or retain some or all of their 
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judges through popular election. Although the public does not regularly exercise it, they 
enjoy their right to vote for judges and are unlikely to give up that right (Rottman, 2002).  
 States that elect their judges can, however, choose between partisan and 
nonpartisan contests to resolve some of the issues with popular selection without the 
public giving up their right to vote. Partisan elections may be a possible solution to some 
problems with judicial elections, namely maintaining a knowledgeable voter population 
capable of voting (as voters glean significant information about candidates based party 
affiliation). Although not without their own issues (e.g., ballot roll-off), nonpartisan 
elections could reduce (although not eliminate) the unwanted involvement of non-
candidate groups and the appearance of “party politics.” 
 As the past few years have seen the rise of new-style judicial campaigns, it is 
unknown as to what reforms (if any) judicial candidates support. Therefore, the following 
research question is advanced: 
RQ7: How do judicial candidates believe judicial elections can be improved? 
 The proceeding chapter describes the methods used to address the research 
questions advanced in this chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Methods 
In order to assess the research questions posed in this investigation, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used. Mixed methods are appropriate in this 
case as they provide multiple ways of approaching and understanding the changing nature 
of judicial campaigns and elections. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) note, mixed 
methods research can answer questions that some methods, when used on their own, 
simply cannot. Combining methods to answer research questions also provides the 
opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of views.   
Mixed methods is not necessarily a new approach, though it is controversial in 
some circles. Mixing methods traditionally used by positivists with methods used by 
interpretivists is often met with concern by some scholars who consider the 
metatheoretical assumptions of the two paradigms as incompatible. Others have 
enthusiastically greeted the blurring of boundaries between paradigms. Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) note the “great potential for interweaving of viewpoints for the 
incorporation of multiple perspectives” (p. 167). Roth and Mehta (2002) similarly argue 
that through combining methods that seek out subjective realities and attempt to 
approximate an objective truth, the researcher can shed a whole new light on the 
phenomenon of study. Lindlof and Taylor (2011) note that some forms of quantitative 
data can “add precision to design efforts at the front end of a [qualitative] project” (p. 
119). 
To assess the research questions advanced in Chapter Three, a survey of 2012 U.S. 
judicial candidates was undertaken. To expand upon survey findings and to better 
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understand the experience of running for judicial office, depth interviews with candidates 
were carried out upon the conclusion of the survey with selected survey respondents. 
Quantitative Study 
Sample 
Participant characteristics. In order to be eligible for participation in this study, 
participants must have run for judicial office in 2012. In contrast with some other studies 
(Herrnson, 1994) campaign staff members, including managers and others, were 
excluded from participating in this study. Survey participant demographics (gender, age, 
income, ethnicity, race, and the state in which the candidate ran for office) are 
summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Data related to the survey participants’ political profile 
(office sought, whether the respondent participated in a retention election, campaign 
budget, incumbency and electoral experience, electoral competition and success, and 
partisanship) are reported in Tables 4.3 through 4.8.  
Sampling procedure. Candidates for judicial office in 2012 were identified 
through the secretary of state or board of elections websites for each state where judges 
are elected to office or face retention elections. Contact information (e-mail addresses 
and physical mailing addresses), if provided, was collected. In cases where contact 
information could not be located, the researcher queried online state bar lawyer databases. 
If contact information could not be located through either of these methods, the 
researcher attempted to locate contact information through an online search engine 
(Google).   
This procedure identified 3,945 candidates. E-mail addresses were located for 
2,111 identified candidates (53.5%). Physical mailing addresses were located for another  
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Table 4.1. Survey Participant Demographics: Sex, Age, Income, Ethnicity, and Race. 
 n % 
Gender   
Male 279 59.1 
Female 96 20.3 
Unspecified 97 20.6 
Age   
18-29 years old 1 0.2 
30-39 years old 18 3.8 
40-49 years old 100 21.2 
50-59 years old 153 32.4 
60-69 years old 98 20.8 
70 years or older 6 1.3 
Unspecified 96 20.3 
Income   
Less than $20,000 1 0.2 
$20,000 to $49,999 6 1.3 
$50,000 to $99,999 45 9.5 
$100,000 to $249,999 239 50.6 
$250,000 to $499,999 47 10.0 
$500,000 to $999,999 3 0.6 
$1,000,000 or more 1 0.2 
Unspecified 130 27.6 
Ethnicity   
Latino, Hispanic, Spanish 19 4.0 
Not Latino, Hispanic, Spanish 342 72.5 
Unspecified 111 22.3 
Race   
White or Caucasian 330 69.9 
Black or African-American 19 4.0 
Asian 2 0.4 
Native American or Alaska Native 1 0.2 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 1 0.2 
Other 2 0.4 
Unspecified 117 24.8 
 
1,563 identified candidates (39.6%). Contact information could not be found in 271 cases 
(6.9%). 
Identified candidates were contacted in two phases. First, candidates were 
contacted via e-mail to participate in an online survey hosted by Qualtrics. A total of  
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Table 4.2. Survey Participant Demographics: State in which Participant Ran for 
Election. 
 n % 
Alabama 19 4.0 
Alaska 1 0.2 
Arizona 1 0.2 
Arkansas 5 1.1 
California 18 3.8 
Colorado 7 1.5 
Florida 28 5.9 
Georgia 7 1.5 
Idaho 3 0.6 
Illinois 8 1.7 
Indiana 8 1.7 
Iowa 1 0.2 
Kansas 7 1.5 
Kentucky 1 0.2 
Louisiana 1 0.2 
Maryland 5 1.1 
Michigan 45 9.5 
Minnesota 8 1.7 
Missouri 5 1.1 
Montana 5 1.1 
Nebraska 2 0.4 
Nevada 7 1.5 
New Mexico 4 0.8 
New York 19 4.0 
North Carolina 12 2.5 
North Dakota 4 0.8 
Ohio 24 5.1 
Oregon 8 1.7 
Texas 28 5.9 
Utah 1 0.2 
Washington 17 3.6 
West Virginia 4 0.8 
Wisconsin 17 3.6 
Wyoming 1 0.2 
Unspecified 141 29.9 
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Table 4.3. Survey Participant Political Profile: Office Sought. 
 n % 
Supreme Court 17 3.6 
Appellate Court 46 9.7 
Trial Court 296 62.7 
Other 21 4.4 
Unspecified 92 19.5 
 
Table 4.4. Survey Participant Political Profile: Participated in a Retention Election? 
 n % 
Yes 71 15.0 
No 307 65.0 
Unspecified 94 19.9 
 
2,111 e-mail invitations were sent on January 14, 2013, each containing a hyperlink to 
the online survey. Based on the suggestion made by Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 
(2009), a follow up reminder to complete the survey was distributed a month later on 
February 11, 2013. Responses were received from 391 contacts (18.5%), though 15 did 
not go beyond the online survey welcome screen. In addition, three reported not being a 
candidate for judicial office in 2012. These 18 cases have been removed from all analyses 
and reports. 
Identified candidates for whom physical addresses could be located but not an e-
mail address (n = 1,563) were considered in the second phase of the survey. Of these 
candidates, 26 were identified as supreme court candidates, 77 were identified as 
appellate court candidates, and 1,460 were identified as trial court candidates. Given the 
small number of candidates for higher levels of judicial office, all supreme and appellate 
court candidates from this population subset were contacted by mail to participate in a 
mail survey (see Appendix B for survey materials). Trial court candidates in this subset 
who faced competition in their elections, as identified through election data provided by  
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Table 4.5. Survey Participant Political Profile: Campaign Budget. 
 n % 
Less than $10,000 132 28.0 
$10,001 to $25,000 77 16.3 
$25,001 to $50,000 72 15.3 
$50,001 to $100,000 51 10.8 
$100,001 to $500,000 46 9.7 
$500,001 to $1,000,000 3 0.6 
More than $1,000,000 1 0.2 
Unspecified 90 19.0 
 
Table 4.6. Survey Participant Political Profile: Incumbency and Electoral 
Experience.* 
 n % 
Incumbency status   
Incumbent 106 26.4 
Non-Incumbent 190 47.4 
Unspecified 105 26.2 
Incumbent participated in election?**   
Yes 67 24.0 
No 124 44.4 
Unspecified 88 31.5 
Held elective public office?**   
Yes 45 16.1 
No 147 52.5 
Unspecified 88 31.4 
 * Survey participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 71) were 
excluded from these items. 
** Survey participants who reported being the incumbent (n = 106) were excluded from 
this item. 
 
Judgepedia.org, (n = 466) were also solicited to participate in the survey. An invitation to 
participate in the survey, along with a physical copy of the survey and a self-addressed 
stamped envelope, were mailed to candidates in May 2013. Of the 569 surveys that were 
mailed, 20 were returned due to an incorrect mailing address and 3 others were returned 
as they were partially destroyed in transit. Removing the 23 surveys that did not reach 
their destinations, a total of 99 mail surveys were received, for a response rate of 18.1%.   
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Table 4.7. Survey Participant Political Profile: Electoral Competition and Success. 
 n % 
Competed in the primary election?*    
Yes 189 47.1 
No 110 27.4 
Unspecified 102 25.4 
Number of candidates on the primary election ballot**    
1 29 15.3 
2 59 31.2 
3 46 24.3 
4 20 10.6 
5 15 7.9 
6 or more 18 9.5 
Unspecified 2 1.1 
Competed in the general election?**   
Yes 191 47.6 
No 106 26.4 
Unspecified 104 25.9 
Number of candidates on the general election ballot***    
1 31 16.2 
2 125 65.4 
3 5 2.6 
4 5 2.6 
5 1 0.5 
6 or more 22 11.5 
Unspecified 2 1.0 
Elected?   
Yes 203 43.0 
No 176 37.3 
Unspecified 93 19.7 
* Survey participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 71) were 
excluded from this item. 
** Only survey participants who reported participating in the primary election (n = 189) 
were included in this item. 
*** Only survey participants who reported participating in the general election (n = 191) 
were included in this item. 
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Table 4.8. Survey Participant Political Profile: Partisanship. 
 n % 
Office sought partisan or non-partisan?*   
Partisan 97 24.2 
Non-partisan 201 50.1 
Unspecified 103 25.7 
Sought party endorsement from:**   
Constitution Party -- -- 
Democratic Party 37 38.1 
Green Party 3 3.1 
Libertarian Party -- -- 
Republican Party 30 30.9 
Other Party 11 11.3 
Received party endorsement from:**   
Constitution Party -- -- 
Democratic Party 40 41.2 
Green Party 2 2.1 
Libertarian Party -- -- 
Republican Party 32 33.0 
Other Party 11 11.3 
* Survey participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 71) were 
excluded from this item. 
** Only survey participants who reported participating in a partisan election (n = 97) 
were included in this item.  Participants were able to select multiple response options. 
 
Overall, 2,657 survey invitations were delivered through online or physical means. 
A total of 490 responses were received, for an overall response rate of 18.4%. Taking the 
overall population of identified candidates (n = 3,945) into account, nearly 1 out of 8 
(12.2%) judicial candidates responded to our invitation. 
  There are some reasons why the survey response was relatively low. First, as 
Dillman et al. (2009) note, we are living in “turbulent times” when it comes to survey 
methodology. Access is becoming more difficult and people are less willing to respond to 
unsolicited communications. Scott Keeter, the survey director for the Pew Research 
Center and president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, notes 
that Pew’s survey responses have taken a dive: whereas surveys conducted in 1997 saw a 
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response rate of 36%, response rates for surveys conducted in 2011 were a mere 11% 
(Peltz, 2012).   
Second, it is possible that not all contact information collected was accurate. 
Some forms of contact may no longer be in use following the conclusion of the election. 
A campaign e-mail address, such as “smith4judge2011@gmail.com,” may not have been 
checked after the conclusion of the election. Some e-mail invitations may have been 
received by campaign personnel and not forwarded on to the candidates. Contact 
information gleaned from state bar databases may not have been current. 
 Lastly, some candidates may have been concerned about privacy and 
confidentiality issues with responding to surveys that ask potentially sensitive questions. 
Measures 
 The measures described here have been used in a larger research program that 
involves an ongoing survey of candidates who ran for U.S. elective office. Several of 
these measures have been used, adapted, or derived from previous studies (Hertog & 
Human, 2008; Hertog, Human, & Zuercher, 2011; Hertog & Zuercher, 2012). 
News media. A battery of survey items dealt with the participants’ views of the 
media, including the amount and quality of news coverage, effort to generate news 
coverage, relationships with the news media, and news media performance.   
Extent of coverage. Participants were asked, “Which of the following best 
characterizes the extent of coverage your campaign received from the traditional news 
media?” Response options included: (a) None (no mention of your campaign), (b) 
Minimal (no more than occasional mention), (c) Limited (monthly mention or less with 
one to two occasions of moderate coverage during the campaign), (d) Moderate 
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(biweekly coverage with perhaps one or two significant stories during the campaign, (e) 
Significant (stories appearing most weeks, with lengthy treatment on several occasions 
during the campaign, or (f) Extensive (several stories per week, some going into great 
depth).  
Participants were also asked about any coverage they might have received from 
non-traditional media sources. This survey item asked candidates to “Please indicate, 
which, if any of the following non-traditional media sources provided significant 
attention to your campaign” and provided the following response options: (a) Talk radio, 
(b) Political blogs, (c) Social media (Facebook, Twitter, Myspace), (d) Other (with a text 
entry option), and (e) I did not receive attention from these sources.   
Lastly, participants were asked about their expectations of receiving news 
coverage: “Did you expect your contest to receive significant news coverage?” (Yes/No). 
Type of coverage. Participants who reported receiving limited, moderate, 
significant, or extensive coverage were asked: “Below are a number of statements 
scholars and critics have made about news coverage of elections. Please mark whether 
you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or 
strongly disagree that each statement applies to your electoral contest.” Statements 
included: (a) News coverage of my electoral contest was inadequate, (b) News coverage 
of my electoral contest focused on the important issues, (c) News coverage of my 
electoral contest focused on its most sensational features, (d) News coverage of my 
electoral contest was biased in favor of my opposition, (e) News coverage of my electoral 
contest was biased in my favor, (f) News coverage of my electoral contest was accurate, 
(g) News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on candidate campaign 
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strategies, and (h) News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on who was 
leading or behind.   
System/candidate effort. Two survey items addressed the effort taken by non-
candidate groups/individuals and candidates to allow for the communication of the 
candidate’s views with the public. Participants were asked, “For each of the following 
activities your campaign engaged in, please indicate all actors who initiated at least one 
communication event. For example, if you were on radio talk shows three times and two 
were set up by your campaign while the third was set up by the host, you would mark the 
columns for ‘you or your campaign organization’ and for ‘media/news organization’ on 
the appropriate row.” Communication events included: (a) Television talk show, (b) 
Radio talk show, (c) Public speeches, (d) Broadcast debates, (e) Public debates that were 
not broadcast, (f) Provide an interview to a journalist, (g) Speak to an editorial board, (h) 
Address a community group, and (i) Fill out an issues questionnaire. Participants could 
affirm whether the following groups/individuals initiated at least one communication 
event: (a) Media/News organization, (b) A community, business, or activist group, (c) A 
political party, (d) You or your campaign organization, (e) An opponent, or (f) Some 
other individual or group.   
For those communication events that participants did not engage in, they were 
asked: “For each of the activities you indicated that your campaign did not engage in, 
please indicate which, if any, of the following groups requested that you engage in the 
activity.” The same actors as the previous item were listed, but only for the events the 
candidate had not participated in.  
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Media relationship. One item dealt with the candidate’s relationship with the 
news media: “Please rate your relationship with the news media during your campaign” 
(Very positive/Somewhat positive/Neither positive nor negative/Somewhat negative/Very 
negative).   
Media performance. One item asked participants to evaluate the news media: 
“On a scale from A to F, please rate the overall news media performance with regard to 
coverage of the electoral contest in which you participated” (A/B/C/D/F). 
Campaign communication methods. Participants were asked about not only the 
campaign communication methods that they used, but also their perceived effectiveness 
at disseminating their messages to potential voters.    
Communication methods used. First, participants were asked, “Please indicate 
which of the following forms of campaign communications were used/engaged in during 
your campaign.”  Participants could respond as to whether they used the following 
methods: (a) Paid television advertising, (b) Paid radio advertising, (c) Paid newspaper 
advertising, (d) Paid outdoor advertising, (e) Include a media coordinator or press 
secretary on staff, (f) Sent out press releases, (g) Scheduled press conferences, (h) 
Submitted OpEd pieces or letters to the editor, (i) Attended news events or public forums, 
(j) Direct mail, (k) Telephone, (l) Yard signs, (m) Personal canvassing (door-to-door), (n) 
Campaign staff canvassing (door-to-door), (o) Campaign literature/brochures distribution, 
(p) Campaign website/blog, (q) E-mail, (r) Social media online such as Facebook or 
Twitter, (s) Television talk show, (t) Radio talk show, (u) Public speeches, (v) Broadcast 
debates, (w) Public debates that were not broadcast, (x) Provide an interview to a 
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journalist, (y) Speak to an editorial board, (z) Address a community group, (aa) Fill out 
an issues questionnaire and (bb) Other (with a text entry option).   
Effectiveness of communication methods. Participants were then asked about the 
effectiveness (Very effective/Somewhat effective/Not very effective) of campaign 
communication methods used in relation to disseminating their message to potential 
voters.   
 Campaign professionalism. Campaign professionalism was assessed by using a 
measure of campaign professionalism developed by Francia and Herrnson (2007). First, 
participants were asked, “Did you hire at least one paid professional for your campaign?” 
Those who responded in the affirmative were then asked if they relied mostly on salaried 
staff or paid consultants for any of the following campaign activities: (a) Campaign 
management, (b) Media advertising, (c) Press relations, (d) Issue or opposition research, 
(e) Polling, (f) Fundraising, (g) Direct mail, (h) Mass telephone calling, (i) Get-out-the-
vote activities, (j) Legal advice, (k) Accounting, and (l) I did not rely mostly on salaried 
staff or paid consultants for any of these activities. Following Francia and Herrnson’s 
measure, those who relied on paid staff for at least one of those activities (a-k) are 
considered to have a “professionalized campaign.” 
Campaign message focus. One item asked: “To what extent did your campaign 
communications focus on the following.” Participants were asked to rate the degree 
(None at all/A little/Some/A great deal) to which their campaign messages focused on (a) 
experience and qualifications, (b) character and ethics, and (c) issue positions. If 
participants noted that their campaign communications focused “a little,” “some,” or “a 
great deal” on issue positions, they were asked a follow-up question based on a measure 
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used by Arbour and McKenzie (2010): “Which issue positions did you discuss in your 
campaign communications?” Response options included: (a) Court administration, (b) 
Crime and sentencing, (c) Civil liberties, (d) Abortion, (e) Tort reform, (f) Consumer 
protection, (g) Same-sex marriage, (h) Other (with a text entry option). 
Attitudes toward negative campaigning. One item, adapted from Francia and 
Herrnson (2007), was used to assess participants’ attitudes toward negative campaigning 
tactics. This item asked candidates, “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a 
candidate’s chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects 
about a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” Participants could respond as 
to whether they thought the following subjects concerning their political opponents were 
“Appropriate” or “Inappropriate”: (a) Using marijuana as a youth, (b) Using cocaine as a 
youth, (c) Failure to pay taxes (tax evasion, tax fraud), (d) Failure to pay child support, 
(e) A documented allegation of marital infidelity, (f) A documented allegation of sexual 
harassment, (g) A bribery conviction, (h) A recent bankruptcy, (i) Using campaign funds 
for personal use, (j) An opponent’s questionable military record, (k) An opponent’s 
religious beliefs, (l) A DUI or DWI (drunk driving) conviction, (m) An illegal immigrant 
employed in an opponent’s home, and (n) An opponent’s sexual orientation. 
Consequences of campaigning. A number of survey items were used to assess 
candidates’ perceived issues with judicial campaigns and elections. Issues taken into 
consideration include the tone of the electoral contest, campaign financing, non-candidate 
group involvement, and consequences of campaigning. 
Tone of the electoral contest. Two items addressed the tone of the election. One 
item, adapted by the questionnaire designed by Justice at Stake Campaign (2001), read, 
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“Was the tone of the electoral contest you were involved in:” and had the following 
response options: (a) Overwhelmingly positive, (b) Somewhat positive, (c) Neither 
positive nor negative, (d) Somewhat negative, or (e) Overwhelmingly negative.  
Another item dealt with whether the candidate felt that another candidate or non-
candidate group misrepresented them. Specifically, participants were asked: “During the 
campaign, did any group or individual misrepresent your experience, qualifications, 
character and ethics, or issue positions?” (Yes/No). If the participant responded in the 
affirmative, he/she was given the follow-up question, “Did you respond to the 
misrepresentation(s)?” (Yes/No). 
Campaign financing. Participants were asked if they established a committee to 
solicit campaign contributions (Yes/No). To determine the sources of a candidate’s 
campaign funds respondents were asked “What sources contributed campaign funds, 
(You or your immediate family/Lawyers or law firms/Other individuals (excluding 
lawyers)/Political party/Interest groups (including PACs)/Other (with a text entry option) 
and the percentage of time spent on their campaign that was dedicated to fundraising 
(0%/10%/20%/30%/40%/50%/60%/70%/80%/90%/100%). 
Non-candidate group involvement. Four items addressed non-candidate group 
involvement. Participants were asked, “In the election you were involved in, how active 
were interest groups (including PACs)?” and “In the election you were involved in, how 
active were political parties?” Response options for these two items included: (a) Not at 
all active, (b) Somewhat active, (c) Very active, and (d) Extremely active. Then, 
participants were asked, “When it comes to interest groups (including PACs) involved in 
judicial campaigns, are your attitudes toward them:” (Very positive/Somewhat 
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positive/Neither negative nor positive/Somewhat negative/Very negative). A parallel 
question was asked for political parties.  
Campaign effectiveness. Participants were asked, “All in all, what level of 
knowledge would you say voters had about your candidacy?” Response options included: 
(a) Voters were well-informed about my relevant qualifications and/or positions, (b) 
Voters were somewhat informed about my relevant qualifications and/or positions, (c) 
Voters were only slightly-informed about my relevant qualifications and/or positions, and 
(d) Voters were uninformed about my relevant qualifications and/or positions.  
Overall experience. Next, participants were asked, “For you, personally, would 
you say that the experience of running for office was:” (Very positive/Somewhat 
positive/Neither positive nor negative/Somewhat negative/Very negative).   
Plans for the future. Lastly, participants were asked, “Which of the following 
statements comes closest to your plans for the future?” Response options included: (a) I 
almost certainly will not run for public office in the future, (b) It is very unlikely that I 
will run for public office in the future, (c) It is fairly unlikely that I will run for public 
office in the future, (d) It is fairly likely that I will run for public office in the future, (e) It 
is very likely that I will run for public office in the future, and (f) I almost certainly will 
run for public office in the future. 
Reform proposal evaluations. Participants were asked whether they strongly 
supported, somewhat supported, neither supported nor opposed, somewhat opposed, or 
strongly opposed a number of voluntarist, informational, and structural reform proposals, 
including: (a) Provide public funding for all ballot-qualified candidates, (b) Limit 
campaign contributions from attorneys and law firms, (c) Limit campaign expenditures, 
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(d) Limit expenditures from non-candidate groups (such as political parties, interest 
groups, and PACs), (e) Require the disclosure of the source of all campaign contributions, 
(f) Stronger recusal/disqualification rules, (g) State-provided voter guides with 
information on all ballot-qualified candidates, (h) Voluntary campaign agreements 
concerning campaign speech and conduct, (i) Include the candidates' incumbency status 
on ballots, (j) Include the candidates' occupations on ballots, (k) More state regulations 
concerning campaign speech, (l) Voluntary campaign workshops conducted by an 
independent, non-partisan committee, (m) Judicial performance evaluations conducted by 
an independent, non-partisan committee, and (n) Independent campaign oversight 
committees capable of asking candidates to pull ads or issuing press releases concerning 
candidates' campaign conduct. 
Participants were also asked about what form of judicial selection they favored for 
both appellate judges and trial judges based on a survey item used by Justice at Stake 
Campaign (2001). This item read, “How do you think the following types of judges 
should be selected in your state?” Participants could respond with: (a) Merit selection 
followed by retention election, (b) Non-partisan popular election, (c) Appointment by the 
governor with legislative confirmation, (d) Appointment by the governor without 
legislative confirmation, (e) Partisan popular election, or (f) Legislative appointment or 
election. 
Candidate political profile. Data concerning the candidate’s political profile 
were also collected, including the office sought, whether the candidate ran in a retention 
election, campaign budget, incumbency and electoral experience, electoral competition 
and success, and partisanship. 
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Office sought. One item asked judicial candidates, “Which of the following best 
describes the judicial office you campaigned for?” Response options included: (a) 
Supreme Court, (b) Appellate Court, (c) Trial Court, and (d) Other (with a text entry 
option). 
Retention election. One item asked, “Were you participating in a retention 
election?” (Yes/No). For the sake of reducing respondent fatigue, candidates who 
responded in the affirmative were not asked about their incumbency and electoral 
experience, electoral competition, or partisanship as those items are not relevant to 
candidates facing retention. 
Campaign budget. One item asked, “Was your campaign budget:” (Less than 
$10,000; $10,001 to $25,000; $25,001 to $50,000; $50,001 to $100,000; $100,001 to 
$500,000; $500,001 to $1,000,000; More than $1,000,000). 
Incumbency and electoral experience. Participants were asked about their 
incumbency status (“Were you the incumbent for the position you sought?”), whether the 
incumbent was involved in the contest (“Was the incumbent for the position you sought a 
candidate in the election?”), and whether they held in elective office in the past (“Have 
you ever held elective public office”). Participants were able to respond to these 
questions with “yes” or “no.”   
Electoral competition and success. Four items dealt with the primary and general 
elections. First, candidates were asked, “Did you compete in a primary election?” 
(Yes/No). If they competed in a primary election, they were asked “In your race, how 
many candidates were there on the primary election ballot (including yourself)?” (1; 2; 3; 
4; 5; 6 or more). Participants were then asked, “Did you compete in the general election?” 
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(Yes, my name was on the ballot/Yes, I competed as a write-in candidate/No). Those who 
did compete in the general election were asked, “In your race, how many candidates were 
there on the general election ballot (including yourself)?” (1/2/3/4/5/6 or more). 
In order to measure electoral success, participants were asked, “Were you elected 
to the office you sought?” (Yes/No).     
Partisanship. Two items dealt with political party affiliation. First, participants 
were asked, “Is the office you sought partisan or non-partisan?” (Partisan/Non-partisan). 
If the response was “Partisan,” the participant received this follow-up question: “Please 
indicate from which, if any, of the following political parties you sought endorsement for 
your candidacy and whether you received their endorsement.” Participants were able to 
note whether they “Sought party endorsement” and/or “Received party endorsement” 
from the Constitution Party, Democratic Party, Green Party, Libertarian Party, 
Republican Party, or some other party which they could describe through a text entry. 
Candidate demographics. Six items assessed the candidate’s demographics. 
Gender (Male/Female/I prefer not to answer), age (18-29 years old/30-39 years old/40-49 
years old/50-59 years old/60-69 years old/70 years or older/I prefer not to answer), 
annual household income ($1,000,000 or more/$500,000 to $999,999/$250,000 to 
$499,999/$100,000 to $249,999/$50,000 to $99,999/$20,000 to $49,999/Less than 
$20,000/I prefer not to answer), ethnicity (I consider myself Latino, Hispanic, or 
Spanish/I do not consider myself Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish/I prefer not to answer), 
race (White or Caucasian/Black or African-American/Asian/Native American or Alaska 
Native/Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander/Other (with text entry option)/I prefer 
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not to answer), and the state in which the participant ran for office were accounted for in 
the survey.   
General open-ended question. At the conclusion of the survey, participants were 
given this open-ended question: “If you wish to provide additional comments concerning 
your campaigning experience or have any comments about this survey, please use the text 
box below.” 
Quantitative Data Analysis  
 Response frequencies and mean scores for the measures described in the previous 
section are reported in Chapter Five. Cross tabulations are calculated to further explore 
the data with the inclusion of candidate political profile variables, specifically election 
type, office sought, incumbency status, and electoral outcome. 
 As the survey was sent to the great majority of candidates (67% of identified 
candidates were contacted) and given the non-random selection of survey participants, 
attempting to use common inferential statistical tests (e.g., t-tests, chi-square tests) to 
generalize about the larger population of candidates is inappropriate. However, treating 
the data as though it were derived from a census is equally perplexing given the low 
response rate. Therefore, the data collected from the survey are limited to those who 
chose to participate in the study. Future studies should focus their efforts on contacting a 
smaller, random sample of candidates in order to overcome this limitation. 
Qualitative Study 
Sample 
Participant characteristics. Telephone interviews were conducted with 35 
survey participants. Interview participant demographics are summarized in Table 4.9 and  
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Table 4.9. Interview Participant Demographics: Gender, Age, Income, Ethnicity, 
and Race. 
 n % 
Gender   
Male 25 71.4 
Female 10 28.6 
Age   
30-39 years old 1 2.9 
40-49 years old 9 25.7 
50-59 years old 11 31.4 
60-69 years old 12 34.3 
70 years or older 2 5.7 
Income   
$50,000 to $99,999 7 20.0 
$100,000 to $249,999 18 51.4 
$250,000 to $499,999 6 17.1 
Unspecified 4 11.4 
Ethnicity   
Latino, Hispanic, Spanish 1 2.9 
Not Latino, Hispanic, Spanish 33 94.3 
Unspecified 1 2.9 
Race   
White or Caucasian 33 94.3 
Black or African-American 1 2.9 
Unspecified 1 2.9 
 
4.10. Data related to the interview participants’ political profile are reported in Tables 
4.11 through 4.16.  
Sampling procedure. At the end of the survey, participants were asked the 
following question: “In order to expand upon and better interpret the information we have 
gained from the survey, a limited number of respondents will be re-contacted over the 
phone. Would you be willing to talk over the phone with Dr. Hertog or a trained 
interviewer in order to enhance our understanding of your campaign experience?” 
Contact information was collected for those who agreed to be interviewed by phone.  
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Table 4.10. Interview Participant Demographics: State in which Participant Ran for 
Election. 
 n %   n % 
Alabama 1 2.9 North Carolina 1 2.9 
California 4 11.4 Ohio 2 5.7 
Florida 2 5.7 Oregon 1 2.9 
Georgia 1 2.9 Texas 7 20.0 
Indiana 1 2.9 Washington 2 5.7 
Louisiana 1 2.9 West Virginia 1 2.9 
Michigan 2 5.7 Wisconsin 3 8.6 
New Mexico 1 2.9 Unspecified 5 14.3 
 
Table 4.11. Interview Participant Political Profile: Office Sought. 
 n % 
Supreme Court 6 17.1 
Appellate Court 11 31.4 
Trial Court 18 51.4 
 
Table 4.12. Interview Participant Political Profile: Participated in a Retention 
Election? 
 n % 
Yes 4 11.4 
No 31 88.6 
 
Table 4.13. Interview Participant Political Profile: Campaign Budget. 
 n % 
Less than $10,000 9 25.7 
$10,001 to $25,000 4 11.4 
$25,001 to $50,000 7 20.0 
$50,001 to $100,000 8 22.9 
$100,001 to $500,000 5 14.3 
$500,001 to $1,000,000 1 2.9 
Unspecified 1 2.9 
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Table 4.14. Interview Participant Political Profile: Incumbency and Electoral 
Experience.* 
 n % 
Incumbency status   
Incumbent 7 20.0 
Non-Incumbent 23 65.7 
Unspecified 1 2.9 
Incumbent participated in election?**   
Yes 9 37.5 
No 14 58.3 
Unspecified 1 4.2 
Held elective public office?**    
Yes 10 41.7 
No 13 54.2 
Unspecified 1 4.2 
* Interview participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 4) were 
excluded from these items. 
** Interview participants who reported being the incumbent (n = 7) were excluded from 
this item. 
 
Candidates who agreed to be re-contacted (n = 156) were considered for inclusion 
in the qualitative study. Given the small proportion of candidates for higher judicial 
offices, a greater emphasis was placed on re-contacting supreme and appellate court 
candidates who agreed to be interviewed by phone (n = 28). In addition, 38 trial court 
candidates who agreed to be interviewed by phone were re-contacted (see Appendix C 
for interview materials).  
Of the 66 candidates re-contacted, 35 (53%) completed phone interviews between 
June 13, 2013 and September 13, 2013. Interviews were conducted using Skype, a voice-
over-IP service, and recorded using MX Skype Recorder. Recordings were manually 
transcribed using Express Scribe. Interviews averaged around 35 minutes in length, with 
the shortest interview being under 18 minutes, and the longest being slightly over 78 
minutes. 
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Table 4.15. Interview Participant Political Profile: Electoral Competition and 
Success. 
 n % 
Competed in the primary election?*   
Yes 18 58.1 
No 12 38.7 
Unspecified 1 3.2 
Number of candidates on the primary election ballot**   
1 4 22.2 
2 2 11.1 
3 7 38.9 
4 2 11.1 
5 2 11.1 
Unspecified 1 3.2 
Competed in the general election?*   
Yes 20 64.5 
No 11 35.5 
Number of candidates on the general election ballot***   
1 1 5.0 
2 15 75.0 
4 1 5.0 
6 or more 3 15.0 
Elected?   
Yes 10 28.6 
No 25 71.4 
* Interview participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 4) were 
excluded from this item. 
** Only interview participants who reported participating in the primary election (n = 18) 
were included in this item. 
*** Only interview participants who reported participating in the general election (n = 
20) were included in this item. 
 
Interview 
 Open-ended questions allow participants to present their experiences in their own 
words.  In this way, interviews are adaptable as follow-up and probing questions can be 
asked based on participants’ initial responses. Unlike a static survey that asks a set of 
predetermined questions as selected by the researcher, interviews allow the researcher to 
remain open to the “unexpected and the emergent” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, p. 172).  
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Table 4.16. Interview Participant Political Profile: Partisanship. 
 n % 
Office sought partisan or non-partisan?*    
Partisan 11 35.5 
Non-partisan 20 64.5 
Sought party endorsement from:**    
Democratic Party 6 54.5 
Republican Party 1 9.1 
Received party endorsement from:**   
Democratic Party 5 45.5 
Republican Party 1 9.1 
* Interview participants who reported participating in a retention election (n = 4) were 
excluded from this item. 
** Only interview participants who reported participating in a partisan election (n = 11) 
were included in this item.  Participants were able to select multiple response options. 
 
This method is particularly useful in this investigation as literature on the subject is 
lacking. 
Aside from a strong degree of openness in terms of participant responses, 
interviews also provide an efficient means by which to obtain information. Even a well-
designed survey might ask questions of little or no relevance to the participant and omit 
questions of greater significance. Although interviews can fall victim to similar 
difficulties, the researcher can adapt interview questions “on the fly” to better capture the 
participant’s experiences.   
A third issue, especially pertinent to this study, is that the circumstances of any 
given judicial contest, and of each candidate within a contest, vary widely. No set of 
universally appropriate survey measures regarding the topics of study here ever could be 
produced. That is, no single set of survey questions can possibly cover the wide range of 
experiences judicial candidates are likely to draw upon when discussing their campaigns. 
A method that can be more easily adapted to such diversity, in this case depth interviews, 
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allows for more effective and efficient collection of data not amenable to study via 
quantitative survey.     
Interviews are also preferable to other qualitative methods, such as participant-
observation methods, when studying judicial candidates to determine common 
experiences. Although following candidates on the campaign trail would generate a 
useful and different set of data related to this subject, the amount of time and resources 
dedicated to following only a few candidates would produce fine-grained and rich but 
overly situated findings at a significant cost.    
Interview participants were asked a number of questions to help further illustrate 
their experiences on the campaign trail. Interview questions focused on the candidate’s 
experiences and perceptions related to the media, campaigning, election reforms, and the 
consequences of campaigning (see Appendix C for interview materials). 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
Analyzing the data generated through qualitative inquiry is a process that directly 
involves the researcher and his or her interpretation of the data. Several scholars follow 
the grounded theory approach outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), which is an 
inductive approach that involves identifying the emergent themes present within the data. 
This usually involves (albeit implicitly) going through the process of coding and 
categorizing. Codes, as described by Lindlof and Taylor (2002) are “the linkages between 
the data and the categories posited by the researcher” (p. 216). On the other hand, 
categorization is the “process of characterizing the meaning of a unit of data with respect 
to certain generic properties” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 214) 
The process of coding and categorizing is unlikely to occur in a neat, linear, stage-
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like process. More specific approaches, such as Maykut and Morehouse's (1994) 
“constant comparison inquiry” detail this process by way of two primary phases: the 
coarse-grain phase, in which the researcher engages in close readings of text, writing 
memos, developing broad categories by expanding potential categories and contracting 
them as the analysis proceeds, and the fine-grain phase, in which categories are refined 
and further broken down (Butler-Kisber, 2010). The researcher works back and forth 
between these phases, constantly comparing categories, codes, and the data itself. This 
method, along with the coding methods described below, will be used in this 
investigation. 
Following Saldaña’s (2009) approach to coding qualitative data, data were coded 
in two phases. First, data were coded using what he refers to as “first cycle” coding 
methods. Initial coding, or “breaking down qualitative data into discrete parts, closely 
examining them, and comparing them for similarities and differences,” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 
81) was conducted initially through simultaneously employing descriptive coding, which 
“summarizes in a word or short phrase … the basic topic of a passage of qualitative data” 
(Saldaña, 2009, p. 70).   
Following initial coding, second cycle coding methods were used to further 
synthesize the data by developing a stronger categorical organization. Pattern coding, a 
second cycle method, was used to further reduce coded data into major themes (or “meta-
codes”). Similar codes from initial coding procedures were assembled based on their 
commonalty in order to develop a final pattern code. Saldaña (2009) notes that this 
method is appropriate for the development of major themes from the data and for the 
search of causes and explanations within the data.  
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Chapter Five presents the results of the study.                          
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Chapter Five 
Results and Discussion 
 This chapter presents the results of the quantitative survey, along with an analysis 
of the interview data collected. Evidence regarding research questions from Chapter 
Three is reviewed and tentative answers to the questions are presented. Given the amount 
of nonresponse, figures presented here should be interpreted with caution as true 
population data would produce more precise results. However, some of the sources of 
nonresponse are identifiable. Not all judicial candidates were contacted by the researcher 
as 1,265 candidates (32% of all candidates) were not contacted to participate in the study 
(due to lack of available contact information and a lack of adequate funds). It is possible 
that contact information was accurate. Therefore, observed differences could be the result 
of nonresponse bias. Because of the differences in response rates among the groups 
considered for analysis (e.g., partisan candidates, retention candidates, incumbents, etc.), 
differences of 5% (0.25 for scale items) or greater are considered “potentially significant,” 
warranting further investigation in future studies.  
The Importance of the News Media for Judicial Candidates 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, judicial candidates rarely receive significant news 
coverage from traditional media outlets (i.e., newspapers). Given the costs associated 
with campaigning, “free” media (or “earned media”) is attractive to candidates for 
judicial office. 
Extent of coverage. Table 5.1 presents the data regarding judicial candidates’ 
perceptions of the extent of coverage their campaigns received from the traditional news  
 
 
Table 5.1. “Which of the following best characterizes the extent of coverage your 
campaign received from the traditional news media?” 
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coverage. Overall, few candidates report receiving significant coverage (n = 15, 3%). The 
majority of respondents indicated receiving no coverage (n = 53, 11%) or minimal 
coverage (n = 191, 40%). This pattern generally holds across election types, the judicial 
office sought, incumbency status, and electoral outcome.   
Further examination of the level of office sought reveals stark differences in the 
perceived extent of news coverage. Candidates for appellate court report far less news 
coverage than candidates for other office levels, with over 70% of appellate court 
candidates reporting no coverage or minimal coverage. As one might expect, candidates 
for supreme court report receiving greater news coverage, though the majority report 
receiving minimal (n = 7, 41%) or limited coverage (n = 7, 41%). Candidates in partisan 
and non-partisan elections report receiving similar amounts of news coverage, though a 
substantial amount of judges standing for retention (n = 20, 28%) claim they received no 
coverage at all. Few candidates in partisan (n = 7, 7%) or non-partisan elections (n = 11, 
5%) share the same perception. Incumbents have a bleaker view of the media’s coverage 
of their campaign compared to their non-incumbent counterparts. Whereas most 
incumbents’ responses to this survey item fell between “None” and “Limited,” most non-
incumbents’ responses fell between “Minimal” and “Moderate.” Surprisingly, those who 
lost the election reported receiving greater coverage than those who won.  
Table 5.2 summarizes the results regarding the number of candidates who 
reported receiving significant attention from non-traditional media sources. Overall, 
several candidates report receiving attention from social media (n = 182, 39%), and a few 
received coverage from talk radio (n = 71, 15%) or political blogs (n = 75, 16%). Slightly 
 
 
Table 5.2. “Please indicate which, if any, of the following non-traditional media 
sources provided significant attention to your campaign.” 
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less than half the candidates do not receive any coverage from these sources (n = 193, 
41%). 
Substantial differences existed across all levels of the variables of interest. Judges 
standing for retention overwhelmingly report receiving no attention from any non-
traditional media sources (n = 41, 58%). Although nearly half of all partisan and non-
partisan candidates reported receiving coverage from social media (n = 46, 47%; n = 96, 
48% respectively), far fewer candidates for retention received such coverage (n = 18, 
25%). As one might expect, a greater number of candidates for supreme court received 
attention from these non-traditional media sources than candidates for other levels of the 
judiciary. Similarly, greater numbers of trial court candidates reported receiving attention 
from these sources than appellate court candidates. In fact, a majority of appellate court 
candidates (n = 27, 59%) report receiving no attention from these sources. Nearly twice 
as many incumbents than non-incumbents report receiving no coverage at all from these 
sources (n = 60, 57% compared to n = 55, 29% respectively). Election winners more 
frequently report receiving no coverage from non-traditional sources (n = 102, 50%) 
compared to defeated candidates (n = 59, 34%). 
As Table 5.3 shows, across all election types, level of office, incumbency status, 
and electoral outcome, the majority of judicial candidates have accepted that the news 
media are unlikely to provide significant coverage of their campaign or contest. Most 
notably, appellate court candidates overwhelmingly do not expect to receive coverage (n 
= 44, 96%), though supreme court candidates are split, with a little less than half (47%) 
who expected significant news coverage. Non-incumbents appear more hopeful than 
incumbents at securing coverage, with over 25% of non-incumbents reporting that they  
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Table 5.3. “Did you expect your contest to receive significant news coverage?” 
  
Yes No Unspecified 
n % n % n % 
Election type             
Retention 8 11 61 86 2 3 
Partisan 17 18 77 79 3 3 
Non-Partisan 46 23 152 76 3 1 
Unspecified 10 10 56 54 37 36 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 8 47 9 53 -- -- 
Appellate Court 1 2 44 96 1 2 
Trial Court 58 20 231 78 7 2 
Other 6 29 15 71 -- -- 
Unspecified 8 9 47 51 37 40 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 13 12 88 83 5 5 
Non-Incumbent 49 26 139 73 2 1 
Unspecified 19 11 119 68 38 22 
Elected             
Won 21 10 175 86 7 3 
Lost 51 29 123 70 2 1 
Unspecified 9 10 48 52 36 39 
Total 81 17 346 73 45 10 
 
expected significant coverage compared to less than half that amount of incumbents 
(12%). 
Boring campaigns, disinterested public. Interview data revealed candidates had 
developed a number of explanations as to why judicial campaigns and elections receive 
little to no coverage from the media. Candidates differed as to what precisely makes 
judicial races unattractive to media outlets. One of the more prominent themes that 
emerged from the interviews was that judicial races are boring, uninteresting and dull.  
A second view expressed as to why coverage is scant was that the public has little 
interest in the courts. James Egan, an Oregon appellate court candidate, explained, “The 
media industry - I mean they have to cover stories that people want to see. If you cover 
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things that people don't want to see, people aren't going to watch so much.”  A similar 
view was shared by Louisiana appellate court candidate, J. Christopher Erny. “It was a 
judicial election,” he explained, “most people don't really care about judicial elections. 
They don't know what a judge does.” The media, according to California trial court 
candidate, John Henry, may not be able to adequately report the judiciary’s doings in an 
easy-to-understand, marketable fashion.  
“It's really kind of difficult to encapsulate things like ‘judicial philosophy’ in a 
sound bite that may be catchy. I mean you can come up with catchphrases but ... 
nobody's going to say that they want to be soft on crime. Nobody wants to say 
that they're going to be unfair … It requires a kind of a second level of discussion 
to really get to what someone means when they say ‘tough on crime’ or what 
someone means when they say that people will ‘be treated fairly.’” 
The public lacks an interest in judicial elections, according to Chris Lipscomb, a trial 
court candidate in Wisconsin, “because you almost have to run a boring race.”   
 Candidates cite campaign speech regulations as the root cause of boring 
campaigns. As Stephen Burk, a Florida trial court candidate, reasoned: “[The news 
media] didn't really cover any of our campaign stops because they were all very 
uneventful because you can't say anything.” Allen Miller, a Washington trial court 
candidate, offered a similar view: “Judicial races are not as sexy because of the fact that 
… you're not spouting off on issues. You're basically just talking about your biography.” 
 Others reasoned the lack of coverage was due to the presence of higher profile 
races, making judicial races less interesting by comparison. Paul Kennedy, a candidate 
for New Mexico’s Supreme Court, recalled,   
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“There was a Presidential race. There was a US Senatorial race. There were 
Congressional races. So all those races had a lot more money in them and with a 
lot more TV advertising and so of course they’re the high profile races and so that 
really detracts from anything below that level.” 
 Only the extraordinary get coverage. For the few that received extensive 
coverage from the news media, the reason why they receive such coverage is clear: they 
are extraordinary candidates or are running in races whose distinctive qualities can be 
easily grasped by the public. “I was and am the first female chief justice of this court,” 
declared Ann Crawford McClure, a Texas appellate court candidate. “The court was 
established in 1911. We celebrated our centennial event two years ago and the media was 
loving, totally loving the, the fact that we had a first female chief justice in the history of 
the court and that obviously played to the gender vote. I made history and the El Paso 
Times did this amazing story on me. Front page: lady justice, first female. It was a huge 
article that garnered tremendous attention in the community.” Likewise, the race itself 
may be so uncommon that it receives a wealth of media coverage. One California trial 
court explained, “Contested judicial campaigns are rare and so [my race] got a lot of 
attention just because it was kind of a once in a generation event. I don't think we had 
contested judicial elections in our area in probably 25 years and we had two at the same 
[time].” 
 Media coverage as undesirable. For some, the lack of media coverage is a 
godsend.  “Who wants to subject themselves and their family to the types of scrutiny that 
others are often subjected to?” asked Mark Shriver, a Georgia trial court candidate. “I 
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think that's one reason why I ran in a judicial race as opposed to some other political 
position because I didn't expect it and it didn't happen.”  
Aside from unwanted intrusions into the candidate’s personal life, candidates 
have no problem with being snubbed by undesirable media outlets. “[The local] paper is 
big, but, on the other hand it's loathed and hated by the conservative portion of the 
population,” explained one trial court candidate. “The Tea Partiers just think it's a 
communist rag ... I mean some people will … find out who the [paper] endorsed and vote 
for the opponent.” Being “guilty by association” was a fear also held by Tod Daniel, a 
Wisconsin trial court candidate. “I can't even remember who [the paper] endorsed 
anymore because you generally don't want their endorsement,” Daniel recounted. 
“They're right-wing lunatics … [and] we’re a union county.”   
Type of coverage. Aside from the sheer amount of coverage, survey respondents 
also addressed the type of coverage they received. Specifically, candidates assessed 
whether coverage was a) adequate, b) focused on important issues, c) sensationalist in 
nature, d) biased in favor of the opposition or in favor of themselves, and e) accurate. 
Adequacy of coverage. Tables 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show the results concerning 
candidates’ perceptions of the adequacy of news coverage. Overall, data show candidates 
leaned toward agreement with the claim that the news coverage they received was 
inadequate (M = 3.21, SD = 1.22).  Little variation was found among election types and 
level of office sought, though there are stark differences based on incumbency status and 
electoral outcome. Incumbents were slightly less prone to agree that coverage was 
inadequate (M = 2.84, SD = 1.26) compared to non-incumbents (M = 3.31, SD = 1.2). 
Perhaps unsurprising, election winners also tended to disagree (M = 2.76, SD = 1.16) and  
 
 
Table 5.4.1. “News coverage of my electoral contest was inadequate” 
(Percentages).* 
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Table 5.4.2. “News coverage of my electoral contest was inadequate” (Scale).* 
 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 3.00 1.25 
Partisan 47 3.17 1.19 
Non-Partisan 102 3.22 1.25 
Unspecified 20 3.50 1.10 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 10 3.50 1.27 
Appellate Court 13 3.54 1.39 
Trial Court 143 3.18 1.19 
Other 10 2.70 1.42 
Unspecified 17 3.29 1.16 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 37 2.84 1.26 
Non-Incumbent 111 3.31 1.20 
Unspecified 45 3.27 1.19 
Elected       
Won 84 2.76 1.16 
Lost 94 3.54 1.17 
Unspecified 15 3.60 1.06 
Total 193 3.21 1.22 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
defeated candidates were more willing to support the claim (M = 3.54, SD = 1.17).   
Focus on important issues. Tables 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 summarize the data related to 
candidates’ views as to whether the media focused on important issues. Overall, 
candidates tilted toward disagreement on this survey item (M = 2.61, SD = 1.19). 
Differences across office levels were surprising. Whereas appellate court candidates 
 
 
Table 5.5.1. “News coverage of my electoral contest focused on the important 
issues” (Percentages).* 
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Table 5.5.2. “News coverage of my electoral contest focused on the important issues” 
(Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 2.75 1.29 
Partisan 46 2.74 1.18 
Non-Partisan 102 2.58 1.17 
Unspecified 21 2.33 1.24 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 10 2.40 1.26 
Appellate Court 13 3.08 1.38 
Trial Court 142 2.59 1.17 
Other 10 3.10 1.20 
Unspecified 18 2.28 1.13 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 37 2.92 1.09 
Non-Incumbent 110 2.55 1.19 
Unspecified 46 2.52 1.26 
Elected       
Won 84 2.95 1.22 
Lost 93 2.40 1.11 
Unspecified 16 2.06 1.06 
Total 193 2.61 1.19 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
appear to be the ones left out of the news cycle, they were mostly neutral on this item (M 
= 3.08, SD = 1.38) compared to supreme court candidates (M = 2.40, SD = 1.26) or trial 
court candidates (M = 2.59, SD = 1.17). Incumbents (M = 2.92, SD = 1.09) and election 
winners (M = 2.95, SD = 1.22) also view the media more favorably on this measure than 
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non-incumbents (M = 2.55, SD = 1.19) and those defeated in the election                        
(M = 2.4, SD = 1.11). 
Sensationalism. Results concerning whether participants felt the media focused 
on their electoral contests’ most sensational features are presented in Tables 5.6.1 and 
5.6.2. Overall, candidates fell somewhere between neutral and somewhat disagreement 
with the notion that the media were sensationalist in their coverage (M = 2.87, SD = 1.24). 
Supreme court candidates felt that the media were sensationalist (M = 3.2, SD = 1.32), 
while appellate court candidates disagreed (M = 2.31, SD = 1.11).  
Candidates for appellate and trial courts felt the media were somewhat passive 
bystanders in their contests. Timothy Vocke, a candidate for trial court, noted the shift in 
the media’s role between his first campaign and his most recent: 
“The media 30 years ago - I think fanned the flames and I think that was part of 
the problem. We have weekly newspapers up here and I used to hate to open the 
newspaper on Thursday morning because I knew that there would just be awful 
things in it … [this time,] they were observers rather than participants and their 
treatment of all three candidates was very even-handed.”  
The lack of an active press acting as watchdog was frustrating to some candidates, 
such as James Rowe, a West Virginia Supreme Court candidate.  “I don't think [the 
media] got into the records as much as they could have and should have,” Rowe said.  
“They just weren't that involved. We don't really have a lot of reporting going on in our 
state these days it seems in so far as the newspapers are concerned.” 
Others found the media was more interested in candidates embroiled in scandal. 
David Towler, a candidate for a Texas appellate court, noted, “[the media] seemed to 
 
 
Table 5.6.1. "News coverage of my electoral contest focused on its most 
sensational features" (Percentages).* 
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Table 5.6.2. "News coverage of my electoral contest focused on its most sensational 
features" (Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 2.75 1.26 
Partisan 47 2.60 1.17 
Non-Partisan 99 3.04 1.18 
Unspecified 20 2.80 1.61 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 10 3.20 1.32 
Appellate Court 13 2.31 1.11 
Trial Court 140 2.93 1.15 
Other 9 2.67 1.66 
Unspecified 18 2.72 1.67 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 37 2.81 1.15 
Non-Incumbent 108 2.91 1.22 
Unspecified 45 2.82 1.39 
Elected       
Won 82 2.85 1.30 
Lost 92 2.87 1.12 
Unspecified 16 2.94 1.65 
Total 190 2.87 1.24 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
spend more time on an individual candidate that had some dirt than they did on the 
candidates where the race wasn't as newsworthy.” 
Bias.  Candidates’ responses to whether they believed media coverage was biased 
in favor of their opposition are summarized in Tables 5.7.1 and 5.7.2.  Overall, candidates’ 
responses fell once again between disagreement and neutral 
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opposition" (Percentages).* 
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Table 5.7.2. "News coverage of my electoral contest was biased in favor of my 
opposition" (Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 2.79 1.35 
Partisan 46 2.41 1.20 
Non-Partisan 102 2.76 1.24 
Unspecified 22 3.05 1.46 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 9 2.67 1.00 
Appellate Court 13 2.38 1.26 
Trial Court 144 2.77 1.26 
Other 10 2.00 1.33 
Unspecified 18 2.94 1.47 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 38 2.16 0.97 
Non-Incumbent 110 2.80 1.28 
Unspecified 46 2.98 1.39 
Elected       
Won 84 2.20 1.16 
Lost 94 3.07 1.19 
Unspecified 16 3.31 1.45 
Total 194 2.72 1.28 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
(M = 2.72, SD = 1.28). Somewhat surprisingly, non-partisan candidates were in more 
agreement with the notion that the media favored their opponents (M = 2.76, SD = 2.41) 
than partisan candidates (M = 2.41, SD = 1.2). Appellate court candidates were less likely 
to agree that the press exhibited a bias favoring their opponents (M = 2.38, SD = 1.26) 
compared to supreme court (M = 2.67, SD = 1.00) and trial court candidates                   
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(M = 2.77, SD = 1.26). Non-incumbents (M = 2.80, SD = 1.28) and defeated candidates 
(M = 3.07, SD = 1.19) were also more likely to suggest the media favored their opponents 
compared to incumbents (M = 2.16, SD = 0.97) and election winners (M = 2.20, SD = 
1.16). 
Tables 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 summarize candidates’ responses to whether they believed 
the news coverage of their electoral contests was biased in their own favor. As the table 
shows, few candidates felt that the media favored them in the election. Only two 
candidates (less than one percent who received this survey question) felt strongly that the 
media favored them in the election. Overall, candidates somewhat disagreed that this 
form of bias was present (M = 2.08, SD = 1.07). Differences were minor among 
candidates based on election type, incumbency status, and electoral result. Appellate 
court candidates were in strong disagreement with such a claim (M = 1.77, SD = 0.83) 
with more than one third of such candidates (n = 5, 38%) voicing strong disagreement 
and more than half (n = 7, 53%) reporting some level of disagreement. 
Although candidates did not report an overwhelming perception of media bias 
(either in favor of their opposition or themselves), interview participants discussed media 
bias stemming from partisanship, close associations between the opposition and the 
media, and media incompetency.  Candidates running in partisan elections, such as 
Lawrence Praeger, a Texas appellate court candidate, considered the partisanship of 
media outlets. “The newspaper is very Republican and I ran as a Democrat,” Praeger 
observed. “Now occasionally they'll endorse a Democrat if there's a scandal or something 
of that nature, but only in the rare cases do you see the endorsements go against what is 
traditionally seen as very conservative Republican newspaper.” 
 
 
Table 5.8.1. "News coverage of my electoral contest was biased in my favor" 
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Table 5.8.2. "News coverage of my electoral contest was biased in my favor" 
(Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 2.21 1.25 
Partisan 47 2.09 1.12 
Non-Partisan 102 2.12 1.00 
Unspecified 22 1.77 1.07 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 10 2.50 1.08 
Appellate Court 13 1.77 0.83 
Trial Court 144 2.17 1.08 
Other 10 1.60 1.07 
Unspecified 18 1.67 0.91 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 38 2.39 1.13 
Non-Incumbent 111 2.05 1.01 
Unspecified 46 1.91 1.11 
Elected       
Won 84 2.20 1.19 
Lost 95 2.05 0.96 
Unspecified 16 1.63 0.89 
Total 195 2.08 1.07 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
 For others, the source of bias came from the connections between the media outlet 
and the opposition. “[This publisher] tried to undermine me in all his questioning by 
asking me very leading questions that were not objective, that were designed to try to 
undermine me and try to say that my opponent was a lot better qualified than I was,” said 
one California trial court candidate. “He was just out there to put me on a hit list and do 
122  
whatever he can to discredit me in his paper because he was buddies with the father who 
was a judge and friendly with his son and that became very apparent in his hatchet job 
and what he had written about me in his publication.” 
 Candidates may have felt that the media were more incompetent than biased, as 
was the case with Courtney McAllister, a California trial court candidate. “Two days 
prior to the election, the paper ran a series of letters to the editor that either promoted my 
opponent or lambasted me and we had several letters that friends had submitted to the 
paper that did not get published in those last two days. It was bizarre. I couldn't believe it,” 
said McAllister, “I open the paper and there's like four letters that are for him or against 
me and none of our letters were published ... So we reached out to the paper. At the same 
time - the paper's editor was fired and so it was hard to even figure out who was in charge 
and nothing could be done. We'd get e-mail or phone call replies saying ‘Sorry, we can't 
find your letters and this is what we ran with.’ It was disappointing … It was frustrating.” 
A Texas appellate court candidate reported a similar situation: “[The newspaper] 
scheduled me for an interview at a time when I had a conflict - a meeting that I myself 
was hosting and could not move and I called them repeatedly in an interval between 
receiving the notice and the meeting time and I finally got to speak to someone - the 
person - after the time for it - the next day - and he had already published a 
recommendation for my opponent, which was pretty sucky.” 
 Accuracy. As Tables 5.9.1 and 5.9.2 show, candidates felt that the media was 
accurate (M = 3.38, SD = 1.18). Minor differences were found across office level and 
incumbency status, though all leaned toward agreement with the claim that the media 
were accurate. Notably, appellate court candidates were more in agreement
 
 
Table 5.9.1. "News coverage of my electoral contest was accurate" 
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Table 5.9.2. "News coverage of my electoral contest was accurate" (Scale).* 
 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type    
Retention 24 3.58 1.10 
Partisan 46 3.52 1.17 
Non-Partisan 102 3.31 1.15 
Unspecified 21 3.14 1.46 
Office sought    
Supreme Court 10 3.00 1.33 
Appellate Court 13 3.77 1.01 
Trial Court 142 3.37 1.16 
Other 10 3.80 1.32 
Unspecified 18 3.11 1.32 
Incumbent    
Incumbent 38 3.58 1.29 
Non-Incumbent 110 3.33 1.12 
Unspecified 45 3.33 1.26 
Elected    
Won 84 3.71 1.20 
Lost 93 3.13 1.07 
Unspecified 16 3.06 1.39 
Total 193 3.38 1.18 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
 (M = 3.77, SD = 1.01) than supreme court candidates (M = 3.00, SD = 1.33) or trial court 
candidates (M = 3.37, SD = 1.16). Election winners (M = 3.71, SD = 1.20) were also 
more in agreement than defeated candidates (M = 3.13, SD = 1.07), though again both 
groups fell somewhere between neutral and agreement on this measure.  
Candidate campaign strategy. Results pertaining to whether candidates felt the 
media focused too much on candidate campaign strategies are reported in Tables 5.10.1 
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and 5.10.2. Candidates were united in their disagreement with the idea that the media was 
fixated with campaign strategy (M = 2.20, SD = 1.03). Interestingly, those in partisan 
races voiced stronger disagreement (M = 1.96, SD = 1.04) than those standing for 
retention (M  = 2.21, SD = 0.93) or running in non-partisan races (M = 2.29, SD = 1.01).  
Supreme court candidates rated highest on this measure, falling nearly in the middle (M = 
2.90, SD = 1.29). This comes as no surprise as supreme court candidates wage higher-
scale campaigns and engage in far more campaign activity than candidates for other 
judicial offices. There was also a substantial divide between election winners (M = 1.98, 
SD = 1.02) and defeated candidates (M = 2.4, SD = 0.97), though both disagreed 
somewhat that the media focused on campaign strategy. 
Horse race coverage. Results pertaining to whether the media focused too much 
on who was leading or who was behind (i.e., “horse race coverage”) were similar to 
results regarding media focus on candidate campaign strategy. As Tables 5.11.1 and 
5.11.2 show, candidates across all levels of variables included for analysis disagreed with 
the notion that the media focused too heavily on horse race coverage. Supreme court 
candidates, who scored the highest on this item (M = 2.50, SD = 1.35), were still slanted 
toward disagreement. Horse race coverage is less likely in judicial races due to the lack of 
regular polling, a feature of most high-level legislative and executive offices. 
System/candidate effort. Determining who is involved in making campaign 
communication acts “happen” reveals the major players of the campaign and can 
influence the importance candidates place on particular acts. Results pertaining to the 
 
 
Table 5.10.1. "News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on 
candidate campaign strategies" (Percentages).* 
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Table 5.10.2. "News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on candidate 
campaign strategies" (Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type    
Retention 24 2.21 0.93 
Partisan 47 1.96 1.04 
Non-Partisan 100 2.29 1.01 
Unspecified 22 2.32 1.17 
Office sought    
Supreme Court 10 2.90 1.29 
Appellate Court 13 2.00 1.22 
Trial Court 142 2.23 0.96 
Other 10 1.60 0.97 
Unspecified 18 2.11 1.18 
Incumbent    
Incumbent 38 2.08 1.00 
Non-Incumbent 109 2.27 1.04 
Unspecified 46 2.15 1.03 
Elected    
Won 83 1.98 1.02 
Lost 94 2.40 0.97 
Unspecified 16 2.19 1.22 
Total 193 2.20 1.03 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
communication activities candidates engaged in and who initiated such events are 
summarized in Table 5.12. Given the complexity of these survey items, results were not 
broken down across the variables of interest, though future studies could further the 
exploration of system/candidate effort. 
 
 
Table 5.11.1. “News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on 
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Incum
bent 
18 
47 
9 
24 
11 
29 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
N
on-Incum
bent 
45 
40 
24 
21 
29 
26 
9 
8 
4 
4 
1 
1 
U
nspecified 
19 
35 
5 
9 
22 
41 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
8 
15 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
48 
57 
13 
15 
21 
25 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
L
ost 
28 
29 
23 
24 
33 
34 
7 
7 
4 
4 
1 
1 
U
nspecified 
6 
25 
2 
8 
8 
33 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
8 
33 
T
otal 
82 
40 
38 
19 
62 
30 
9 
4 
4 
2 
9 
4 
128 
129  
Table 5.11.2. “News coverage of my electoral contest focused too much on who was 
leading or behind” (Scale).* 
  
Scale** 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 24 2.04 0.95 
Partisan 47 1.81 1.06 
Non-Partisan 102 2.13 1.1 
Unspecified 22 2.23 0.92 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 10 2.50 1.35 
Appellate Court 13 1.62 1.19 
Trial Court 144 2.09 1.04 
Other 10 1.60 0.84 
Unspecified 18 2.06 0.94 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 38 1.82 0.87 
Non-Incumbent 111 2.13 1.15 
Unspecified 46 2.07 0.95 
Elected       
Won 84 1.73 0.92 
Lost 95 2.33 1.11 
Unspecified 16 2.13 0.96 
Total 195 2.05 1.05 
* Only respondents who reported 'Limited,' 'Moderate,' or 'Significant' news coverage 
(n = 204) were considered for analysis.  
** Results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item. 
 
The media do engage in actions that have the potential for generating news 
coverage.  Of the candidates who were interviewed (n = 212), nearly three-quarters (n = 
152, 72%) reported a media news organization initiated the event. Likewise, more  
than 75% of those who spoke to an editorial board (n = 143) did so at the behest of a 
media news organization. Radio and talk show participation, however, was divided 
 
 
Table 5.12. “For each of the following activities your campaign engaged in, 
please indicate all actors who initiated at least one communication event.” 
 
  
Media 
News organization 
A community, business, 
or activist group 
A political party 
You or your campaign 
organization 
An opponent 
Some other individual or 
group 
T
otal* 
* Total refers to the total number of participants who reported engaging in the 
activity.  
Note: Percentages take into account the number of participants who indicated the 
actor initiated the event out of the number of participants who reported engaging in 
the activity. 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
T
elevision talk show
 
 
26 
60 
6 
14 
2 
5 
14 
33 
-- 
-- 
3 
7 
43 
R
adio talk show
 
 
56 
48 
7 
6 
3 
3 
58 
50 
4 
3 
8 
7 
117 
Public speeches 
 
24 
10 
138 
55 
101 
41 
113 
45 
7 
3 
54 
22 
249 
B
roadcast debates 
 
24 
31 
41 
53 
5 
6 
4 
5 
2 
3 
7 
9 
78 
Public debates that 
w
ere not broadcast 
9 
6 
97 
69 
37 
26 
16 
11 
-- 
-- 
29 
21 
140 
Provide an interview
 
to a journalist 
152 
72 
6 
3 
5 
2 
70 
33 
5 
2 
4 
2 
212 
Speak to an editorial 
board 
108 
76 
5 
4 
-- 
-- 
32 
22 
3 
2 
5 
4 
143 
A
ddress a com
m
unity 
group 
12 
4 
184 
63 
54 
19 
163 
56 
8 
3 
42 
14 
290 
Fill out an issues 
questionnaire 
77 
36 
119 
56 
29 
14 
49 
23 
-- 
-- 
39 
18 
214 
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between candidate effort and media effort. Of the 43 candidates who reported 
participating in television talk shows, 26 (60%) reported having done so at the request of 
a media organization. The difference is more staggering when it comes to the 117 
candidates who were featured on radio talk shows. Of those 117, 56 (48%) reported 
having participated as a result of the news media asking for their involvement. A total of 
58 candidates (50%) reported having done so based on their own effort to get on the air.   
Public appearances (i.e., public speeches, broadcast debates, public debates that 
were not broadcast, and addressing a community group) were largely a result of the 
involvement of community, business, or activist groups; political parties; and other 
individuals or groups. Of the 249 candidates who engaged in public speeches, 138 (55%) 
report having done so by request of community, business, or activities groups. These 
groups were also cited by 41 of the 78 candidates (53%) who engaged in broadcast 
debates and 97 of the 140 candidates (69%) who engaged in public debates that were not 
broadcast. They were also instrumental in asking candidates to address community 
groups (63% of candidates who addressed such groups identified these groups as event 
initiators) or to fill out issues questionnaires (56% of candidates who filled out such 
questionnaires noted they were sent by such groups).   
For communication events candidates did not engage in, understanding who 
attempted to initiate such events (if anyone) gives a broader picture as to who promotes 
campaign communications activities. Results, summarized in Table 5.13, demonstrate 
that candidates rarely turn down opportunities to engage in campaign activity. It seems 
that the only campaign activity candidates refuse to engage in but are nonetheless asked 
 
 
Table 5.13. “For each of the following activities you indicated that your 
campaign did not engage in, please indicate, if any, of the following groups 
requested that you engage in the activity.” 
 
 
  
Media 
News organization 
A community, business, 
or activist group 
A political party 
You or your campaign 
organization 
An opponent 
Some other individual or 
group 
T
otal* 
* Total refers to the total number of participants who reported engaging in the 
activity.  
Note: Percentages take into account the number of participants who indicated the 
actor initiated the event out of the number of participants who reported engaging in 
the activity. 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
T
elevision talk show
 
 
8 
2 
  
  
1 
0 
3 
1 
1 
0 
5 
1 
429 
R
adio talk show
 
 
6 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
7 
2 
-- 
-- 
4 
1 
355 
Public speeches 
 
-- 
-- 
11 
5 
8 
4 
7 
3 
1 
0 
3 
1 
223 
B
roadcast debates 
 
2 
1 
4 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
1 
394 
Public debates that 
w
ere not broadcast 
1 
0 
8 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
-- 
-- 
4 
1 
332 
Provide an interview
 
to a journalist 
7 
3 
3 
1 
-- 
-- 
2 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
260 
Speak to an editorial 
board 
3 
1 
1 
0 
-- 
-- 
1 
0 
-- 
-- 
1 
0 
329 
A
ddress a 
com
m
unity group 
5 
3 
52 
29 
19 
10 
24 
13 
3 
2 
16 
9 
182 
Fill out an issues 
questionnaire 
3 
1 
25 
10 
3 
1 
1 
0 
-- 
-- 
11 
4 
258 
132 
133  
to do is addressing community groups. As the table shows, of the 182 candidates who did 
not address a community group, a sizeable portion (n = 52, 29%) were asked by 
community groups to do so. This result indicates that candidates are not always willing to 
get in front of any group that wants their presence.   
Media relationship. Tables 5.14.1 and 5.14.2 summarize respondents’ ratings of 
their relationships with the news media. Results suggest most candidates had a somewhat 
positive relationship with the media (M = 3.50, SD = 1.03), with less than 4% (n = 16) 
reporting a “very negative” relationship and only 11% (n = 53) reporting a “somewhat 
negative” relationship. Participants in partisan and non-partisan races reported more 
positive relationships with the media (M = 3.62, SD = 1.01; M = 3.57, SD = 1.07 
respectively) than judges standing for retention (M = 3.30, SD = 0.89). Candidates for 
supreme court also reported more positive relationships with the media (M = 3.88, SD = 
0.86) than candidates for appellate court (M = 3.47, SD = 0.87) and trial court (M = 3.50, 
SD = 1.03). For the most part, candidates fell squarely between neutral and somewhat 
positive on this measure. 
In follow up interviews, candidates discussed the nearly symbiotic relationships 
formed with the media. “I develop[ed] relationships with reporters. I didn't give them 
anything I shouldn't have,” explained Glenn Thompson, an Alabama trial court candidate. 
“I didn't speak out of turn. If I couldn't talk to them on the record, I'd at least make sure 
they understood the process and why I couldn't talk to them on the record and when I 
could give them a quote, I gave them a quote. And they loved me for it.”   
Although survey results show a generally positive relationship between 
candidates and the media, candidates found themselves frequently frustrated with the
 
 
Table 5.14.1. “Please rate your relationship with the news media during your 
campaign” (Percentages).* 
  
V
ery 
negative 
Som
ew
hat 
negative 
N
either 
positive 
nor 
negative 
Som
ew
hat 
positive 
V
ery 
positive 
U
n-
specified 
* Excludes cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 20). 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
etention 
2 
3 
6 
8 
36 
51 
16 
23 
7 
10 
4 
6 
Partisan 
2 
2 
9 
9 
34 
35 
28 
29 
22 
23 
2 
2 
N
on-Partisan 
5 
2 
33 
16 
44 
22 
77 
38 
40 
20 
2 
1 
U
nspecified 
7 
7 
5 
5 
43 
42 
21 
20 
15 
15 
12 
12 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
1 
6 
4 
24 
8 
47 
4 
24 
-- 
-- 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
1 
2 
2 
4 
23 
50 
13 
28 
6 
13 
1 
2 
T
rial C
ourt 
9 
3 
39 
13 
92 
31 
99 
33 
51 
17 
6 
2 
O
ther 
  
  
6 
29 
3 
14 
4 
19 
7 
33 
1 
5 
U
nspecified 
6 
7 
5 
5 
35 
38 
18 
20 
16 
17 
12 
13 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
-- 
-- 
9 
8 
38 
36 
33 
31 
25 
24 
1 
1 
N
on-Incum
bent 
6 
3 
32 
17 
39 
21 
73 
38 
37 
19 
3 
2 
U
nspecified 
10 
6 
12 
7 
80 
45 
36 
20 
22 
13 
16 
9 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
1 
0 
19 
9 
77 
38 
56 
28 
44 
22 
6 
3 
L
ost 
9 
5 
29 
16 
43 
24 
68 
39 
25 
14 
2 
1 
U
nspecified 
6 
6 
5 
5 
37 
40 
18 
19 
15 
16 
12 
13 
T
otal 
16 
3 
53 
11 
157 
33 
142 
30 
84 
18 
20 
4 
134 
135  
Table 5.14.2. “Please rate your relationship with the news media during your 
campaign” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* 
n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 67 3.30 0.89 
Partisan 95 3.62 1.01 
Non-Partisan 199 3.57 1.07 
Unspecified 91 3.35 1.07 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 17 3.88 0.86 
Appellate Court 45 3.47 0.87 
Trial Court 290 3.50 1.03 
Other 20 3.60 1.27 
Unspecified 80 3.41 1.11 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 105 3.70 0.93 
Non-Incumbent 187 3.55 1.09 
Unspecified 160 3.30 1.01 
Elected       
Won 197 3.62 0.95 
Lost 174 3.41 1.09 
Unspecified 81 3.38 1.09 
Total 452 3.50 1.03 
* Excludes cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 20). 
media’s endorsement of candidates (namely the opposition).  Lawrence Praeger, a Texas 
Appellate Court candidate, described his dissatisfaction with the news media: 
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“I had kind of a particularly testy relationship with [the media] because when I 
ran the first time, they were kind of condescending and when I ran a second time 
and they interviewed me - it was almost kind of humorous because they endorsed 
this lawyer - my opponent - who'd never tried any cases. I don't think he picked 
one jury in his life. They endorsed him because he was an energy lawyer - 
lobbyist - and then when they came back to me the second time around for an 
endorsement and I said to them - between the first election and the second 
election - an opinion came out from the court of appeals that he was on where 
they disqualified a judge or an arbitrator cause he had some relationship with an 
industry and so I pointed out to the editorial board. I said, ‘Well’ - they said, 
‘Well what have they done wrong at the court?’ I said, ‘It's not what they've done 
wrong, it's what they've done right.’ I said, ‘They said this case came out and they 
said anyone who's this closely associated with these parties or litigants has to 
resign from this case and my opponent - he represented energy companies and 
there's not a lot of mom and pop energy houses out there so he'd have to resign 
from any energy case.’ And they said, ‘Well I have no problem with that - he'll do 
that.’ I said, ‘Well if he does that, that was the only reason you endorsed him last 
time’ (laughs).” 
 For others, the politics of the media was the source of frustration. “You have 
editorial boards that are (sighs) like any small community,” said Karen Klein, a 
Washington trial court candidate, “You have alliances and more old-boy networks.” 
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 Media performance. Results pertaining to how well the media performed in 
terms of coverage of electoral contests are summarized in Table 5.15.1 and 5.15.2. 
Overall, candidates were slightly negative on this survey item (M = 2.90, SD = 1.18). 
Judges standing for retention were one of the few categories of candidates that had some 
more positive opinions of the media’s performance (M = 3.34, SD = 1.16). Continuing to 
follow the same pattern, incumbents (M = 3.01, SD = 1.22) and election winners (M = 
3.17, SD = 1.23) reported higher grades for the media’s performance than non-
incumbents (M = 2.76, SD = 1.13) and those defeated in the election (M = 2.61, SD = 
1.04). Appellate court candidates were more critical of the media’s performance (M = 
2.66, SD = 1.13) than were trial court candidates (M = 2.93, SD = 1.19). 
Results are surprising as more than half of all candidates reported receiving 
minimal or no coverage at all, which would inspire more critical evaluations of the 
media’s performance. Candidates may have pulled their punches when it came to rating 
the media’s performance because they did not expect coverage in the first place (nearly 
three out of four candidates reported that they did not expect to receive significant 
coverage). Beyond low expectations for receiving coverage, interviews revealed judicial 
candidates did not view the media as being a strong player in their elections regardless of 
the amount of coverage given. The day of the newspaper, they say, has ended: 
• “Most people gravitated away from the newspapers and I don't think [they are] 
much of a factor” - Paul Kennedy, New Mexico Supreme Court candidate. 
• “What goes on nowadays, I don't think newspapers have as much influence as 
they once did. I think it's decreasing” - Karen Klein, Washington trial court 
candidate. 
 
 
Table 5.15.1. “On a scale from A to F, please rate the overall news media 
performance with regard to coverage of the electoral contest in which you 
participated” (Percentages).* 
  
 
* Excludes cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 77). 
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11 
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3 
4 
13 
18 
 
Partisan 
5 
5 
17 
18 
28 
29 
25 
26 
18 
19 
4 
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9 
44 
22 
57 
28 
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24 
23 
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11 
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4 
11 
11 
17 
17 
12 
12 
10 
10 
49 
48 
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ourt 
-- 
-- 
5 
29 
4 
24 
7 
41 
1 
6 
-- 
-- 
 
A
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ourt 
3 
7 
6 
13 
12 
26 
14 
30 
6 
13 
5 
11 
 
T
rial C
ourt 
28 
9 
63 
21 
86 
29 
61 
21 
38 
13 
20 
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3 
14 
2 
10 
3 
14 
8 
38 
2 
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3 
14 
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8 
49 
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15 
14 
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14 
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28 
14 
48 
24 
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27 
29 
14 
22 
11 
22 
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3 
29 
16 
52 
30 
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14 
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5 
5 
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16 
8 
9 
8 
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8 
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18 
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20 
54 
11 
77 
16 
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Table 5.15.2. “On a scale from A to F, please rate the overall news media 
performance with regard to coverage of the electoral contest in which you 
participated” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* Total 
n M SD n 
Election type         
Retention 58 3.34 1.16 71 
Partisan 93 2.63 1.15 97 
Non-Partisan 190 2.93 1.16 201 
Unspecified 54 2.76 1.20 103 
Office sought         
Supreme Court 17 2.76 0.97 17 
Appellate Court 41 2.66 1.13 46 
Trial Court 276 2.93 1.19 296 
Other 18 2.78 1.31 21 
Unspecified 43 2.98 1.22 92 
Incumbent         
Incumbent 96 3.01 1.22 106 
Non-Incumbent 185 2.76 1.13 190 
Unspecified 114 3.02 1.22 176 
Elected         
Won 181 3.17 1.23 203 
Lost 170 2.61 1.04 176 
Unspecified 44 2.86 1.25 93 
Total 395 2.90 1.18 472 
* Excludes cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 77). 
•  “The three candidates who won - the two Republicans and myself - got, I 
think, more newspaper endorsements than anybody else, but I thought we 
were told no one reads newspapers anymore, so I don't know what to make of 
it all” - Bridget Mary McCormack, Michigan Supreme Court candidate. 
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• “While we were successful at getting in the paper, I think that newspaper 
publicity had almost nothing to do with the outcome to my disappointment 
because most people don't even read it. And if they do, it's just the casual 
glance and it doesn't influence their vote” - Courtney McAllister, California 
trial court candidate. 
Candidates were appreciative of gaining media coverage, but even for those who were 
not so quick to dismiss the influence of their local media, gauging the level of importance 
the news media play in judicial elections was beyond anyone’s grasp. 
 Summary. As expected, few candidates earn substantial coverage from 
traditional media sources and few expect to gain any significant coverage. Despite the 
scant amount of coverage, candidates report few faults with the type of coverage they 
received. Though candidates find coverage inadequate, most do not see media coverage 
as being sensationalist, biased, or focused on strategy/horserace coverage. Overall, 
candidates have a somewhat positive relationship with the media though they rated media 
performance slightly negative. Candidates do everything they can to earn free media 
coverage, but as follow-up interviews revealed, several candidates do not find traditional 
media coverage essential to securing an electoral victory as media sources, specifically 
newspapers, have less influence in judicial elections than they once did. 
Campaign Communication Methods 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, campaign communication media can be divided 
into three categories: earned or “free” media, paid media, and direct communications.   
 Earned or “free” media. Responses to survey items related to earned or “free” 
media are summarized in Tables 5.16.1 and 5.16.2. Judicial candidates engaged in several  
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Table 5.16.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Earned Media). 
 
  
Include a 
media 
coord-
inator or 
press 
secretary 
on staff 
Sent out 
press 
releases 
Scheduled 
press con-
ferences 
Submitted 
OpEd 
pieces or 
letters to 
the editor 
Television 
talk show 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 3 4 17 24 2 3 11 15 2 3 
Partisan 12 12 37 38 11 11 21 22 17 18 
Non-Partisan 26 13 107 53 8 4 69 34 20 10 
Unspecified 9 9 20 19 2 2 13 13 4 4 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 6 35 9 53 6 35 7 41 5 29 
Appellate Court 9 20 16 35 1 2 7 15 3 7 
Trial Court 28 9 129 44 10 3 83 28 27 9 
Other 2 10 9 43 3 14 6 29 4 19 
Unspecified 5 5 18 20 3 3 11 12 4 4 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 9 8 35 33 5 5 22 21 8 8 
Non-Incumbent 30 16 108 57 14 7 68 36 29 15 
Unspecified 11 6 38 22 4 2 24 14 6 3 
Elected                     
Won 21 10 66 33 11 5 40 20 17 8 
Lost 25 14 98 56 10 6 63 36 22 13 
Unspecified 4 4 17 18 2 2 11 12 4 4 
Total 50 11 181 38 23 5 114 24 43 9 
 
campaign communication methods specifically designed to generate news coverage. The 
three most popular methods were providing an interview to a journalist (n = 212, 45%), 
sending out press releases (n = 181, 38%), and speaking to an editorial board (n = 143, 
30%).  Few candidates scheduled press conferences (n = 23, 4%), appeared on a  
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Table 5.16.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Earned Media). 
(cont.) 
 
  
Radio talk 
show 
Provide 
an 
interview 
to a 
journalist 
Speak to 
an 
editorial 
board 
n % n % n % 
Election type       
Retention 12 17 19 27 11 15 
Partisan 31 32 52 54 36 37 
Non-Partisan 60 30 118 59 80 40 
Unspecified 14 14 23 22 16 16 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 5 29 13 76 14 82 
Appellate Court 10 22 19 41 20 43 
Trial Court 85 29 153 52 94 32 
Other 6 29 8 38 3 14 
Unspecified 11 12 19 21 12 13 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 25 24 42 40 34 32 
Non-Incumbent 64 34 125 66 81 43 
Unspecified 28 16 45 26 28 16 
Elected             
Won 51 25 80 39 50 25 
Lost 55 31 112 64 82 47 
Unspecified 11 12 20 22 11 12 
Total 117 25 212 45 143 30 
 
television talk show (n = 43, 9%), or included a media coordinator or press secretary on 
staff (n = 50, 11%). Despite their popularity, most of the “free” communication methods 
were rated as ineffective compared to paid media and direct communications. Press 
releases (M = 1.67, SD = 0.69), television talk shows (M = 1.86, SD = 0.65), radio talk  
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Table 5.16.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Earned 
Media).  
 
  
Include a media 
coordinator or 
press secretary 
on staff 
Sent out press 
releases 
Scheduled press 
conferences 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 2 2.50 0.71 14 1.50 0.65 1 3.00 -- 
Partisan 12 2.08 0.67 37 1.70 0.66 10 1.90 0.88 
Non-Partisan 24 2.38 0.71 97 1.70 0.71 8 2.00 0.76 
Unspecified 6 2.17 0.75 14 1.57 0.65 1 1.00 -- 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 6 2.00 0.63 9 1.78 0.83 6 1.50 0.55 
Appellate Court 9 2.33 0.87 15 1.53 0.52 -- -- -- 
Trial Court 25 2.24 0.66 118 1.67 0.68 9 2.33 0.87 
Other 2 3.00 0.00 9 2.00 0.87 3 2.33 0.58 
Unspecified 2 2.50 0.71 11 1.55 0.69 2 1.00 0.00 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 9 2.56 0.53 31 2.06 0.73 5 2.40 0.89 
Non-Incumbent 28 2.21 0.74 102 1.61 0.65 13 1.77 0.73 
Unspecified 7 2.14 0.69 29 1.48 0.63 2 2.00 1.41 
Elected                   
Won 21 2.62 0.59 60 1.87 0.77 9 2.44 0.88 
Lost 22 1.95 0.65 91 1.55 0.60 10 1.60 0.52 
Unspecified 1 2.00 -- 11 1.64 0.67 1 1.00 -- 
Total 44 2.27 0.69 162 1.67 0.69 20 1.95 0.83 
 
shows (M = 1.87, SD = 0.65), and even providing an interview to a journalist (M = 1.89, 
SD = 0.67) had overall effectiveness scores toward the “non-effective” side of the scale. 
Only two methods within this category - include a media coordinator or press secretary 
on staff (M = 2.27, SD = 0.69) and speak to an editorial board (M = 2.02, SD = 0.77) - 
were viewed as being somewhat effective.   
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Table 5.16.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Earned 
Media). (cont.) 
 
  
Submitted 
OpEd pieces or 
letters to the 
editor 
Television talk 
show Radio talk show 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 10 2.10 0.88 2 2.50 0.71 11 1.82 0.60 
Partisan 21 2.10 0.70 17 1.76 0.66 30 1.77 0.68 
Non-Partisan 65 1.94 0.73 20 1.90 0.64 57 1.98 0.64 
Unspecified 7 2.14 0.69 3 1.67 0.58 8 1.50 0.53 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 7 1.71 0.95 5 1.80 0.84 5 1.80 0.84 
Appellate Court 7 1.86 0.90 3 1.67 1.15 10 2.00 0.82 
Trial Court 78 2.01 0.69 27 1.96 0.59 81 1.86 0.61 
Other 6 2.17 0.75 4 1.50 0.58 5 2.00 1.00 
Unspecified 5 2.20 0.84 3 1.67 0.58 5 1.60 0.55 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 22 2.23 0.69 8 1.88 0.64 25 1.80 0.58 
Non-Incumbent 64 1.91 0.71 29 1.86 0.64 60 1.97 0.69 
Unspecified 17 2.06 0.83 5 1.80 0.84 21 1.67 0.58 
Elected                   
Won 39 2.31 0.66 17 1.94 0.75 50 2.02 0.65 
Lost 59 1.78 0.70 22 1.82 0.59 51 1.75 0.63 
Unspecified 5 2.20 0.84 3 1.67 0.58 5 1.60 0.55 
Total 103 2.00 0.73 42 1.86 0.65 106 1.87 0.65 
 
Judges standing for retention were less likely to engage in any of these campaign 
communication methods, likely due to campaign restrictions (i.e., some states bar 
retention candidates from campaigning unless substantial opposition to their retention 
exists) or the perception that retention is guaranteed.   
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Table 5.16.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Earned 
Media). (cont.) 
 
  
Provide an 
interview to a 
journalist 
Speak to an 
editorial board 
n M SD n M SD 
Election type       
Retention 17 1.94 0.56 9 1.78 0.83 
Partisan 51 1.90 0.73 36 1.75 0.73 
Non-Partisan 110 1.92 0.65 77 2.12 0.74 
Unspecified 16 1.56 0.63 11 2.36 0.81 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 13 1.85 0.69 14 2.14 0.66 
Appellate Court 19 1.95 0.85 20 2.05 0.69 
Trial Court 142 1.91 0.64 89 1.96 0.80 
Other 8 1.88 0.83 3 2.00 1.00 
Unspecified 12 1.58 0.51 7 2.43 0.79 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 39 1.95 0.76 34 2.12 0.69 
Non-Incumbent 119 1.91 0.64 78 1.97 0.77 
Unspecified 36 1.75 0.65 21 2.00 0.89 
Elected             
Won 77 2.03 0.67 49 2.27 0.73 
Lost 104 1.83 0.66 78 1.85 0.74 
Unspecified 13 1.54 0.52 6 2.17 0.98 
Total 194 1.89 0.67 133 2.02 0.77 
 
Supreme court candidates more frequently engaged in these activities compared to 
candidates for other levels of judicial office, whereas appellate court candidates showed a 
lack of effort to gain free media. Slightly more than a third of appellate candidates (n = 
16, 35%) reported sending press releases, far fewer than their supreme court and trial  
court counterparts (n = 9, 53%; n = 129, 44% respectively). This pattern emerged across 
146  
other communication methods as well. Appellate court candidates trailed behind supreme 
and trial court candidates in terms of submitting OpEd pieces or letters to the editor, 
engaging in television talk shows, engaging in radio talk shows, and providing interviews 
to journalists. 
Differences across incumbency status and electoral outcome demonstrated a 
singular, strong pattern: non-incumbents and defeated candidates report engaging in all of 
these activities at a higher frequency than incumbents and election winners. This finding 
reflects the up-hill battle these candidates ultimately face. Non-incumbents simply do not 
have the name recognition as most incumbents enjoy and must therefore try to generate 
as much awareness of themselves as they possibly can.   
Variations in effectiveness scores based on election type are difficult to interpret 
given the small number of retention candidates who reported having engaged in these 
methods. In most cases, differences in mean scores are slight enough to suggest little 
variation exists among effectiveness scores as a result of election type. This holds true for 
office sought as well, as slight variations are present within the data, but the limited 
number of cases makes it difficult to make substantial conclusions.   
Non-incumbents also gave lower effectiveness ratings on all of these methods 
compared to incumbents except for radio talk shows; a finding that escapes explanation 
within this study. Defeated candidates rated all of these methods lower in terms of 
effectiveness than did election winners, which should come as no surprise. 
 Paid media. Paid media was similarly popular among candidates, as Tables 
15.17.1 and 15.7.2 show. Overall, nearly one out of every five judicial candidates (n = 86, 
18%) reported having used paid television advertising in their campaign. This form of  
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Table 5.17.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Paid Media). 
 
  
Paid 
television 
advertising 
Paid radio 
advertising 
Paid 
newspaper 
advertising 
Paid outdoor 
advertising 
n % n % n % n % 
Election type         
Retention 7 10 12 17 19 27 15 21 
Partisan 23 24 45 46 61 63 44 45 
Non-Partisan 45 22 86 43 110 55 72 36 
Unspecified 11 11 13 13 20 19 17 17 
Office sought                 
Supreme Court 10 59 9 53 7 41 5 29 
Appellate Court 12 26 17 37 14 30 12 26 
Trial Court 53 18 114 39 160 54 110 37 
Other 2 10 7 33 14 67 10 48 
Unspecified 9 10 9 10 15 16 11 12 
Incumbent                 
Incumbent 24 23 35 33 51 48 29 27 
Non-Incumbent 43 23 93 49 119 63 88 46 
Unspecified 19 11 28 16 40 23 31 18 
Elected                 
Won 34 17 65 32 91 45 51 25 
Lost 45 26 84 48 104 59 85 48 
Unspecified 7 8 7 8 15 16 12 13 
Total 86 18 156 33 210 44 148 31 
  
campaign communication was most frequently used by supreme court candidates (n = 10, 
59%), though more than one quarter of appellate court candidates (n = 12, 26%) reported 
having used paid television advertising. Paid television advertising was expectedly less 
popular with trial court candidates, with less than one out of five (n = 53, 18%) reporting 
having used such ads in their campaigns. Compared to paid television advertising, paid 
radio advertising was a stronger focal point for appellate and trial court candidates  
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Table 5.17.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Paid 
Media). 
 
  
Paid television 
advertising 
Paid radio 
advertising 
Paid newspaper 
advertising 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 7 2.00 0.58 10 1.90 0.57 17 2.29 0.59 
Partisan 23 2.35 0.49 43 2.12 0.63 61 1.85 0.68 
Non-Partisan 43 2.30 0.77 83 2.10 0.66 104 1.88 0.64 
Unspecified 7 2.71 0.49 8 2.00 0.53 14 2.07 0.47 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 10 2.50 0.71 9 2.00 0.71 7 1.86 0.69 
Appellate Court 12 2.50 0.67 17 2.18 0.39 14 1.86 0.77 
Trial Court 51 2.25 0.66 107 2.07 0.65 151 1.93 0.65 
Other 2 1.50 0.71 7 2.14 0.90 14 1.86 0.53 
Unspecified 5 2.60 0.55 4 2.25 0.50 10 2.10 0.57 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 23 2.48 0.59 32 2.25 0.62 51 2.02 0.65 
Non-Incumbent 42 2.26 0.73 91 2.03 0.66 113 1.81 0.65 
Unspecified 15 2.27 0.59 21 2.05 0.50 32 2.19 0.54 
Elected                   
Won 33 2.52 0.57 61 2.25 0.57 91 2.14 0.62 
Lost 44 2.16 0.71 81 1.95 0.65 96 1.71 0.61 
Unspecified 3 2.67 0.58 2 2.50 0.71 9 2.00 0.50 
Total 80 2.33 0.67 144 2.08 0.63 196 1.92 0.65 
 
(n = 17, 37%; n = 114, 39% respectively). Paid newspaper advertising and paid outdoor 
advertising were used infrequently by supreme (n = 7, 41%; n = 14, 30% respectively) 
and appellate court candidates (n = 14, 30%; n = 12, 26% respectively).  In contrast, trial 
court candidates made significant use of these methods (n = 160, 54% used paid 
newspaper advertising; n = 110, 37% used paid outdoor advertising).  
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Table 5.17.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Paid 
Media). (cont.) 
 
  
Paid outdoor 
advertising 
n M SD 
Election type    
Retention 12 2.08 0.67 
Partisan 41 2.10 0.77 
Non-Partisan 64 2.19 0.61 
Unspecified 12 2.50 0.52 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 5 1.60 0.55 
Appellate Court 11 2.27 0.79 
Trial Court 96 2.14 0.66 
Other 10 2.60 0.52 
Unspecified 7 2.43 0.53 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 28 2.07 0.77 
Non-Incumbent 78 2.19 0.65 
Unspecified 23 2.26 0.62 
Elected       
Won 47 2.43 0.65 
Lost 75 2.01 0.65 
Unspecified 7 2.29 0.49 
Total 129 2.18 0.67 
 
As Table 15.17.1 shows, candidates competing in partisan and non-partisan 
elections used paid media similarly (e.g., a similar amount of partisan candidates 
 (n = 23, 24%) and non-partisan candidates (n = 45, 22%) purchased television 
advertising) in contrast to judges standing for retention (e.g., only 10% (n = 7) of judges 
standing for retention purchased television advertising). Partisan candidates outnumbered 
their non-partisan counterparts across all forms of paid media. Non-incumbents (except in 
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the case of paid television advertising) and candidates defeated in the election also 
reported greater frequency of use across all forms of paid media compared to incumbents 
and election winners. 
Overall, candidates rate paid media, aside from paid newspaper advertising, to be 
slightly above “somewhat effective.” Out of all of the campaign communication methods 
addressed by the survey, paid television advertising was ranked similarly in terms of 
overall effectiveness (M = 2.33, SD = 0.67) to direct mail (M = 2.37, SD = 0.64) and 
personal canvassing (door-to-door) (M = 2.53, SD = 0.66). Television advertising was 
reported as particularly effective for supreme court and appellate court candidates (M = 
2.50, SD = 0.71; M = 2.50, SD = 0.67 respectively). More surprising, however, is that 
candidates who won and those who lost both considered television commercials effective 
(M = 2.52, SD = 0.57; M = 2.16, SD = 0.71 respectively).     
 Other forms of paid media were not rated as highly, though most were considered 
beyond “somewhat effective” overall. Few differences across election type, office sought, 
incumbency status, or electoral outcome were found for paid radio advertising. Paid 
newspaper advertising fell toward “not very effective” overall (M = 1.92, SD = 0.65), 
though judges standing for retention found that method largely effective (M = 2.29, SD = 
0.59). Paid outdoor advertising was also favored by appellate court candidates (M = 2.27, 
SD = 0.79), though supreme court candidates saw otherwise (M = 1.60, SD = 0.55). 
 Although candidates openly expressed their inability to gauge the effectiveness of 
their campaign methods (discussed later in this section), few were skeptical of the power 
of paid advertising, particularly television advertising. For most candidates, television 
advertising was seen as the be-all, end-all campaign method. James Rowe, a West 
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Virginia Supreme Court candidate, exemplifies this viewpoint. “I think it still boils down 
basically to TV as opposed to other [methods] … Some old political type said, ‘TV, TV, 
TV,’ - that's what it all boils down to and he was right.” Ann Crawford McClure echoed 
and expanded on this perspective, claiming, “I could not have won without TV ads.  
Simply put.” 
 Candidates who found paid media ineffective at carrying their campaign messages 
cited channel and price limitations, as well as dwindling audiences, as reasons to doubt 
their influence in turning out voters. “Some of the other candidates - including the one I 
ran against - he did a lot of billboards - I don't think those are very effective because it 
doesn't give enough context for people to understand who you are or what it is you're 
running for,” Darren Kugler explained, noting the lack of available space (or bandwidth) 
of some forms of paid media. Tod Daniel noted the rise in costs associated with paid 
media: “The newspaper has priced itself out of business. And then the radio station is 
about the only thing that's affordable.” Others, such as Glenn Thompson, claimed the rise 
of competing media is driving away traditional media audiences. “Now, with the influx 
of XM radio, iPads, MP3s - a lot of people really don't listen to the radio,” said 
Thompson.   
 Direct communication. Direct communication methods were also well-used by 
candidates, as summarized in Tables 15.18.1 and 15.8.2. Yard signs dominated this 
category of communication methods, with 289 candidates (61%) having used this method. 
Other popular methods included attending news events or public forums (n = 275, 58%) 
campaign literature/brochures distribution (n = 275, 58%), campaign website or blog (n = 
266, 56%), social media (n = 249, 53%), public speeches (n = 249, 53%), and direct mail  
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Table 5.18.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Direct 
Communication). 
 
  
Attended 
news 
events or 
public 
forums 
Direct 
mail Telephone 
Yard 
Signs 
Personal 
can-
vassing 
(door-to-
door) 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 24 34 19 27 11 15 24 34 15 21 
Partisan 71 73 65 67 45 46 78 80 59 61 
Non-Partisan 149 74 126 63 69 34 152 76 102 51 
Unspecified 31 30 28 27 23 22 35 34 26 25 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 11 65 9 53 8 47 12 71 3 18 
Appellate Court 26 57 17 37 10 22 22 48 12 26 
Trial Court 203 69 176 59 100 34 211 71 148 50 
Other 12 57 14 67 13 62 19 90 18 86 
Unspecified 23 25 22 24 17 18 25 27 21 23 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 60 57 50 47 26 25 63 59 39 37 
Non-Incumbent 158 83 139 73 86 45 165 87 120 63 
Unspecified 57 32 49 28 36 20 61 35 43 24 
Elected                     
Won 111 55 92 45 54 27 117 58 80 39 
Lost 142 81 124 70 78 44 147 84 104 59 
Unspecified 22 24 22 24 16 17 25 27 18 19 
Total 275 58 238 50 148 31 289 61 202 43 
 
(n = 238, 50%). Among the least popular direct communications were broadcast debates 
(n = 78, 17%), campaign staff canvassing (door-to-door) (n = 131, 28%), and public 
debates that were not broadcast (n = 140, 30%). 
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Table 5.18.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Campaign 
staff can-
vassing 
(door-to-
door) 
Campaign 
literature/
brochures 
dis-
tribution 
Campaign 
website/ 
blog E-mail 
Social 
media 
online 
such as 
Facebook 
or Twitter 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 10 14 22 31 22 31 17 24 19 27 
Partisan 37 38 76 78 69 71 64 66 70 72 
Non-Partisan 66 33 147 73 147 73 128 64 133 66 
Unspecified 18 17 30 29 28 27 24 23 27 26 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 3 18 11 65 15 88 14 82 13 76 
Appellate Court 9 20 25 54 27 59 25 54 19 41 
Trial Court 98 33 202 68 193 65 165 56 183 62 
Other 9 43 16 76 10 48 11 52 12 57 
Unspecified 12 13 21 23 21 23 18 20 22 24 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 25 24 59 56 56 53 49 46 52 49 
Non-Incumbent 76 40 163 86 159 84 141 74 148 78 
Unspecified 30 17 53 30 51 29 43 24 49 28 
Elected                     
Won 44 22 109 54 106 52 85 42 96 47 
Lost 74 42 145 82 139 79 130 74 132 75 
Unspecified 13 14 21 23 21 23 18 19 21 23 
Total 131 28 275 58 266 56 233 49 249 53 
 
 Personal canvassing (M = 2.53, SD = 0.66), direct mail (M = 2.37, SD = 0.64), 
and addressing community groups (M = 2.31, SD = 0.67) were seen as some of the most 
effective at getting candidates’ campaign message out to voters. Few methods’ overall  
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Table 5.18.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Public 
speeches 
Broadcast 
debates 
Public 
debates 
that were 
not 
broadcast 
Address a 
commun-
ity group 
Fill out an 
issues 
ques-
tionnaire 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 23 32 5 7 6 8 26 37 19 27 
Partisan 73 75 17 18 31 32 77 79 53 55 
Non-Partisan 127 63 48 24 90 45 156 78 120 60 
Unspecified 26 25 8 8 13 13 31 30 22 21 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 14 82 4 24 5 29 12 71 14 82 
Appellate Court 24 52 9 20 17 37 29 63 24 52 
Trial Court 182 61 56 19 106 36 210 71 154 52 
Other 10 48 2 10 2 10 16 76 5 24 
Unspecified 19 21 7 8 10 11 23 25 17 18 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 57 54 11 10 25 24 59 56 50 47 
Non-Incumbent 141 74 54 28 93 49 172 91 122 64 
Unspecified 51 29 13 7 22 13 59 34 42 24 
Elected                     
Won 102 50 23 11 56 28 116 57 83 41 
Lost 127 72 49 28 76 43 151 86 113 64 
Unspecified 20 22 6 6 8 9 23 25 18 19 
Total 249 53 78 17 140 30 290 61 214 45 
 
effectiveness scores dipped below “somewhat effective.” The mean rating on campaign 
websites (M = 1.93, SD = 0.66), broadcast debates (M = 1.97, SD = 0.66), public debates  
that were not broadcast (M = 1.90, SD = 0.74), and issue questionnaires (M = 1.71, SD = 
0.67) fell on the “not effective” side of the scale.   
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Table 5.18.1. “Please indicate which of the following forms of campaign 
communications were used/engaged in during your campaign” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Other 
n % 
Election type   
Retention 13 18 
Partisan 7 7 
Non-Partisan 11 5 
Unspecified 3 3 
Office sought     
Supreme Court -- -- 
Appellate Court 7 15 
Trial Court 25 8 
Other -- -- 
Unspecified 2 2 
Incumbent     
Incumbent 6 6 
Non-Incumbent 13 7 
Unspecified 15 9 
Elected     
Won 22 11 
Lost 9 5 
Unspecified 3 3 
Total 34 7 
 
As with earned media, judges standing for retention reported less use of all direct 
communication methods than did candidates in partisan and non-partisan races.   
Appellate court candidates were last in the use of almost every direct communication 
method though differences among groups were sometimes small. In the one exception to 
the rule of appellate court judges trailing the pack, canvassing was less popular among  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). 
 
  
Attended news 
events or public 
forums Direct mail Telephone 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 22 1.86 0.56 17 2.41 0.71 8 2.25 0.89 
Partisan 70 1.90 0.75 65 2.45 0.64 44 2.18 0.76 
Non-Partisan 140 2.04 0.67 119 2.35 0.63 60 2.05 0.65 
Unspecified 25 2.08 0.64 19 2.16 0.60 17 1.71 0.59 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 11 1.91 0.70 9 2.44 0.53 8 2.25 0.71 
Appellate Court 24 1.96 0.62 17 2.29 0.59 10 2.10 0.88 
Trial Court 194 1.98 0.69 166 2.37 0.65 87 2.03 0.71 
Other 12 2.17 0.72 14 2.57 0.65 13 2.31 0.63 
Unspecified 16 2.00 0.63 14 2.14 0.66 11 1.82 0.60 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 56 1.93 0.71 49 2.41 0.61 24 2.17 0.70 
Non-Incumbent 152 2.02 0.70 133 2.38 0.65 79 2.09 0.70 
Unspecified 49 1.96 0.58 38 2.26 0.64 26 1.88 0.71 
Elected                   
Won 105 2.09 0.68 89 2.58 0.56 48 2.35 0.73 
Lost 136 1.92 0.69 118 2.24 0.65 71 1.90 0.64 
Unspecified 16 1.94 0.57 13 2.08 0.64 10 1.80 0.63 
Total 257 1.99 0.68 220 2.37 0.64 129 2.06 0.70 
 
supreme court candidates than appellate or trial court contenders. Filling out issues 
questionnaires was commonplace for supreme court candidates compared to appellate 
and trial court candidates. 
Supreme court candidates found a number of direct methods less effective than 
their counterparts. Yard signs, public speeches, broadcast debates, and public debates that  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Yard signs 
Personal 
canvassing 
(door-to-door) 
Campaign staff 
canvassing 
(door-to-door) 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 23 2.35 0.57 15 2.47 0.74 9 2.44 0.53 
Partisan 78 2.12 0.70 58 2.47 0.71 37 2.24 0.72 
Non-Partisan 149 2.30 0.64 96 2.59 0.59 61 2.34 0.68 
Unspecified 26 2.23 0.59 20 2.45 0.76 12 2.33 0.78 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 12 1.83 0.58 3 3.00 0.00 3 2.67 0.58 
Appellate Court 22 2.05 0.72 12 2.42 0.90 9 2.33 0.87 
Trial Court 207 2.27 0.63 142 2.48 0.66 91 2.25 0.69 
Other 19 2.53 0.77 18 2.94 0.24 9 2.56 0.53 
Unspecified 16 2.19 0.54 14 2.50 0.65 7 2.71 0.49 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 62 2.26 0.68 36 2.36 0.64 25 2.16 0.62 
Non-Incumbent 163 2.24 0.67 116 2.61 0.63 71 2.35 0.72 
Unspecified 51 2.25 0.59 37 2.43 0.73 23 2.39 0.66 
Elected                   
Won 115 2.37 0.66 78 2.59 0.61 43 2.47 0.59 
Lost 145 2.15 0.65 99 2.47 0.69 69 2.19 0.73 
Unspecified 16 2.19 0.54 12 2.58 0.67 7 2.71 0.49 
Total 276 2.25 0.65 189 2.53 0.66 119 2.32 0.69 
 
were not broadcast were all rated less effective by supreme court candidates than other 
candidates, suggesting that these methods have a greater impact on smaller races.  
A familiar pattern emerged across incumbency status and electoral outcome: non-
incumbents and defeated candidates reported higher levels of use for every direct 
communication method than did incumbents and election winners. However,  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Campaign 
literature/ 
brochures 
distribution 
Campaign 
website/ blog E-mail 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 21 2.48 0.51 21 1.86 0.73 16 1.94 0.77 
Partisan 75 2.19 0.63 69 1.74 0.53 63 2.11 0.57 
Non-Partisan 139 2.26 0.61 141 2.05 0.67 119 2.03 0.66 
Unspecified 24 2.13 0.68 20 1.80 0.77 18 1.83 0.79 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 11 2.00 0.63 15 2.07 0.70 13 2.00 0.41 
Appellate Court 25 2.16 0.55 26 1.88 0.65 24 1.96 0.69 
Trial Court 192 2.24 0.61 187 1.94 0.66 156 2.06 0.65 
Other 16 2.63 0.62 10 1.80 0.63 11 1.91 0.83 
Unspecified 15 2.13 0.64 13 1.85 0.69 12 1.92 0.79 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 58 2.28 0.62 54 1.93 0.67 45 2.00 0.64 
Non-Incumbent 155 2.23 0.62 155 1.97 0.64 136 2.08 0.64 
Unspecified 46 2.26 0.61 42 1.79 0.72 35 1.89 0.72 
Elected                   
Won 108 2.34 0.61 102 1.90 0.67 79 2.16 0.65 
Lost 136 2.19 0.60 136 1.96 0.65 125 1.96 0.64 
Unspecified 15 2.00 0.65 13 1.85 0.69 12 1.92 0.79 
Total 259 2.24 0.62 251 1.93 0.66 216 2.03 0.66 
 
effectiveness ratings were largely similar between incumbents and non-incumbents.  
Defeated candidates frequently rated direct methods as less effective than did elected 
candidates.     
One commonality that most direct methods possess is the potential capability for 
the candidate to gauge effectiveness of the method. If candidates encounter nothing but  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Social media 
online such as 
Facebook or 
Twitter Public speeches 
Broadcast 
debates 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 18 2.22 0.73 20 2.15 0.75 5 2.20 1.10 
Partisan 70 2.03 0.70 72 2.10 0.67 16 1.94 0.77 
Non-Partisan 129 2.10 0.68 124 2.20 0.65 45 1.93 0.78 
Unspecified 19 1.68 0.58 18 2.28 0.57 5 2.20 0.84 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 13 2.15 0.55 14 1.86 0.77 4 1.50 0.58 
Appellate Court 19 1.84 0.69 24 2.04 0.62 9 2.00 0.71 
Trial Court 178 2.09 0.72 176 2.20 0.65 52 1.98 0.83 
Other 12 2.08 0.51 9 2.33 0.87 2 3.00 0.00 
Unspecified 14 1.79 0.58 11 2.27 0.47 4 1.75 0.50 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 50 1.96 0.73 56 2.04 0.69 10 2.00 0.82 
Non-Incumbent 146 2.12 0.67 138 2.22 0.65 51 1.94 0.79 
Unspecified 40 1.95 0.71 40 2.18 0.64 10 2.10 0.88 
Elected                   
Won 93 2.11 0.68 99 2.24 0.62 22 2.32 0.78 
Lost 130 2.05 0.70 123 2.11 0.70 46 1.83 0.77 
Unspecified 13 1.77 0.60 12 2.25 0.45 3 1.67 0.58 
Total 236 2.06 0.69 234 2.17 0.66 71 1.97 0.79 
 
voters who slam the door in their face, they can gather how well they stand in the election 
(whether they are accurate or not). E-mail and other web-based technologies allow for 
feedback, traffic monitoring, and other measures that allow a candidate to gather how 
well their message is being received. Candidates were fond of methods whose reception 
could be quantified. “I think sending e-mail letters out [was successful] because [we]  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Public debates 
that were not 
broadcast 
Address a 
community 
group 
Fill out an issues 
questionnaire 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 5 1.80 0.84 24 2.29 0.69 17 1.82 0.64 
Partisan 31 1.87 0.81 75 2.25 0.62 53 1.66 0.65 
Non-Partisan 84 1.90 0.69 149 2.33 0.69 112 1.72 0.69 
Unspecified 10 2.00 0.94 24 2.42 0.72 18 1.67 0.69 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 5 1.40 0.55 12 1.92 0.67 14 1.79 0.70 
Appellate Court 17 2.00 0.79 29 2.14 0.64 23 1.61 0.72 
Trial Court 99 1.92 0.72 200 2.34 0.67 145 1.71 0.66 
Other 2 2.50 0.71 15 2.40 0.63 5 2.00 0.71 
Unspecified 7 1.57 0.79 16 2.56 0.63 13 1.69 0.75 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 24 1.75 0.74 59 2.22 0.72 48 1.73 0.71 
Non-Incumbent 88 1.95 0.73 163 2.34 0.64 116 1.71 0.66 
Unspecified 18 1.83 0.79 50 2.32 0.71 36 1.69 0.67 
Elected                   
Won 55 2.09 0.70 114 2.47 0.63 80 1.90 0.69 
Lost 70 1.80 0.73 142 2.16 0.68 106 1.58 0.62 
Unspecified 5 1.20 0.45 16 2.50 0.63 14 1.64 0.74 
Total 130 1.90 0.74 272 2.31 0.67 200 1.71 0.67 
 
could measure the percentage of how many people opened it,” said one Texas appellate 
court candidate. 
There is a general sense that despite their limitations (and relatively low 
effectiveness ratings from candidates), electronic communications are the future for 
campaigns. Seasoned Kentucky Supreme Court candidate Janet Stumbo noted the shift in  
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Table 5.18.2. “Please indicate how effective the following forms of campaign 
communications were in disseminating your message to potential voters” (Direct 
Communication). (cont.) 
 
  
Other 
n M SD 
Election type    
Retention -- -- -- 
Partisan 4 2.50 1.00 
Non-Partisan 5 2.20 0.84 
Unspecified 3 1.67 0.58 
Office sought       
Supreme Court -- -- -- 
Appellate Court 2 2.00 1.41 
Trial Court 7 2.43 0.79 
Other 1 2.00 -- 
Unspecified 2 1.50 0.71 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 3 2.00 1.00 
Non-Incumbent 7 2.43 0.79 
Unspecified 2 1.50 0.71 
Elected       
Won 2 3.00 0.00 
Lost 8 2.13 0.83 
Unspecified 2 1.50 0.71 
Total 12 2.17 0.83 
  
media use across generations: “It used to be that we relied very heavily on direct mail and 
that was extremely effective. I think its effectiveness has lessened in that people basically 
don't pay attention to hard copy mail except for the older generations ... it’s all electronic 
communications.”   
Despite the popularity of electronic communications as a means to wage a 
campaign, candidates appear cautious to claim e-mails, websites, and social media 
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profiles are powerfully influential. For one Texas Appellate Court candidate, electronic 
communications were just one way to convey some “life” in the campaign: “We had a 
Facebook page and a website but I think both of them had sort of a flavor of the month 
quality of being ‘Okay, we're with it here,’ but I don't think they had that big of an impact 
relative to the more old-fashioned things at this time.” 
Gauging communication effectiveness. Follow up interviews demonstrated the 
difficulty candidates have when it comes to gauging the effectiveness of specific 
campaign communication methods. Campaign methods that allowed for feedback (either 
through direct observation or through quantitative reports) were prized; however, most 
candidates felt as though they were “operating in the dark.” 
Feedback. Methods that allowed for feedback were frequently considered 
effective, whereas candidates had a much more difficult time assessing the impact of 
other campaign communication methods (as discussed below). Without specifically 
recognizing the value he placed on feedback, Allen Miller, a Washington trial court 
candidate, described what he felt were the most effective methods he used in his 
campaign: “Probably the most effective was attending the various places where people 
gathered who were obviously interested in voting because they were at these various 
rallies. And then, I guess, doorbelling would be next just because it appeared that people 
enjoyed meeting the candidate face-to-face … And we did get comments through the 
website and through the Facebook page.” 
Beyond merely allowing candidates to observe audience reactions, channels that 
allowed for interaction were also desirable to candidates. “I felt that the most successful 
[methods] were any opportunities or forums where I had to actually be able to get out and 
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interact with people face-to-face” John Henry explained. “Even if it was nothing more 
than speaking to them as a group - I felt like that was more effective than things like 
mailers.” 
Aside from methods that allowed for direct observation of feedback, candidates 
also prized methods that allowed for quantification of feedback. “I was able to see how 
many hits [on the website] I was getting on how many days and all of those kinds of 
things,” explained Mindy Barry. “As compared to how many people who heard me speak 
at an event and paid attention - I definitely feel that the website was effective.” 
 “In the dark.” Candidates who used traditional mass media methods had 
virtually no basis from which to assess effectiveness. Susan Burch, a seasoned judicial 
election veteran who ran for a North Carolina trial court in 2012, provided a clear 
demonstration of this: “In past years, I've done television ads. I don't really have a sense 
of how successful that was.” 
Candidates expressed their frustration with gauging how effective their campaign 
communications were. John Baker, an Indiana Appellate Court candidate, exemplifies 
this vexation: “You just do the best you can and flail around and flail around and flail 
around and then see how it works out.” Bridget McCormack, who was elected to 
Michigan’s Supreme Court in 2012, even admitted feeling “in the dark” as to what 
methods worked for her campaign: “I don't know. I have no idea how to measure what 
worked and what didn't to be perfectly honest. I really don't know.” 
Even with campaign methods that allow for a degree of feedback, candidates 
express difficulty in determining whether engaging voters translates to electoral success.   
“You never know whether what you’re doing in your campaign is helping,” Robert 
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Schaffer, a Texas trial court candidate admitted. “If I go to an event every night over a 
three or four month period of time, will that help me more than staying at home and being 
with family and helping with homework and doing other stuff? You just don't know if 
what you're doing is helpful and there's no way of really gauging it.”  
Outside of targeted mailing, candidates have little to go on in determining 
whether their campaign activities reach likely voters. “Going to general events, such as 
non-political-type public events - the farmer's market, Kiwanis events,” John Henry 
explains, “Those sorts of events are - it's hard to get a good read on how effective that is 
because you don't know how many likely voters you're talking to. It's good publicity. It's 
good opportunity to see a lot of the public but it's harder to know if you're actually getting 
much in the way of results … you feel like you're operating in the dark a lot. You really 
don't know how effective you're being in what you're doing.” 
Method selection. The reasons why candidates choose specific campaign 
communication methods fell into five general categories: cost effectiveness, ability to 
target communications, media richness, the influence of perceived experts, and the 
expectations of voters. 
Cost effectiveness. For most candidates, the mix of communication methods was 
determined by their budget. “[It] was not all that difficult because I was on a real tight 
budget,” said Steven Burk, a Florida trial court candidate, “So, it's not like I had a wide 
selection of things to do.” David Towler, a Texas Appellate Court candidate similarly 
noted how his campaign budget dictated the campaign media he used: “If there was a 
single biggest criteria for my campaign [methods] - it was budget and not effectiveness.” 
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Focusing strictly on the cost of campaign media was crucial for candidates facing 
competition in both primary and general elections. Elizabeth Best, a Montana Supreme 
Court candidate, knew having a reserve available to purchase great media buys in the 
general election was important: “We were strategic about the media that we had bought 
before the primary and were thinking in terms of needing to keep a cache available for 
the general.” 
Beyond budget considerations, Frank Supercinski, a Texas Appellate Court 
candidate, took into account the perceived effectiveness of campaign media: “The main 
reason I chose going those methods was trying to get the most bang for the buck.” Mindy 
Barry, a Michigan Supreme Court candidate, likewise sought a budget-friendly campaign 
method capable of reaching scores of voters: “My husband built me a website. I think he 
did it from GoDaddy for like $75 or something and he did that. And so the website was 
obviously something that we thought could reach as many people as possible at the 
lowest cost.” 
Ability to target communications. Others, such as New Mexico Supreme Court 
candidate, Paul Kennedy, focused entirely on the potential reach of the medium: “We 
decided as early as we could - we decided that the only effective way to reach voters in 
general and targeted populations was by direct mail. So that's pretty much everything we 
concentrated on - it was direct mail.” 
The ability to target likely voters with direct mail made this particular method 
attractive and popular. Candidates, such as Dean Van Dress, an Ohio trial court candidate, 
honed in on likely voters through direct mail: “What I did with my limited amount of 
funds is I was able to send out direct mail to 60,000 people who actually requested the 
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absentee ballot with the hopes that those people would actually vote as opposed to trying 
to advertise or trying to contact people and have a 50% chance that those people would 
vote.” 
Beyond simply contacting absentee voters, candidates used sophisticated targeting 
techniques through the use of electronic voter databases. “The direct mailing was very 
successful because I used Votebuilder, which is provided by the Democratic party,” 
explained Darren Kugler, a New Mexico trial court candidate. “I think that was 
developed largely from some of the new blood that President Obama brought in and got 
modern technology involved in how you run campaigns and Votebuilder allows you to 
develop very focused voter lists to target voters and I used that for my mailers.” 
Direct mail has become such a popular campaign method that it has become an 
industry in and of itself. Chris Cobey, a trial court candidate, described the direct mail 
scene in California: “In the past, California campaigns you'd have something called ‘slate 
mailers’ where you can buy the designation for your office on a postcard that maybe goes 
to all Democratic voters, all Republican voters, all environmental voters. You can slice 
and dice the electorate however you want. And I got a lot of solicitations for those … 
‘Time's running out - do you want to be on the card? It's going to cost you $12,000.  Well 
we've got a special deal now it's $10. Now it's $8. Now it's $5.’” 
Despite many candidates’ fondness of direct mail’s ability to target specific types 
of voters, some doubt the effectiveness of this campaign method, particularly in a busy 
election year as voters can become saturated with campaign mailers. “Anyone would go 
to their post office box or go to their mailbox on any given day and there would be three 
to six, what I call, ‘slick pieces of mail,’” said Alabama trial court candidate, Glenn 
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Thompson. “I'm talking about high quality printing, color, professionally done, really 
nice pieces. There were so many pieces of mail that if you were at a post office box at a 
post office, you'd stop at the garbage can before you got in your car and just dump all that 
stuff in the garbage can. I saw that happen over and over again.” 
Media richness. The leanness or richness of a medium was also a factor in 
campaign communication method selection. Campaign methods that allowed for a great 
deal of “space” (or bandwidth) for candidates to explain their candidacy to voters were 
often prized by candidates. Despite the popularity of direct mail, John Henry, a California 
trial court judge standing for retention, criticized the media’s inherent leanness: “In 
something in like a judicial campaign, it's difficult to explain to people why they should 
care in a mailer. I think that it's easier to do it in an e-mail than it is in a mailer just by 
virtue of being - the space that you have available to you, but when you are given an 
opportunity to speak to people for 10, 15, 20 minutes - I think that allows you to do an 
even better job of explaining than you could in some sort of a written form.” 
Others, such as Frank Supercinski, felt the Internet provided the space necessary 
to explain the candidate’s candidacy. “Everything I did,” Supercinski explained, “I 
directed them to that Internet site because I felt that Internet site, they could get educated. 
With radio ads and newspaper ads and things like that, you aren't going to find out 
anything about that race.” 
Though electronic communications were cited as having the capability for 
candidates to wage an adequate campaign, the reality of limited effectiveness was 
realized by many. Chris Cobey, who expressed his admiration for and support of the 
League of Women Voters’ “SmartVoter” project, simultaneously expressed the lack of 
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actual reach websites had: “Not that many people went [to SmartVoter] for their voting 
information. As a matter of fact, when I last checked the website - and I think they had a 
counter on how many people had viewed the videos of the candidates - it was like 300 
(laughs), which out of an election of three quarters of a million ain't gonna [sic] do a 
whole lot for you. As we like to say, you can get the informed vote, but you actually need 
50% of the vote (laughs).” 
The influence of perceived experts. Judicial candidates rely on the expertise of 
others in crafting their campaign strategy. Paul Kennedy explained his choice of using 
direct mail in his campaign for New Mexico Supreme Court: “Direct mail's been pretty 
much universally recommended to me by all of the political wisepeople [sic] as being the 
effective way to do things in a low profile race.”   
Candidates also took advice from successful local politicians and other elected 
officials. John Henry explained how he chose his campaign methods: “The way that we 
kind of figured [what methods to use] was by talking to people and to some other local 
politicians that were willing to talk to us or were receptive to our message and trying to 
figure out where they have had success in that message not only in judicial elections but 
in other down ballot elections and trying to figure out where there places were where we 
could reach people that would be likely to vote in the election.” 
Scholarly research was also cited as a source of campaign guidance. Chris Cobey 
noted referring to research to determine his campaign methods: “If I had it to do over 
again maybe I'd look longer at e-mail … I think I even did a little online research for 
professional literature in political science on the effect of e-mail as a voter motivation 
tool, but I think in the end it came down to cost. I essentially wasn't going to pay for it.”  
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Cobey focused a great deal of effort on his ballot designation, citing political science 
literature as evidence of the ballot designation’s influence in elections: “I know I read in 
the past from … the political science literature that the voter cue in California of the 
ballot designation is extremely important.” 
Voter expectations. Put simply: sometimes candidates just “have to” engage in 
certain campaign communication methods. James Rowe, a candidate for West Virginia’s 
Supreme Court, explained: “I was just in the primary and so [the political parties] 
provided forums at times … You'd have the Democratic Women of Monroe County 
hosting a candidate forum and so you'd drive half a day to get to a little courthouse where 
maybe 30 people showed up at best and you'd talk about your campaign. It's one of those 
deals where the adage was that you probably don't accomplish a whole lot by showing up 
but if you don't show up, then people will get mad and they'll say, ‘Why so-and-so didn't 
bother to come to our county so to hell with him.’” 
Summary. Direct campaign communication methods (e.g., yard signs, addressing 
a community group, attending news events/public forums, campaign literature/brochures 
distribution, etc.) were the most popular in terms of use amongst candidates. The most 
resource-intensive campaign communication methods (e.g., paid TV/radio/outdoor 
advertising, direct mail, personal/campaign staff canvassing) were considered the most 
effective at disseminating campaign messages. However, candidates faced a difficult task 
in determining how effective their campaign communications are without some form of 
feedback (e.g., comments on Facebook pages, website visits, and other quantifiable 
feedback measures). Campaign budgets ultimately determined the campaign methods 
candidates employ. Candidates were resourceful and balanced the cost of communication 
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methods against the amount of likely voters they could reach with those methods. 
Candidates also took into consideration the richness or leanness of campaign methods. 
Some methods are not appropriate (e.g., billboards) for lengthy, complex campaign 
messages. Candidates also chose methods based on the evidence of their success (as 
measured by other successful politicians, consultants, or political scientists) or the voters’ 
expectations (e.g., attending a public forum in smaller communities). 
Developing Campaign Messages 
 The candidate’s own personal experience, friends and family, observation of other 
candidates, voters, regulations, and consultants influence how candidates develop 
campaign messages. 
 Personal experience. Although the skillset required for running a campaign is 
largely unrelated to the duties of serving as an effective judge, this is not to say that 
judicial candidates come into their own campaigns clueless. Candidates frequently 
discussed how their political background extends well before the date they filed papers 
announcing their candidacy. “I've been involved in politics virtually all of my adult life,” 
said Oregon appellate court candidate, James Egan. “Even during my Marine Corps 
career I would write to candidates, contact candidates, and participate as much as I could 
from a distance. So, I'm pretty adept at the political form and I kind of knew what I was 
getting into. Specifically, I knew that I was getting into a judicial campaign and that they 
were traditionally staid, underreported, and difficult because people don't care that much 
(laughs).” 
 A similar story emerged from California trial court candidate Chris Cobey: “My 
dad was in the state legislature for 12 years in California, so I grew up sort of immersed 
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in politics and I was actually a page in the House of Representatives when I was in high 
school.” Robert Schaffer also described having waded in the political pool long before 
announcing his candidacy for a Texas trial court judgeship: “I have been interested in 
politics since I was in college. I worked in political campaigns many years ago and had a 
feel for what I wanted to do.” 
 Friends and family. Although judicial campaigns have been marked with a 
greater degree of professionalization than campaigns in the past (Arbour & McKenzie, 
2010), for many – including those running for higher level judicial offices, campaigning 
is a family affair. For Kentucky Supreme Court candidate Janet Stumbo, family members 
proved to provide the most campaign help: “Except for the lady that did the e-mail blast 
for us, everything else was done basically in house. My husband's always run my 
campaigns. My daughter did our websites and Facebook and all of that kind of 
communications. We hired film crews but we wrote our own script.” 
Observation of other candidates. In developing campaign messages, judicial 
candidates turned to other candidates (their opposition and candidates for other offices) 
for both a source of inspiration and to identify meaningful contrasts. 
 Borrowing from other campaigns. Candidates observe and import campaign 
ideas from other candidates in other races. Said one Florida trial court candidate, “[My 
wife] and I sat down on the Internet for several nights and went through all of - you know, 
there are a myriad number of places you can go to get ideas for campaign signs and so we 
plagiarized some and stole some ideas and came up with a few ideas of our own.” 
 Differentiating from other campaigns. Judicial candidates also take note of their 
opponents and attempt to create contrasting campaign materials. Trial court candidate, 
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Steve Burk, described how he developed some of his campaign communications: “I 
looked at what my opponents had done, in terms of - like their, their billboards and yard 
signs and whatnot - and decided that there was just way too much information on 'em and 
so, my signs - and I was quite, quite pleased with what my wife and I came up with - my 
signs featured my name in very large letters on the top of the sign and then the word 
‘Judge’ below my name in very bold letters and between the two, it was, you know, you 
have to insert the word ‘for,’ but that was in rather small letters.” 
 Voters. The perceived expectations from voters also factored into how candidates 
steered their campaigns. Candidates, such as Texas Appellate court candidate Penny 
Phillips, put themselves in the shoes of the voters to help understand how to effectively 
reach them: “I just analyzed why someone might want to vote for me instead of that 
person and that was my message. So my message was: ‘If you think 16 years is enough or 
if you think it's time for a change,’ you know, that sort of thing,” said Phillips. 
Candidates focus their messages on what they believe will be relevant to likely 
voters. James Rowe described how he crafted his campaign messages while keeping the 
electorate in mind: “I talked about how important it was to have courts that addressed 
societal needs and that sort of thing and - but that was not a result of, you know, any 
polling or any focus groups. That's, you know - we just thought that would resonate with 
the voters.” John Henry, a California trial court candidate, also keyed in on issues he felt 
the voters would identify as important: “We noticed kind of a theme of [the incumbent 
judge] doing what he wanted to on the bench as opposed to doing what we thought the 
law required. Then it was just a matter of finding the most egregious cases of it or the 
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cases that people would care most about and typically those are going to be famous like 
three strike cases or child molestation cases.”  
Candidates for judicial office try to be keenly aware of their electorate’s 
demographics, which in turn influences their campaign messaging. As North Carolina 
trial court candidate, Susan Burch, noted, “Well, one of the things that you pay attention 
to are demographics of the area that you're running in and I run county-wide and so I 
have paid attention to sort of what the demographics and the voting makeup is of the 
county that I have and different parts of our county have concentrated voters of different 
party. For example, some of our outer county area - not as developed - those tend to be 
more conservative Republican voters. A lot of the city - bigger urban areas that are more 
densely populated - those tend to vote Democratic.” 
 For judicial candidates in non-partisan elections, the political makeup of the 
electorate can still play a key role in how they develop their campaign messages. Trial 
court candidate Courtney McAllister explained how the political demographics of her 
electorate drove her campaign focus: “The substance of the messages I chose are 
primarily driven by who I am and then tailored to identify with the electorate. Where I 
am in northern California, it's a pretty rural area that is more conservative than most of 
California and so there's a large percentage of the electorate here that identifies with the 
conservative message. I'm certainly a conservative person, so my message was about the 
rule of law, consistency, predictability, being conservative, and judicial philosophy, not 
being a judicial activist and being a kind of law-and-order type person.” 
 Others attempted to design campaign messages with a more populist appeal, such 
as Florida trial court candidate Karen Miller. In the course of her campaign, the local 
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media highlighted the candidate’s recent DUI, which she in turn attempted to counter. “I 
spun it as ‘Yeah, I'm everyman. I'm the kind of person that should be a judge. I'm not 
perfect. I admit I'm not perfect. You know, that would make me better because I am a real 
person with real life experience. I'm not sitting up on some pedestal. I'm a real person and 
that makes me a better candidate.’” 
  Regulations. Judicial candidates’ campaign messages are also shaped by the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. For some, the regulatory power of the Code essentially dictates 
their campaign message. When asked how he developed his campaign communications, 
Allen Miller, a Washington trial court candidate, explained, “Well that was relatively 
easy because of the code of judicial conduct.” Robert Schaffer, a Texas trial court 
candidate, echoed this sentiment: “I can't choose a message … I can't say I'm in favor of 
tort reform and I will impose it every chance I get. I can't say I'm in favor of the death 
penalty and I will impose it every chance I get.” 
 Candidates also attribute the general lack of excitement in judicial campaigns to 
the restrictive nature of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As New Mexico trial court 
candidate Darren Kugler noted, “You focus on primarily a message about your 
experience, your qualifications, your personality - so it's very innocuous once you're 
campaigning on trying to sell yourself cause you're prohibited from getting into any 
specific issues.” 
 The shakeup in judicial candidate speech regulations has left some candidates 
without a clear understanding of what is legal campaign speech. One Ohio trial court 
candidate demonstrated this point by describing how the canons of judicial conduct 
factored into his campaign messages: “We can put out fact-based, fact-based things and  
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Table 5.19. “Did you hire at least one paid professional for your campaign?” 
  
Yes No 
Un-
specified 
n % n % n % 
Election type             
Retention 13 18 57 80 1 1 
Partisan 45 46 52 54 -- -- 
Non-Partisan 96 48 104 52 1 1 
Unspecified 11 11 20 19 72 70 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 12 71 5 29 -- -- 
Appellate Court 23 50 22 48 1 2 
Trial Court 118 40 178 60 -- -- 
Other 6 29 15 71 -- -- 
Unspecified 6 7 13 14 73 79 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 39 37 66 62 1 1 
Non-Incumbent 102 54 88 46 -- -- 
Unspecified 24 14 79 45 73 41 
Elected             
Won 78 38 123 61 2 1 
Lost 82 47 94 53 -- -- 
Unspecified 5 5 16 17 72 77 
Total 165 35 233 49 74 16 
 
also endorsements and those kind of things but we're not allowed to make kind of like 
opinion statements.” 
Campaign professionalization. Results pertaining to the professionalization of 
judicial campaigns are summarized in Table 5.19. Judges standing for retention were far 
less prone to hire paid professionals – only 13 (18%) of those standing for retention 
reporting hired a paid professional, whereas nearly half of candidates in partisan races (n 
= 45, 46%) and non-partisan races (n = 96, 48%) reporting having done so. Supreme 
Court candidates (n = 12, 71%) and appellate court candidates (n = 23, 50%) were more 
inclined to hire professionals compared to trial court candidates (n = 118, 40%). Non-
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incumbents, perhaps due to their inexperience with running judicial campaigns, more 
frequently relied on professionals (n = 102, 54%) than incumbents (n = 39, 37%). Those 
defeated in the election also reported higher numbers in this area (n = 82, 47%) than 
those who were victorious (n = 78, 38%), though victorious uncontested candidates likely 
saw no need to actively campaign.  
 The types campaign activities for which candidates relied on paid professionals or 
salaried staff to execute are analyzed in Table 5.20. Overall, candidates relied on paid 
staff or professionals for three primary campaign activities: media advertising (n = 101, 
61%), direct mail (n = 82, 50%), and campaign management (n = 82, 50%).   
 For most candidates, consultants act as a sounding board for campaign ideas or 
are hired to “make things happen” and “get things done.” This is the result of two key 
factors: the inability for judicial candidates to locate suitable consultants who (a) have 
experience in or with judicial elections and (b) have specific knowledge of the electorate 
they face. Alabama trial court candidate Glenn Thompson explained the role of the 
consultant he hired: “I really felt like I knew more about Morgan County than [my 
consultant] did and he agreed and I used him primarily as an advisor – ‘What do you 
think about this?’ ‘Look at this - tell me what you think.’ A lot of the stuff I wrote. The 
letter from my eight friends - I wrote myself - ran it by him.” David Towler, a Texas 
Appellate court candidate, described a similar arrangement: “I had a campaign manager 
and I would talk to him about the message but he wasn't a lawyer or a judge and … we 
bounced [ideas] off of each other, but ultimately it was my decision what the message 
was and I did what I thought would play well for me.” 
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Table 5.20. “Did you rely on mostly salaried staff or paid consultants for any of 
the following campaign activities?” 
 
  
Campaign 
manage-
ment 
Media 
adver-
tising 
Press 
relations 
Issue or 
opposition 
research Polling 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 7 54 8 62 6 46 2 15 2 15 
Partisan 25 56 27 60 13 29 3 7 13 29 
Non-Partisan 45 47 60 63 27 28 9 9 15 16 
Unspecified 5 45 6 55 3 27 -- -- 1 9 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 8 67 9 75 7 58 4 33 7 58 
Appellate Court 12 52 16 70 9 39 1 4 5 22 
Trial Court 54 46 69 58 31 26 9 8 18 15 
Other 5 83 5 83 2 33 -- -- 1 17 
Unspecified 3 50 2 33 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 17 44 26 67 9 23 4 10 9 23 
Non-Incumbent 54 53 62 61 32 31 7 7 20 20 
Unspecified 11 46 13 54 8 33 3 13 2 8 
Elected                     
Won 45 58 49 63 19 24 5 6 17 22 
Lost 35 43 51 62 29 35 9 11 14 17 
Unspecified 2 40 1 20 1 20 -- -- -- -- 
Total 82 50 101 61 49 30 14 8 31 19 
 
Consultants also help bridge knowledge gaps, as those interested in judicial office 
are often unfamiliar with the mechanics of running a campaign. Michigan Supreme Court 
candidate Bridget McCormack demonstrates this succinctly: “I listened to advice from  
people who knew more than I did.” Going further, Mark Shriver, a Georgia trial court 
candidate, described how consultants helped in areas with which he had little 
experience: “It was helpful to have assistance of the consultant for more of the details of 
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Table 5.20. “Did you rely on mostly salaried staff or paid consultants for any of the 
following campaign activities?” (cont.) 
 
  
Fund-
raising 
Direct 
mail 
Mass 
telephone 
calling 
Get-out-
the-vote 
activities 
Legal 
advice 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention -- -- 6 46 1 8 2 15 2 15 
Partisan 15 33 26 58 13 29 10 22 3 7 
Non-Partisan 22 23 45 47 19 20 7 7 7 7 
Unspecified 3 27 5 45 1 9 2 18 -- -- 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 6 50 3 25 4 33 2 17 3 25 
Appellate Court 9 39 10 43 4 17 1 4 -- -- 
Trial Court 24 20 61 52 23 19 17 14 8 7 
Other -- -- 5 83 2 33 1 17 1 17 
Unspecified 1 17 3 50 1 17 -- -- -- -- 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 9 23 20 51 8 21 4 10 2 5 
Non-Incumbent 29 28 52 51 23 23 14 14 8 8 
Unspecified 2 8 10 42 3 13 3 13 2 8 
Elected                     
Won 19 24 43 55 12 15 11 14 6 8 
Lost 20 24 38 46 21 26 9 11 6 7 
Unspecified 1 20 1 20 1 20 1 20 -- -- 
Total 40 24 82 50 34 21 21 13 12 7 
 
how you do it and how many people you have to contact in order to try to raise as 
much money as you can and like - for instance, the first time I met with him, he said, 
you need to come up with a list of 300 people that you could ask for money from.” In 
essence, consultants act as hired experience, as J. Christopher Erny, a Louisiana 
Appellate court candidate found. “[The consultants] opened some doors that I wouldn't 
have been able to open,” Erny explained, “I had limited resources so they helped 
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Table 5.20. “Did you rely on mostly salaried staff or paid consultants for any of 
the following campaign activities?” (cont.) 
 
  
Accounting 
Did not rely on 
salaried staff or 
paid consultants 
for these 
activities Total 
n % n % n 
Election type      
Retention 4 31 2 15 13 
Partisan 5 11 4 9 45 
Non-Partisan 24 25 15 16 96 
Unspecified 3 27 -- -- 11 
Office sought          
Supreme Court 6 50 1 8 12 
Appellate Court 6 26 1 4 23 
Trial Court 21 18 19 16 118 
Other 1 17 -- -- 6 
Unspecified 2 33 -- -- 6 
Incumbent          
Incumbent 2 5 4 10 39 
Non-Incumbent 27 26 15 15 102 
Unspecified 7 29 2 8 24 
Elected          
Won 13 17 10 13 78 
Lost 21 26 11 13 82 
Unspecified 2 40 -- -- 5 
Total 36 22 21 13 165 
 
maximize the dollar value for exposure and things. They've done this enough to where 
they knew the tricks of the trade.” 
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Table 5.21.1. “To what extent did your campaign communications focus on the 
following:” (Experience and Qualifications). 
 
  
None at 
all A little Some 
A great 
deal 
Un-
specified 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 15 21 3 4 2 3 37 52 14 20 
Partisan -- -- 3 3 6 6 87 90 1 1 
Non-Partisan 10 5 4 2 15 7 168 84 4 2 
Unspecified 5 5 -- -- 3 3 17 17 78 76 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 1 6 -- -- 2 12 14 82 -- -- 
Appellate Court 4 9 2 4 3 7 32 70 5 11 
Trial Court 21 7 7 2 18 6 236 80 14 5 
Other 1 5 1 5 1 5 17 81 1 5 
Unspecified 3 3 -- -- 2 2 10 11 77 84 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 9 8 2 2 7 7 84 79 4 4 
Non-Incumbent 1 1 5 3 14 7 169 89 1 1 
Unspecified 20 11 3 2 5 3 56 32 92 52 
Elected                     
Won 22 11 6 3 10 5 147 72 18 9 
Lost 5 3 4 2 14 8 151 86 2 1 
Unspecified 3 3 -- -- 2 2 11 12 77 83 
Total 30 6 10 2 26 6 309 65 97 21 
 
Issue positions. Tables 5.21.1-5.21.4 compile the results regarding the focus of 
campaign messages. A majority of candidates emphasized experience and qualifications 
(n = 309, 65%) “a great deal” in their campaign communications. Character and ethics 
were also stressed “a great deal” by half of all candidates (n = 232, 49%). Issue positions 
were clearly less emphasized by candidates as 42% (n = 197) did not stress such content  
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Table 5.21.2. “To what extent did your campaign communications focus on the 
following:” (Character and Ethics). 
 
  
None at 
all A little Some 
A great 
deal 
Un-
specified 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 21 30 5 7 11 15 19 27 15 21 
Partisan 4 4 5 5 22 23 65 67 1 1 
Non-Partisan 16 8 8 4 35 17 137 68 5 2 
Unspecified 7 7 3 3 4 4 11 11 78 76 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 1 6 -- -- 6 35 10 59 --   
Appellate Court 7 15 4 9 10 22 20 43 5 11 
Trial Court 35 12 16 5 51 17 178 60 16 5 
Other 2 10 -- -- 2 10 16 76 1 5 
Unspecified 3 3 1 1 3 3 8 9 77 84 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 14 13 7 7 21 20 59 56 5 5 
Non-Incumbent 6 3 6 3 35 18 142 75 1 1 
Unspecified 28 16 8 5 16 9 31 18 93 53 
Elected                     
Won 32 16 12 6 36 18 103 51 20 10 
Lost 12 7 8 5 33 19 121 69 2 1 
Unspecified 4 4 1 1 3 3 8 9 77 83 
Total 48 10 21 4 72 15 232 49 99 21 
 
in their campaign at all.  Less than one out of ten candidates (n = 43, 9%) reported having 
emphasized issue positions “a great deal” in their communications.   
Two types of candidates emerged as being substantially different when it comes 
to these types of campaign communications: judges standing for retention and appellate 
court candidates, both of whom appear to campaign far less than other judicial  
candidates. 
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Table 5.21.3. “To what extent did your campaign communications focus on the 
following:” (Issue Positions). 
 
  
None at 
all A little Some 
A great 
deal 
Un-
specified 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 39 55 5 7 4 6 6 8 17 24 
Partisan 44 45 16 16 16 16 14 14 7 7 
Non-Partisan 99 49 40 20 31 15 20 10 11 5 
Unspecified 15 15 4 4 2 2 3 3 79 77 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 5 29 4 24 3 18 4 24 1 6 
Appellate Court 28 61 4 9 5 11 2 4 7 15 
Trial Court 147 50 50 17 40 14 34 11 25 8 
Other 7 33 4 19 5 24 2 10 3 14 
Unspecified 10 11 3 3 -- -- 1 1 78 85 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 62 58 13 12 13 12 8 8 10 9 
Non-Incumbent 80 42 40 21 35 18 27 14 8 4 
Unspecified 55 31 12 7 5 3 8 5 96 55 
Elected                     
Won 111 55 25 12 23 11 16 8 28 14 
Lost 75 43 37 21 30 17 26 15 8 5 
Unspecified 11 12 3 3 -- -- 1 1 78 84 
Total 197 42 65 14 53 11 43 9 114 24 
 
Although one might expect vast differences in campaign focal points between 
partisan and non-partisan candidates, the data show few significant differences. Across 
level of judicial office, state supreme court candidates engaged in discussing issue 
positions far more than both appellate and trial court candidates. Nearly one out of four (n 
= 4, 24%) supreme court candidates reported “a great deal” of focus on issue positions.  
Such emphasis was less popular with appellate court candidates and trial court candidates 
(n = 2, 4%; n = 34, 11% respectively reported “a great deal” of focus on issue positions).  
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Table 5.21.4. “To what extent did your campaign communications focus on the 
following:” (Scales). 
 
  
Experience and 
qualifications 
Character and 
ethics Issue positions 
n M SD n M SD n M SD 
Election type          
Retention 57 3.07 1.33 56 2.50 1.31 54 1.57 1.04 
Partisan 96 3.88 0.42 96 3.54 0.78 90 2.00 1.14 
Non-Partisan 197 3.73 0.74 196 3.49 0.91 190 1.85 1.04 
Unspecified 25 3.28 1.21 25 2.76 1.30 24 1.71 1.08 
Office sought                   
Supreme Court 17 3.71 0.77 17 3.47 0.80 16 2.38 1.20 
Appellate Court 41 3.54 0.98 41 3.05 1.14 39 1.51 0.91 
Trial Court 282 3.66 0.85 280 3.33 1.04 271 1.86 1.08 
Other 20 3.70 0.80 20 3.60 0.94 18 2.11 1.08 
Unspecified 15 3.27 1.22 15 3.07 1.22 14 1.43 0.85 
Incumbent                   
Incumbent 102 3.63 0.90 101 3.24 1.08 96 1.66 1.00 
Non-Incumbent 189 3.86 0.46 189 3.66 0.69 182 2.05 1.11 
Unspecified 84 3.15 1.28 83 2.60 1.30 80 1.58 0.99 
Elected                   
Won 185 3.52 1.02 183 3.15 1.15 175 1.68 1.02 
Lost 174 3.79 0.62 174 3.51 0.87 168 2.04 1.12 
Unspecified 16 3.31 1.20 16 2.94 1.29 15 1.40 0.83 
Total 375 3.64 0.88 373 3.31 1.05 358 1.84 1.08 
 
 Non-incumbents were also more engaged in this discussion than incumbents (n = 
27, 14%; n = 8, 8% respectively reported “a great deal” of focus on issue positions). 
Treating these items as a scale, both supreme court candidates and non-incumbents are 
the top two highest mean scores (M = 2.38, SD = 1.20; M = 2.05, SD = 1.11) out of every 
category of candidate.  
Examining the actual issues discussed provides a fuller view of the judicial 
campaigns waged in 2012. Table 5.22 shows the results of the survey question, “Which  
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Table 5.22. “Which issue positions did you discuss in your campaign 
communications?”* 
 
  
Court 
admin-
istration 
Crime 
and 
sentencing 
Civil 
liberties Abortion 
Tort 
reform 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Election type           
Retention 12 80 9 60 5 33 -- -- -- -- 
Partisan 40 87 21 46 9 20 2 4 5 11 
Non-Partisan 73 80 54 59 18 20 6 7 7 8 
Unspecified 5 56 4 44 3 33 -- -- -- -- 
Office sought                     
Supreme Court 9 82 5 45 4 36 -- -- 1 9 
Appellate Court 7 64 2 18 2 18 -- -- 1 9 
Trial Court 102 82 75 60 26 21 6 5 10 8 
Other 9 82 5 45 1 9 2 18 -- -- 
Unspecified 3 75 1 25 2 50 -- -- -- -- 
Incumbent                     
Incumbent 27 79 20 59 5 15 -- -- 2 6 
Non-Incumbent 85 83 54 53 22 22 7 7 10 10 
Unspecified 18 72 14 56 8 32 1 4 -- -- 
Elected                     
Won 48 75 37 58 11 17 2 3 3 5 
Lost 80 86 49 53 21 23 6 6 9 10 
Unspecified 2 50 2 50 3 75 -- -- -- -- 
Total 130 81 88 55 35 22 8 5 12 7 
* Only candidates who reported that their campaign communications focused on issue 
positions "a little," "some," or "a great deal" (n = 161) were given this survey item. 
 
issue positions did you discuss in your campaign communications?” In an effort to 
minimize survey fatigue, this question was only asked if candidates reported spending “a 
little,” “some,” or “a great deal” of focus on issue positions in their campaigns.  
Percentages reported here take into account the total number of candidates who received 
this survey item (n = 161).  The three most popular issue positions discussed by  
185  
Table 5.22. “Which issue positions did you discuss in your campaign 
communications?”* (cont.) 
 
  
Consumer 
protection 
Same-sex 
marriage Other Total 
n % n % n % n 
Election type        
Retention -- -- -- -- 2 13 15 
Partisan 2 4 -- -- 15 33 46 
Non-Partisan 9 10 3 3 43 47 91 
Unspecified 1 11 -- -- 3 33 9 
Office sought              
Supreme Court -- -- -- -- 4 36 11 
Appellate Court 1 9 -- -- 5 45 11 
Trial Court 9 7 3 2 48 39 124 
Other 1 9 -- -- 4 36 11 
Unspecified 1 25 -- -- 2 50 4 
Incumbent              
Incumbent 1 3 1 3 16 47 34 
Non-Incumbent 10 10 2 2 43 42 102 
Unspecified 1 4 -- -- 4 16 25 
Elected              
Won 5 8 1 2 27 42 64 
Lost 6 6 2 2 34 37 93 
Unspecified 1 25 -- -- 2 50 4 
Total 12 7 3 2 63 39 161 
* Only candidates who reported that their campaign communications focused on issue 
positions "a little," "some," or "a great deal" (n = 161) were given this survey item. 
 
candidates included court administration (n = 130, 81%), crime and sentencing (n = 88, 
55%), and “other” (n = 63, 39%). Participants reported a variety of “other” issues, such 
as: court access, capital punishment, issues related to specialty courts (drug courts, 
juvenile courts, probate courts, etc.), gun rights, and several others that could be explored 
in future analyses.  
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“Hot button” issues rarely made their way into judicial campaigns – at least 
according to candidates. Few reported discussing abortion (n = 8, 5%) and even fewer 
touched on the subject of same-sex marriage (n = 3, 2%). As the data show, the majority 
of candidates who opt to discuss issue positions overwhelmingly report discussing 
appropriately relevant issues (i.e., court administration, sentencing, and other issues 
directly related to the judiciary). That said, it is important to reiterate that issue positions 
are not a central focus of most judicial campaigns. 
Why avoid discussing issue positions? Beyond citing the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, judicial candidates discussed a number of rationales behind their avoidance of 
including issue positions in their campaigns.  
 Undesirable characteristic. Aside from the real or perceived legal consequences 
of engaging in controversial campaign speech, normative beliefs also inform judicial 
candidates’ attitudes when it comes to discussing personal politics. For Glenn Thompson, 
an Alabama trial court candidate, touting personal positions is akin to ruling without the 
facts: “As I say often: no matter how thin you slice a biscuit, there's always another side 
to it. And until you actually are put in a position to have to make a decision, you don't 
need to be telling folks how you're going to decide something cause there's always some 
issue that you didn't think about.” 
 Others noted that judges should be open minded when approaching cases: “You 
don't want a judge coming in with a lot of preconceived notions about what they would 
do when there's a certain set of facts,” said Texas Appellate Court candidate Lawrence 
Praeger, “You just want to know: Do they understand the law, do they understand the 
role of the judiciary, do they understand the mechanics of procedure.” 
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In a similar fashion, candidates may lack the information necessary to make 
declarative statements concerning their personal political viewpoints. “Most judges - they 
don't have the wide background,” explained Wisconsin trial court candidate, Chris 
Lipscomb. “Some have never dealt with the kind of cases they're dealing with when they 
become a judge.  So you almost need to have the lawyers who are representing the parties 
to tell you [the facts] because they have no background. So I wouldn't want some judge 
thinking he knows the answer before he started anything.” 
 Not relevant to the duties of the office. Personal issue positions are viewed as 
irrelevant to the duties of a judge. As one trial court candidate observed, “As a judge, 
your client is the law … [Y]ou don't just enforce the laws or apply the laws that you think 
are wise. You apply them all.” Susan Burch, a North Carolina trial court candidate, 
similarly separated the role of personal politics within the role of judge: “I would not be 
comfortable going out and saying, ‘I'm a conservative judge,’ or, ‘I'm a liberal judge.’ I 
think my job is to administer the law ... You're not a conservative or a liberal. You're 
doing this particular job.” 
 Bridget McCormack echoed a related reasoning: “The big difference between a 
candidate for judicial office and a candidate for the state house is that you're not actually 
an advocate for any particular position or group and if you can't understand and accept 
that, I think you're not the best man for the job. So, in some ways, your positions or views 
shouldn't be nearly as relevant as they are for other races.” 
 Although these sentiments may seem like high minded idealism, Kentucky 
Supreme Court candidate Janet Stumbo cited specific administrative limitations that 
further bolster this perspective: “Frankly my personal opinions have very little to do with 
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my legal opinions (laughs). I mean - I can believe one way but I'm bound by the law and 
must obey the opinions of the higher courts and so that gives me very little to work with 
there. I have great respect for the way the law is set up and I'm going to follow precedent.” 
 Hinders ability to perform judicial duties. Candidates recognized that discussing 
personal politics has potential ramifications for how they perform in office. Ann 
Crawford McClure explained, “Just because we can [discuss issues positions] doesn't 
mean we should. So I don't take positions on issues that may come before me. Judges that 
do are going to be subject to tremendous scrutiny and a motion to recuse for having 
already expressed their opinions.” 
 The fear of recusal looms in the minds of many candidates, who frequently err on 
the side of caution when discussing political issues. Michigan Supreme Court candidate, 
Bridget McCormack, noted the difficulty in responding to issues questionnaires: “There 
were times when we had to figure out whether we could answer the questions that were 
asked or not … the main reason [I avoid bringing up issues] is to prevent myself from 
being recused in any important cases that came before the court in the event that I won.” 
Avoiding issue position discussion. Candidates typically avoided discussing 
issue positions by citing the Code of Judicial Conduct and through boiler plate responses 
(e.g., “It is inappropriate for me to say.”). Beyond these simple responses, candidates also 
opted to respond to inquiries from the public and press by speaking in general terms or 
through the use of proxies.   
Broad generalities. Rather than being specific about personal policy preferences, 
candidates may choose to retreat to broader generalities. Elizabeth Best described this 
communicative strategy: “Sometimes people would ask me what I felt about the right to 
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life and I would go back to my core of: the constitution protects life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, for example. But I was not going to engage on the specific issue 
because I didn't think that was appropriate.”   
 Chris Cobey, a California trial court candidate, also described using this strategy, 
though he understood its inability to win over or even placate inquisitive voters:  
“Somebody wrote me about animal rights (laughs): How do you feel about animal 
rights?  … The only thing you can say is, ‘I will enforce the law as I understand 
the law.’ And to a lay person, that's a non-answer, so it's very frustrating in that 
response.” 
 Proxies. Candidates can signal their personal beliefs to voters through association 
rather than through explicit declarations. As Washington trial court candidate, Karen 
Klein, explained, “If somebody asks me, I can tell what groups I belong to. So if they 
were clearly in my opinion very supporting of marriage equality, I would tell them that 
I'm a member of the Northwest LGBT Elder Network … Now if they were people like 
perceived as not supporting that, I wouldn't tell them that piece of information.” 
Negative campaigning. Topics candidates found to be “appropriate” or 
“inappropriate” to publicly raise about an opponent are summarized in Table 5.23. 
Candidates were more prone to find subjects involving legal infractions appropriate and 
personal or moral matters far less so, suggesting candidates themselves are not personally 
supportive of personal attacks or mudslinging. For example, marital infidelity was found 
largely inappropriate to bring up (n = 285, 60%), however a documented case of sexual 
harassment was deemed much more appropriate (n = 266, 56%). Few found bringing up 
an opponent’s religious beliefs appropriate (n = 17, 4%), just as few found bringing up 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” 
 
  
U
sing m
arijuana as a youth 
U
sing cocaine as a youth 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
etention 
48 
68 
8 
11 
15 
21 
39 
55 
17 
24 
15 
21 
Partisan 
87 
90 
6 
6 
4 
4 
73 
75 
19 
20 
5 
5 
N
on-Partisan 
165 
82 
24 
12 
12 
6 
144 
72 
44 
22 
13 
6 
U
nspecified 
16 
16 
3 
3 
84 
82 
13 
13 
6 
6 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
17 
100 
--  
--  
--  
--  
14 
82 
3 
18 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
34 
74 
3 
7 
9 
20 
27 
59 
10 
22 
9 
20 
T
rial C
ourt 
243 
82 
34 
11 
19 
6 
212 
72 
63 
21 
21 
7 
O
ther 
15 
71 
2 
10 
4 
19 
12 
57 
5 
24 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
7 
8 
2 
2 
83 
90 
4 
4 
5 
5 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
91 
86 
10 
9 
5 
5 
78 
74 
23 
22 
5 
5 
N
on-Incum
bent 
158 
83 
21 
11 
11 
6 
137 
72 
40 
21 
13 
7 
U
nspecified 
67 
38 
10 
6 
99 
56 
54 
31 
23 
13 
99 
56 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
163 
80 
17 
8 
23 
11 
143 
70 
37 
18 
23 
11 
L
ost 
145 
82 
22 
13 
9 
5 
121 
69 
44 
25 
11 
6 
U
nspecified 
8 
9 
2 
2 
83 
89 
5 
5 
5 
5 
83 
89 
T
otal 
316 
67 
41 
9 
115 
24 
269 
57 
86 
18 
117 
25 
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Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
Failure to pay taxes (tax evasion, tax 
fraud) 
Failure to pay child support 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
etention 
2 
3 
54 
76 
15 
21 
7 
10 
49 
69 
15 
21 
Partisan 
13 
13 
81 
84 
3 
3 
19 
20 
76 
78 
2 
2 
N
on-Partisan 
23 
11 
168 
84 
10 
5 
32 
16 
158 
79 
11 
5 
U
nspecified 
4 
4 
15 
15 
84 
82 
5 
5 
14 
14 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
3 
18 
14 
82 
--  
--  
4 
24 
13 
76 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
3 
7 
36 
78 
7 
15 
8 
17 
30 
65 
8 
17 
T
rial C
ourt 
30 
10 
248 
84 
18 
6 
44 
15 
235 
79 
17 
6 
O
ther 
4 
19 
13 
62 
4 
19 
4 
19 
13 
62 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
7 
8 
83 
90 
3 
3 
6 
7 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
9 
8 
93 
88 
4 
4 
13 
12 
89 
84 
4 
4 
N
on-Incum
bent 
25 
13 
156 
82 
9 
5 
35 
18 
146 
77 
9 
5 
U
nspecified 
8 
5 
69 
39 
99 
56 
15 
9 
62 
35 
99 
56 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
23 
11 
159 
78 
21 
10 
36 
18 
146 
72 
21 
10 
L
ost 
17 
10 
151 
86 
8 
5 
25 
14 
143 
81 
8 
5 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
8 
9 
83 
89 
2 
2 
8 
9 
83 
89 
T
otal 
42 
9 
318 
67 
112 
24 
63 
13 
297 
63 
112 
24 
191 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
A
 docum
ented allegation of m
arital 
infidelity 
A
 docum
ented allegation of sexual 
harassm
ent 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
42 
59 
14 
20 
15 
21 
10 
14 
46 
65 
15 
21 
Partisan 
79 
81 
15 
15 
3 
3 
29 
30 
65 
67 
3 
3 
N
on-Partisan 
150 
75 
39 
19 
12 
6 
50 
25 
141 
70 
10 
5 
U
nspecified 
14 
14 
5 
5 
84 
82 
5 
5 
14 
14 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
16 
94 
1 
6 
--  
--  
6 
35 
11 
65 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
32 
70 
6 
13 
8 
17 
12 
26 
26 
57 
8 
17 
T
rial C
ourt 
214 
72 
63 
21 
19 
6 
69 
23 
210 
71 
17 
6 
O
ther 
15 
71 
2 
10 
4 
19 
5 
24 
12 
57 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
8 
9 
1 
1 
83 
90 
2 
2 
7 
8 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
81 
76 
20 
19 
5 
5 
24 
23 
77 
73 
5 
5 
N
on-Incum
bent 
145 
76 
35 
18 
10 
5 
51 
27 
131 
69 
8 
4 
U
nspecified 
59 
34 
18 
10 
99 
56 
19 
11 
58 
33 
99 
56 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
149 
73 
33 
16 
21 
10 
52 
26 
130 
64 
21 
10 
L
ost 
127 
72 
39 
22 
10 
6 
40 
23 
128 
73 
8 
5 
U
nspecified 
9 
10 
1 
1 
83 
89 
2 
2 
8 
9 
83 
89 
T
otal 
285 
60 
73 
15 
114 
24 
94 
20 
266 
56 
112 
24 
192 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
A
 bribery conviction 
A
 recent bankruptcy 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
  
  
56 
79 
15 
21 
24 
34 
32 
45 
15 
21 
Partisan 
8 
8 
87 
90 
2 
2 
46 
47 
47 
48 
4 
4 
N
on-Partisan 
13 
6 
179 
89 
9 
4 
86 
43 
105 
52 
10 
5 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
17 
17 
84 
82 
9 
9 
10 
10 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
2 
12 
15 
88 
--  
--  
6 
35 
11 
65 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
2 
4 
37 
80 
7 
15 
16 
35 
22 
48 
8 
17 
T
rial C
ourt 
14 
5 
266 
90 
16 
5 
131 
44 
148 
50 
17 
6 
O
ther 
4 
19 
13 
62 
4 
19 
9 
43 
7 
33 
5 
24 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
8 
9 
83 
90 
3 
3 
6 
7 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
6 
6 
97 
92 
3 
3 
39 
37 
62 
58 
5 
5 
N
on-Incum
bent 
14 
7 
168 
88 
8 
4 
89 
47 
92 
48 
9 
5 
U
nspecified 
3 
2 
74 
42 
99 
56 
37 
21 
40 
23 
99 
56 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
17 
8 
167 
82 
19 
9 
88 
43 
93 
46 
22 
11 
L
ost 
5 
3 
163 
93 
8 
5 
74 
42 
94 
53 
8 
5 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
9 
10 
83 
89 
3 
3 
7 
8 
83 
89 
T
otal 
23 
5 
339 
72 
110 
23 
165 
35 
194 
41 
113 
24 
193 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
U
sing cam
paign funds for personal use 
A
n opponent's questionable m
ilitary 
record 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
3 
4 
53 
75 
15 
21 
19 
27 
36 
51 
16 
23 
Partisan 
9 
9 
86 
89 
2 
2 
42 
43 
49 
51 
6 
6 
N
on-Partisan 
17 
8 
175 
87 
9 
4 
80 
40 
107 
53 
14 
7 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
16 
16 
84 
82 
7 
7 
12 
12 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
2 
12 
15 
88 
--  
--  
8 
47 
9 
53 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
3 
7 
36 
78 
7 
15 
12 
26 
26 
57 
8 
17 
T
rial C
ourt 
22 
7 
258 
87 
16 
5 
113 
38 
158 
53 
25 
8 
O
ther 
3 
14 
14 
67 
4 
19 
10 
48 
7 
33 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
7 
8 
83 
90 
5 
5 
4 
4 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
9 
8 
94 
89 
3 
3 
42 
40 
57 
54 
7 
7 
N
on-Incum
bent 
16 
8 
166 
87 
8 
4 
79 
42 
98 
52 
13 
7 
U
nspecified 
7 
4 
70 
40 
99 
56 
27 
15 
49 
28 
100 
57 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
20 
10 
164 
81 
19 
9 
86 
42 
91 
45 
26 
13 
L
ost 
10 
6 
158 
90 
8 
5 
60 
34 
105 
60 
11 
6 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
8 
9 
83 
89 
2 
2 
8 
9 
83 
89 
T
otal 
32 
7 
330 
70 
110 
23 
148 
31 
204 
43 
120 
25 
194 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
A
n opponent's religious beliefs 
A
 D
U
I or D
W
I (drunk driving) 
conviction 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
53 
75 
2 
3 
16 
23 
8 
11 
48 
68 
15 
21 
Partisan 
91 
94 
4 
4 
2 
2 
29 
30 
62 
64 
6 
6 
N
on-Partisan 
181 
90 
11 
5 
9 
4 
43 
21 
145 
72 
13 
6 
U
nspecified 
19 
18 
--  
--  
84 
82 
7 
7 
12 
12 
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
17 
100 
--  
--  
--  
--  
6 
35 
11 
65 
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
38 
83 
1 
2 
7 
15 
8 
17 
30 
65 
8 
17 
T
rial C
ourt 
264 
89 
15 
5 
17 
6 
66 
22 
208 
70 
22 
7 
O
ther 
16 
76 
1 
5 
4 
19 
4 
19 
12 
57 
5 
24 
U
nspecified 
9 
10 
--  
--  
83 
90 
3 
3 
6 
7 
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
100 
94 
3 
3 
3 
3 
22 
21 
79 
75 
5 
5 
N
on-Incum
bent 
170 
89 
12 
6 
8 
4 
48 
25 
128 
67 
14 
7 
U
nspecified 
74 
42 
2 
1 
100 
57 
17 
10 
60 
34 
99 
56 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
176 
87 
7 
3 
20 
10 
52 
26 
128 
63 
23 
11 
L
ost 
158 
90 
10 
6 
8 
5 
32 
18 
132 
75 
12 
7 
U
nspecified 
10 
11 
--  
--  
83 
89 
3 
3 
7 
8 
83 
89 
T
otal 
344 
73 
17 
4 
111 
24 
87 
18 
267 
57 
118 
25 
195 
 
 
Table 5.23. “Regardless of the impact on campaign strategy and a candidate’s 
chance of winning, do you think that publicly raising the following subjects about 
a political opponent is appropriate or inappropriate?” (cont.) 
 
  
A
n illegal im
m
igrant em
ployed in an 
opponent's hom
e 
A
n opponent's sexual orientation 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
Inappro-
priate 
A
ppro-
priate 
U
n-
Specified 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
21 
30 
35 
49 
15 
21 
52 
73 
3 
4 
16 
23 
Partisan 
56 
58 
35 
36 
6 
6 
91 
94 
4 
4 
2 
2 
N
on-Partisan 
94 
47 
89 
44 
18 
9 
183 
91 
9 
4 
9 
4 
U
nspecified 
10 
10 
9 
9 
84 
82 
19 
18 
--  
--  
84 
82 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
13 
76 
4 
24 
--  
--  
17 
100 
--  
--  
--  
--  
A
ppellate C
ourt 
19 
41 
17 
37 
10 
22 
38 
83 
1 
2 
7 
15 
T
rial C
ourt 
137 
46 
134 
45 
25 
8 
265 
90 
14 
5 
17 
6 
O
ther 
9 
43 
7 
33 
5 
24 
16 
76 
1 
5 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
6 
7 
83 
90 
9 
10 
--  
--  
83 
90 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
55 
52 
44 
42 
7 
7 
100 
94 
3 
3 
3 
3 
N
on-Incum
bent 
94 
49 
79 
42 
17 
9 
172 
91 
10 
5 
8 
4 
U
nspecified 
32 
18 
45 
26 
99 
56 
73 
41 
3 
2 
100 
57 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
93 
46 
83 
41 
27 
13 
176 
87 
7 
3 
20 
10 
L
ost 
83 
47 
80 
45 
13 
7 
159 
90 
9 
5 
8 
5 
U
nspecified 
5 
5 
5 
5 
83 
89 
10 
11 
--  
--  
83 
89 
T
otal 
181 
38 
168 
36 
123 
26 
345 
73 
16 
3 
111 
24 
196 
197  
an opponent’s sexual orientation appropriate (n = 16, 3%). However, failure to pay taxes 
(tax evasion, tax fraud), failure to pay child support, a bribery conviction, using campaign 
funds for personal use, and a DUI or DWI (drunk driving) conviction were all deemed 
appropriate subjects to raise against a political opponent by more than half of those 
surveyed. Some legal infractions were not deemed so appropriate. Both “using marijuana 
as a youth” and “using a cocaine as a youth” were found largely inappropriate subjects to 
bring up against an opponent (n = 316, 67%; n = 269, 57% respectively). Candidates 
favor subjects about their opponent that are recent and timely and have some legal 
implication.  
 There were three subjects where candidates appeared divided: a recent bankruptcy, 
an opponent’s questionable military record, and an illegal immigrant employed in an 
opponent’s home. The division is likely a result of not enough context to determine the 
appropriateness of such subjects. A bankruptcy in and of itself is not necessarily a sign of 
poor character and in a tough economy, harping on an opponent’s bankruptcy may be 
perceived as “kicking someone while they’re down.” An opponent’s questionable 
military record may be worth discussing, but without the context, candidates were 
divided. A “questionable military record” could refer to a candidate having a poor 
attendance record or perhaps to something far more serious. Also lacking enough context 
for a definitive ruling, “an illegal immigrant employed in an opponent’s home” could be 
worth mentioning, but without knowing whether the opponent was aware or not may 
have inhibited candidates from finding this legal infraction “appropriate” subject matter 
for their campaign. 
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 Looking at the findings across election types, few differences are found. A fair 
amount (20%+) of judges standing for retention failed to respond to these items, making 
comparisons difficult. Likewise, few differences were found across incumbency status or 
electoral outcome. 
Analyzing the data across office sought reveals some stark differences for both 
supreme and trial court candidates. First, supreme court candidates are unlikely to find 
many of these subjects appropriate campaign fodder. Second, some issues are more likely 
to be appropriate in trial court contests. Trial court candidates were more approving of 
raising subjects related to sexual morality, including marital infidelity (deemed 
appropriate by n = 63, 21%) and sexual harassment (deemed appropriate by n = 210, 
71%) than were supreme court candidates (n = 1, 6%; n = 11, 65% respectively reported 
such subjects as “appropriate”). 
Summary. Beyond campaign regulations, candidates cite a number of sources 
that influenced their campaign message development. The candidate’s own personal 
experience (e.g., previous campaigns), friends and family, other candidates for office, 
voters, and campaign consultants all played roles in how candidates crafted their 
communications.  
Issue positions were rarely a significant feature of candidates’ campaigns. Those 
that did discuss issue positions largely kept the discussion limited to issues relevant to the 
judicial office (e.g., court administration issues, crime and sentencing issues, etc.). Few 
candidates chose to campaign on hot button issues (e.g., abortion, same-sex marriage). 
The majority of candidates focus on traditional campaign messages focused on their 
experience and qualifications, as well as their character and ethics. Candidates chose to 
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avoid discussing issue positions because they see such outspokenness as being an 
undesirable characteristic for a judge or they believe personal positions are not relevant to 
the judicial office they sought. As some candidates noted in follow-up interviews, being 
outspoken could result in having to recuse oneself from a greater number of cases, 
thereby hindering their ability to serve in the position they sought. Candidates avoid 
discussing their own personal positions by speaking in broad generalities or through 
identifying associations with particular positions (e.g., being a member of the National 
Rifle Association would indicate strong beliefs about the Second Amendment and gun 
ownership).  
Candidates are generally against negative campaigning, though they have more 
favorable attitudes toward bringing up an opponent’s legal infractions.  
Consequences of Campaigning 
Rewarding aspects of campaigning. Although scholars have focused a great 
deal of effort criticizing judicial elections, judicial candidates relayed a number of 
positive outcomes associated with this selection method. Candidates frequently discussed 
how their campaigns helped connect them to the greater community (and vice versa), 
aided in educating the public, and fulfilled democratic ideals. Candidates also noted a 
number of personal rewards as a result of running for judicial office.  
 Community support. Elections provide an outlet for community support through 
interaction between and among the candidates and the public. “For all the demands 
associated with campaigning, the ability to meet people during the process provides the 
greatest reward to a candidate, regardless of the outcome,” explained Kevin Flanagan. “I 
know of no other time except during the campaign process where a complete stranger can 
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walk up onto a porch, extend a hand and introduce oneself.” Even larger scale judicial 
elections have the potential to achieve such ideal outcomes. Though critical of elections 
for a number of reasons, James Rowe, a West Virginia Supreme Court candidate, noted 
the power of elections to bring people together: “You become closer … with people in 
their community as well as their communities and you know what's going on and you 
know what their issues are and what is important and what's not important. And it does 
force you to reconnect with the community and from that standpoint that's a very good 
thing.” 
 Education. One of the rewards candidates identified was the educational aspect of 
campaigns, which is critical as the public is generally uninformed when it comes to the 
judiciary. “The public is basically generally divorced from the legal system” explained 
Texas appellate court candidate, Frank Supercinski, “Unless they get involved in it 
personally and then they get real concerned, you know.” Judicial campaigns allow a 
space and time for candidates to remind the people the purpose of the judicial system and 
how it functions. Tod Daniel, a trial court candidate from Wisconsin, discussed how 
campaigns remain one of the few places for educating the public about the functions of 
the judiciary: “The opportunity to talk about the system and stuff is fun. I mean, we used 
to do a lot more stuff in schools - like May Day we'd be in classrooms, you know, that 
kind of stuff. Bar doesn't do any of that anymore.”   
 Given the lack of public knowledge of the courts, it is no surprise that candidates 
spent a great deal of effort educating the public about the office they sought. Darren 
Kugler, a New Mexico trial court candidate, discussed how voter education was the 
central aspect of his campaign:  
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“I ended up spending as much of my time talking about what the position is in 
district court. The general public outside the Bar and law enforcement community 
doesn't even understand when you say ‘district court’ as to which court - I learned 
to identify it by its street location ... So, a lot of it is educational process with the 
public - informing them as to … which court it is, what kind of matters are heard 
there, and why it is important to them.” 
 Aside from educating the electorate, campaigns also require candidates to educate 
themselves. “It’s very scary,” one candidate said, “because frankly I didn’t even know 
what my district was when I first filed. There were a couple of counties in there I had 
never been to before (laughs).” Elections also encourage candidates (typically practicing 
lawyers) to reexamine their core understanding of the legal system. “You get back to 
your basic fundamental constitutional understanding,” Texas appellate court candidate 
Lawrence Praeger explained, “Why are jury trials important? What's the constitution 
about? Individual liberties - what does that mean? Have you ever represented someone 
against the power of government?” 
 Fulfilling democratic ideals. For many candidates, running for office fulfills 
democratic ideals. Aside from providing voters a choice in potential officials, competitive 
elections result in other beneficial outcomes, according to Mindy Barry, a Michigan 
Supreme Court candidate: “I believe that the more candidates there are, the better off the 
electorate is - not just because they have more options, but also because I think the 
competition between the candidates forces topics to be discussed that may not otherwise 
be discussed.” Competitive elections, Chris Lipscomb, explained, forces candidates to 
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“prove themselves” by requiring candidates to “put [their] qualifications and time and 
effort into [the campaign].”   
 Although critics of elections cite the unwanted influence of public opinion in the 
judicial process as one of the downsides to judicial elections, to some, such as Ohio trial 
court candidate Dean W. Van Dress, such an outcome is beneficial to democracy if one 
views the judicial office as being in line with legislative and executive offices. “I think 
that when you run against incumbents,” Van Dress explained, “You keep current 
incumbents in check a little bit. I think that they think about the next race a little bit more. 
They know that somebody out there who will run against them and it tempers them a 
little bit while they're in office to perhaps, you know, double check and rethink and make 
sure they're doing everything right or [inaudible] that they can do or perhaps to do better 
service for their constituents.” 
 Personal rewards. Campaigning for judicial office simultaneously promotes self-
reflection and self-validation on the part of the candidates. David Towler, a Texas 
appellate court candidate, found himself proud of his ability to push himself outside of 
his comfort zone: “I didn't run away - I didn't just go to Democratic functions. I went to 
mixed functions. I even went to some Republican functions. Not scared to talk to the 
opposition - talk to people who viewed me skeptically from the get go and I found it 
rewarding to be able to talk to them.” Campaigning, according to Karen Klein, a 
Washington trial court candidate, also encourages self-reflection. “You have to talk all 
the time and you have to give sound bites but you also have to really look at yourself,” 
Klein revealed, “It really reinforced who I am and what I want out of life and that I want 
to make a difference.” 
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Running for office provides a platform for public attention, which can often 
benefit the careers of candidates. “The best advertising campaign I ever ran was the year I 
took off as the democratic nominee for the fourth court of appeals (laughs),” noted one 
candidate. “You talk about business coming in, shwew man. People just flock to you. It 
gives you an amount of credibility that nothing else you can do will ever come close to. 
So it was good for business. I'll say that.” Aside from the potential for increased legal 
business, lawyers running against incumbents may benefit in the courtroom due to 
recusal rules. “Here's the even best part,” one Florida court candidate explained, “I never 
have to appear in front of [my opponent] or her husband ever again, which is huge for my 
clients cause they're horrible judges. They have to recuse themselves from all of my 
cases.”   
Troubling aspects of campaigning. Candidates identified several troubling 
aspects of running for office, including concerns over campaign speech, greater structural 
issues with judicial elections in general, campaign financing concerns, and concerns over 
the role external groups take in judicial elections. 
 Campaign speech concerns. Campaign speech concerns revolved around two 
primary aspects of campaigning: negative campaigning and candidate speech regulations.   
Negative campaigning. Tables 5.24.1 and 5.24.2 show the survey data regarding 
candidates’ views on the tone of the election. Overall, results lean toward to the positive 
end of the scale (M = 3.33, SD = 1.15), indicating that most candidates found the 
campaign tone to be neutral to mostly positive. 
Further examination of the data with regard to election type reveals retention 
candidates were more neutral on this item (M = 3.17, SD = 1.02) compared to partisan 
 
 
Table 5.24.1. “Was the tone of the electoral contest you were involved in:” 
(Percentages). 
  
 
  
 
 
O
ver-
w
helm
ingly 
negative 
M
ostly 
negative 
N
either 
positive nor 
negative 
M
ostly 
positive 
O
ver-
w
helm
ingly 
positive 
U
nspecified 
 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
3 
4 
11 
15 
32 
45 
3 
4 
11 
15 
32 
45 
Partisan 
3 
3 
21 
22 
27 
28 
3 
3 
21 
22 
27 
28 
N
on-Partisan 
11 
5 
41 
20 
52 
26 
11 
5 
41 
20 
52 
26 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
3 
18 
6 
35 
4 
24 
3 
18 
6 
35 
4 
24 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
6 
13 
17 
37 
-- 
-- 
6 
13 
17 
37 
T
rial C
ourt 
14 
5 
60 
20 
90 
30 
14 
5 
60 
20 
90 
30 
O
ther 
1 
5 
4 
19 
4 
19 
1 
5 
4 
19 
4 
19 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
1 
1 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
5 
5 
20 
19 
34 
32 
5 
5 
20 
19 
34 
32 
N
on-Incum
bent 
9 
5 
42 
22 
45 
24 
9 
5 
42 
22 
45 
24 
U
nspecified 
4 
2 
16 
9 
37 
21 
4 
2 
16 
9 
37 
21 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
7 
3 
37 
18 
63 
31 
7 
3 
37 
18 
63 
31 
L
ost 
11 
6 
40 
23 
49 
28 
11 
6 
40 
23 
49 
28 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
4 
4 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
4 
4 
T
otal 
18 
4 
78 
17 
116 
25 
18 
4 
78 
17 
116 
25 
204 
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Table 5.24.2. “Was the tone of the electoral contest you were involved in:” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* 
n M SD 
Election type 
   Retention 65 3.17 1.02 
Partisan 95 3.37 1.12 
Non-Partisan 198 3.37 1.19 
Unspecified 18 3.22 1.26 
Office sought 
   Supreme Court 16 2.63 1.36 
Appellate Court 44 3.50 0.93 
Trial Court 287 3.32 1.15 
Other 20 3.50 1.24 
Unspecified 9 3.78 1.20 
Incumbent 
   Incumbent 102 3.35 1.17 
Non-Incumbent 189 3.37 1.17 
Unspecified 85 3.21 1.08 
Elected 
   Won 194 3.42 1.15 
Lost 172 3.21 1.15 
Unspecified 10 3.70 1.06 
Total 376 3.33 1.15 
* Excludes cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 20). 
 
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.12) and non-partisan (M = 3.37, SD = 3.37) candidates. Candidates for 
state supreme court by and large viewed their electoral contests negatively (M = 2.63, SD 
= 1.36) – far more so than appellate (M = 3.50, SD = 0.93) and trial (M = 3.32, SD = 
1.15) court candidates.  The responses of incumbents and non-incumbents were 
essentially identical (M = 3.35, SD = 1.17 and M = 3.37, SD = 1.17 respectively). 
Defeated candidates were slightly more negative than election winners  
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Table 5.25. “During the campaign did any group or individual misrepresent your  
experience, qualifications, character and ethics, or issue positions?" 
  
Yes No Unspecified 
n % n % n % 
Election type       
Retention 23 32 45 63 3 4 
Partisan 38 39 59 61 -- -- 
Non-Partisan 90 45 109 54 2 1 
Unspecified 9 9 11 11 83 81 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 10 59 7 41 -- -- 
Appellate Court 11 24 34 74 1 2 
Trial Court 129 44 163 55 4 1 
Other 9 43 12 57 -- -- 
Unspecified 1 1 8 9 83 90 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 34 32 71 67 1 1 
Non-Incumbent 95 50 94 49 1 1 
Unspecified 31 18 59 34 86 49 
Elected             
Won 64 32 136 67 3 1 
Lost 95 54 79 45 2 1 
Unspecified 1 1 9 10 83 89 
Total 160 34 224 47 88 19 
 
(M = 3.21, SD = 1.15 compared to M = 3.42, SD = 1.15), though both leaned toward the 
positive end of the scale.   
Similar in scope, Table 5.25 breaks down the data regarding whether candidates 
reported being misrepresented during the course of their campaigns. Overall, more than a 
third of candidates (n = 160, 34%) felt that some group or individual had misrepresented 
their experience, qualifications, character and ethics, or issue positions at some point 
during the election. 
Interestingly, non-partisan candidates reported with greater frequency being 
misrepresented during the campaign (n = 90, 45%) than partisan candidates  
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(n = 23, 32%) or judges standing for retention (n = 23, 32%). Across judicial office, 
supreme court candidates stood out as the majority (n = 10, 59%) reported being 
misrepresented. A larger proportion of non-incumbents (n = 34, 32%) and defeated 
candidates (n = 95, 54%) reported being misrepresented compared to incumbents (n = 34, 
32%) and election winners (n = 64, 32%). 
Candidates, as Table 5.26 shows, are evenly divided when it comes to responding 
to such misrepresentations with 80 (50%) reporting having responded to the 
misrepresentations and 80 (50%) indicating that they did not respond. Across each of the 
variables analyzed, data appear to suggest one singular trend: about half of candidates 
respond and about half do not.   
Those who faced negative campaigning were taken by surprise. “What was 
disappointing to me was,” Mindy Barry explained, “There was a lot more dirty fighting 
than I had anticipated. The personal, unethical attack - it was hard on my family. Putting 
them through the mudslinging [was] directly hurtful to them.” 
 Aside from finding such campaigning distasteful, candidates note their inability to 
launch effective counter campaigns. Elizabeth Best, a candidate for Montana’s Supreme 
Court explained why she did not choose to respond to an interest group’s round of 
negative ads that specifically targeted her:  
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Table 5.26. “Did you respond to the misrepresentation(s)?”* 
  
Yes No Total 
n % n % n 
Election type      
Retention 10 43 13 57 23 
Partisan 19 50 19 50 38 
Non-Partisan 45 50 45 50 90 
Unspecified 6 67 3 33 9 
Office sought          
Supreme Court 5 50 5 50 10 
Appellate Court 6 55 5 45 11 
Trial Court 64 50 65 50 129 
Other 4 44 5 56 9 
Unspecified 1 100 -- -- 1 
Incumbent          
Incumbent 18 53 16 47 34 
Non-Incumbent 49 52 46 48 95 
Unspecified 13 42 18 58 31 
Elected          
Won 29 45 35 55 64 
Lost 50 53 45 47 95 
Unspecified 1 100 -- -- 1 
Total 80 50 80 50 160 
 
* Only participants who reported being misrepresented (n = 160) were given this survey 
item. 
 
“I didn't have time. Once I found out, we were two weeks away from the primary 
and there wasn't anything really that could be done. All of the media was bought.  
There wasn't any more and that's another factor - there wasn't any more media to 
buy because, again, of all this upticket campaigning … The media was bought 
early and all sorts of candidates had bought it and there just wasn't any more 
room.” 
 Judges standing for retention are particularly at a disadvantage as several states 
prohibit campaign activity unless the candidate faces opposition. One judge standing for 
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retention described one possible scenario: “[If] all of a sudden there was active 
opposition about a week or two before the election - that candidate probably would not be 
able to effectively mount a campaign to challenge the opposition.” The candidate would 
be unable to mount a counter-campaign as the candidate would first have to observe 
opposition and submit forms to the state prior to attempt to raise funds. Resource-laden, 
national interest groups need only wait until the final stretch of the election to launch an 
opposition campaign in order to ensure the absence of an effective counter-campaign.   
Launching a counter-campaign may not be productive, as some candidates noted.  
For one state supreme court candidate, fighting back was simply not an appropriate 
response: “I got a lot of criticism because I didn't fight back but I don't think that's 
appropriate … I demonstrated that they were incorrect and that they were misrepresenting 
what I said but I didn't try to do anything like that my opponent because I don't think 
that's appropriate. That's not what a judicial race should be.”   
For another candidate, fighting back would have meant starting a war: “I debated 
whether to respond to that and I just kind of went back on the past experience that that 
kind of thing doesn't ever help (laughs) you know, it just seems to feed the flame of 
negativity and so I just let it be.”  
Candidates found that going negative simply did not play to their best strength or 
interest. “I was very careful to stay away from criticizing [my opponent] because I don't 
think criticism has much place in a judicial race and I just don't think it serves me well,” 
explained one candidate. “Some people can do it and get away with it, some people can't. 
I felt like if I got ugly, if I got critical, that I would do myself more harm than I would 
good, so, I didn't.” 
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Going further, candidates also recognized that voters do not respond well to 
negative campaigning in judicial elections. Darren Kugler, a trial court candidate in New 
Mexico, noted that he and his opponents were aware of the consequences of going 
negative: “I think all of us realized there's a futility to going negative. That it was more 
likely to turn off voters than it was to actually help you prevail.” This perspective was 
also shared by Wisconsin trial court candidate Chris Lipscomb, who observed, “I do 
think most people though want a fair election … particularly for judges more than 
anybody else … They don't like the mudslinging.”  
 Candidate speech regulations. Candidates also took issue with speech regulations 
that limit their ability to connect with the electorate. On one hand, restrictions appear to 
be more of annoyance for candidates such as Florida trial court candidate, Stephen Burk. 
“Really the only thing that you're allowed to say is ‘In making a decision, I will follow 
and apply the law.’ What the hell does that tell you?” He continued, “[W]hile I 
understand and agree with the restrictions against doing that because that might tend to 
make people want to pander to various groups or individuals or whatever - I agree with it 
from that standpoint but it's also very frustrating in that you don't really have the 
opportunity to let people know what sort of a person they're voting for.” 
On the other hand, restrictions may in fact be the driving factor behind the 
disconnect between the judiciary and the public. James Egan, an Oregon appellate court 
candidate, explained: “The canons of judicial conduct, to a certain extent, cause the 
candidates to [appear] aloof. You can't talk about a specific case, you can't talk about 
specific issues you might be called upon to decide and therefore, these candidates sound 
like they're just in an ivory tower.” 
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   Some restrictions, as one candidate pointed out, may have outlived their utility in 
an age where vast amounts of personal information available online. “Some of the stuff is 
really stupid,” said one candidate, “like we’re not allowed to say our party affiliation, 
which I'm sure in the old days was a maybe an okay idea, but I'm sure that anybody can 
Google me and find out what my party affiliation is.” 
 Electoral concerns. Candidates discussed three general structural concerns with 
judicial elections: overcrowded ballots, sizeable electorates, and the arbitrariness of 
elections. 
 Overcrowded ballots make it difficult for candidates to effectively reach voters.  
“Our ballots are long and we're at the bottom,” explained Susan Burch, a North Caroline 
trial court candidate. “The only race usually that's beyond ours is the soil and water 
conservation supervisor and so, you know a lot of folks, after they get through the first 7 
or 8 pages are like, ‘How long is this thing?’ They don't know anything about the judges 
and they just simply stop voting and so it can be very confusing … [Y]ou might have to 
deal with 15 or 16 different elections on that ballot of judges that are running.” 
 Aside from overcrowded ballots, judicial candidates running in densely populated 
counties or serving large districts (or the state as a whole) likewise face an uphill battle 
when it comes to connecting with the electorate. In many cases, candidates face larger 
electorates than those serving as state representatives or senators. “A number of years 
ago,” John Baker, an Indiana appellate court judge began, “I was approached by one of 
our Democrats in the House of Representatives and he said ‘Well, you know, there's 
some discussion about putting you guys back on the ballot - partisan.’ And I said, ‘Now 
you think about that for a minute, representative. How many counties do you run in, sir?’ 
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And he said, ‘Well I run in four.’ And I said, ‘Well I run in 53’ … That was the end of 
the discussion for that session.”  
 By and large, candidates took issue with the arbitrariness of elections. Concerns 
within this category included the arbitrariness of the election outcome and the candidates’ 
political party designation. The outcome of judicial elections, according to one judicial 
candidate, is akin to a “crap shoot” dependent on “things like the weather.” Ohio 
appellate court candidate, Clair Dickinson, summed up this frustration succinctly: “What 
you have to do to get the job has absolutely nothing to do whatsoever with how you'll 
perform the job.” 
 A great example demonstrative of Dickinson’s claim is the “name game” 
involved in judicial elections, specifically low-information non-partisan contests. In such 
circumstances, the candidate’s name is one of the most important assets (or liabilities) to 
a candidate. One aspect of this concern involves the order of candidate’s names, as 
Georgia trial court candidate Mark Shriver explained: 
“Candidates on the ballot are listed alphabetically and my opponent's last name 
begins with a 'C.' My last name begins with an 'S.' So his name is top of mine on 
the ballot and somebody told me at the very beginning of the campaign that that 
would - that I faced an uphill battle just because of that. And I believe that came 
to be true.”   
 Aside from ballot order, names also impart information to voters concerning the 
candidate’s likely gender and ethnicity. “In my county, if you have an Irish or an Italian 
name, you get elected. It's just that simple, which is kind of ironic, because I'm Italian but 
I don't have an Italian sounding name,” one candidate said. “[My opponent] used her 
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former spouses' politically great name to get elected … Other people have actually 
changed their name … because it was a great ballot name. I swear, it's insane. At the end 
of the day, every single candidate that had an Irish or Italian surname won.”   
 Perceived ethnicity based on the candidate’s name can also lead candidates to 
alter their name to make it more palatable to the electorate. Karen Miller described one 
candidate, Miguel Fernandez, who changed his approach in his third judicial campaign:  
“This is a real white, middle-class redneck area and they don't like his name. The 
last election, he's now introducing himself as ‘Mike Fernandez’ like he would sit 
next to me … and he would say - and I know him real well - and he would say, 
‘Well my name appears on the ballot as Miguel Fernandez - but, but all my 
friends call me Mike.' Okay dude, none of your friends have ever called you 
‘Mike,’ okay, ever. And he was beaten by somebody named Joseph Foster who 
was a virtual unknown … 70% of the vote Joe got … and that's just because 
[Miguel Fernandez] has an ethnic name.”   
Aside from making minor alterations to their name, candidates also engage in the name 
game by picking better political last names upon marriage. “Sweeney in Cuyhoga County 
is gold,” explained another candidate, “and [a male candidate] married a Sweeney and 
changed his name to his wife's name.” 
 Partisan designations were also the source of much concern. As some candidates 
discovered, party labels can be more powerful than any campaign message. Stephen Burk, 
who ran for trial court judge in Florida, believed his past experience battling against the 
state in the courtroom would resonate with the libertarian-minded Tea Party crowd. 
Indeed, as Burk noted, “these Tea Party folks just really ate that up … As a matter of fact, 
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they kind of swamped my wife after we spoke [at their meeting].” However, as the 
campaigns progressed and voters learned of the candidates’ party labels, Burk faced a 
much colder reception when speaking at a second meeting: “I did not feel the love the 
second time we were invited there ... I had several people come up to me during the 
campaign and say to me, point blank, ‘I've heard you speak, I love what you have to say, 
you belong to the wrong party. I would never vote for you.’”  
 The power of the party label is difficult if not impossible to overcome, as Robert 
Shaffer noted, “In the end, if I'd had $10 million, I don't think it would have made a 
difference. So, I felt like we had done everything we could with the resources that we had 
and that there just wasn't anything that was going to change the outcome.” Partisanship 
also discourages candidates from attempting to engage the electorate. David Towler faced 
this scenario in his campaign for Texas appellate court: 
“I was going to be driving through town, taking my son off to college, and I was 
told by the party chair, ‘Don't bother even slowing down. We got about 300 
Democrats in this county. You're going to get all their votes. There's nothing else 
you can do here. I don't have time for you.’ (sighs)” 
 Candidates were surprised by such occurrences given the general sentiment that 
personal political ideology has little to do with the functions of a judge. “In the broad 
scheme of things, there isn't Republican justice or Democratic justice,” Ann Crawford 
McClure argued, “We're supposed to follow the law and apply the law to the facts of the 
case.” Susan Burch further added her concern over information gleaned from party 
labels: “I'm not sure that party affiliation really tells a voter anything about how that 
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person will do as a judge. It doesn't really give insight into their qualifications or skill 
level to be able to do the work that you're voting on them to do.” 
This sentiment was particularly true for trial court candidates, who by in and large 
do not issue rulings related to policy. As one trial court candidate explained, “At our level 
of work, your political ideology is so immaterial. You're calling the balls and strikes … 
Even if you're trying to inject it into things, you wouldn't find many opportunities to do it 
because we're not dealing with policy matters, we're dealing with individual cases.”   
 Financing concerns. Campaign finance is a great concern in the “new-style” 
judicial campaign era. Raising campaign funds proved important for candidates. Nearly 
half of those surveyed (n = 228, 48%) reported establishing a committee to solicit 
campaign contributions.   
Table 5.27 further shows stark differences across the variables of interest. Less 
than one third of judges standing for retention (n = 21, 30%) established a committee, 
which is unsurprising given that many of these judges are specifically prohibited from 
actively campaigning. Partisan and non-partisan candidates were similar in their adoption 
of committees (n = 62, 64% and n = 129, 64% respectively). Although most candidates 
for state supreme court (n = 12, 71%) and trial courts (n = 179, 60%) established 
committees, appellate court candidates lagged behind both by a high degree (n = 20, 
43%). Lastly, candidates defeated in the election (n  = 118, 67%) were more likely to 
establish committees compared to their counterparts (n = 100, 49%). This difference is 
likely due to incumbents who did not face active opposition to their election and therefore 
did not have to actively campaign. 
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Table 5.27. “Did you establish a committee to solicit campaign contributions?” 
  
Yes No Unspecified 
n % n % n % 
Election type       
Retention 21 30 49 69 1 1 
Partisan 62 64 34 35 1 1 
Non-Partisan 129 64 66 33 6 3 
Unspecified 16 16 14 14 73 71 
Office sought             
Supreme Court 12 71 5 29 -- -- 
Appellate Court 20 43 26 57 -- -- 
Trial Court 179 60 110 37 7 2 
Other 8 38 12 57 1 5 
Unspecified 9 10 10 11 73 79 
Incumbent             
Incumbent 60 57 44 42 2 2 
Non-Incumbent 132 69 53 28 5 3 
Unspecified 36 20 66 38 74 42 
Elected             
Won 100 49 98 48 5 2 
Lost 118 67 55 31 3 2 
Unspecified 10 11 10 11 73 78 
Total 228 48 163 35 81 17 
 
Table 5.28 shows the sources from which judicial candidates reported receiving 
campaign contributions. The majority of candidates received campaign contributions 
from their own pockets (n = 321, 68%), lawyers/law firms (n = 259, 55%), and other 
individuals (excluding lawyers) (n = 268, 57%). Similar to the findings summarized in 
Table 5.27, retention candidates, appellate court candidates, incumbents, and election 
winners lagged behind their counterparts. However, the findings here demonstrate the 
increased importance of contributions from interest groups. More candidates reported 
receiving contributions from interest groups (n = 101, 21%) than from political parties (n 
= 58, 12%). Further review of the data reveals that even in partisan contests, twice as 
 
 
Table 5.28. “Which of the following sources contributed campaign funds?” 
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many judicial candidates report receiving contributions from interest groups (n = 34, 
35%) than from political parties (n = 18, 19%). However, nowhere else do interest groups 
shine more than in contests for state supreme court where more than three-quarters (n = 
13, 76%) of candidates report receiving contributions from such groups.   
Despite the importance of securing campaign contributions, judicial candidates 
report fundraising as a minor campaign activity. Overall, most candidates (n = 242, 51%) 
spend between 0-20% of their time on the campaign trail actively seeking campaign 
donations (see Tables 5.29.1 and 5.29.2 for full analysis), with an overall average of just 
over 20% (M = 21.89, SD = 22.97).   
Retention candidates by and large do not seek campaign contributions as 65% (n 
= 46) report spending absolutely zero time attempting to raise funds. Partisan (M = 25.47, 
SD = 22.01) and non-partisan candidates (M = 24.77, SD = 23.16) report a near 
equivalent amount of time spent fundraising. Compared to candidates for other levels of 
the judiciary, supreme court candidates are under greater pressure to raise money for their 
campaigns. The majority of supreme court candidates (n = 10, 59%) report spending 
between 30-50% of their time fundraising, with an overall average of over 40% (M = 
43.53, SD = 26.91) of their time being spent on seeking campaign contributions – far 
greater than appellate (M = 21.82, SD = 24.62) or trial court candidates (M = 21.40, SD = 
22.12). Non-incumbents (M = 27.91, SD = 22.49) and defeated candidates (M = 28.71, 
SD =23.78) report spending more time fundraising than their counterparts (M = 20.75, SD 
= 22.83 and M = 16.67, SD = 20.58 respectively).   
 
 
Table 5.29.1. “Please indicate the percentage of time spent on your campaign 
that was dedicated to fundraising” (Percentages). 
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Table 5.29.1. “Please indicate the percentage of time spent on your campaign 
that was dedicated to fundraising.” (cont.) 
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Table 5.29.2. “Please indicate the percentage of time spent on your campaign that 
was dedicated to fundraising” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* 
n M SD 
Election type 
   Retention 64 9.69 19.35 
Partisan 95 25.47 22.01 
Non-Partisan 197 24.77 23.16 
Unspecified 30 17.67 23.44 
Office sought       
Supreme Court 17 43.53 26.91 
Appellate Court 44 21.82 24.62 
Trial Court 286 21.4 22.12 
Other 20 18 18.52 
Unspecified 19 14.21 23.64 
Incumbent       
Incumbent 106 20.75 22.83 
Non-Incumbent 184 27.61 22.49 
Unspecified 96 12.19 20.68 
Elected       
Won 195 16.67 20.58 
Lost 171 28.71 23.78 
Unspecified 20 14.5 23.5 
Total 386 21.89 22.97 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 86) 
Campaign finance proved to be the primary concern of candidates as they 
simultaneously recognized the influence money has within the judiciary and the 
insatiable need for campaign donations. 
Judicial candidates are well aware of the inherent “ickiness” of financing judicial 
campaigns. “One of the most disgusting things about … being an attorney is when people 
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are running for judge, you get hit up for campaign contributions,” Stephen Burk 
explained, “It's always made me very uncomfortable to write a check to a judge's 
campaign knowing that someday I might be in front of that judge. It just doesn't smell 
right to be funding judicial campaigns.” Similarly, Lawrence Praeger discussed his 
experience as a lawyer serving clients who sought to influence the judge through 
campaign contributions: “I have had clients come into my office and say things to me like, 
‘Well do you think it'd be better for my case if I gave a contribution to the campaign?’” 
Even candidates who recognized judicial campaign financing as a necessary evil 
have a difficult time accepting the current model. “Everything about the money is 
disheartening,” said one trial court candidate, “There's no getting away from the fact that 
there's … tension about saying - even if it's through an intermediary – ‘Give me money 
so that I can be in a position to decide your cases’ (laughs) … I don't look at it that way 
… I think a rational way to look at it is that good lawyers want to have good judges do a 
good job and they benefit from that irrespective of outcomes in particular, specific cases, 
but still it's awkward.” 
 At the same time, candidates who seek judicial office are in no place to turn away 
contributors for the sake of high-minded ideals. “[Campaigning is] just an endless cycle 
of expenses,” says Texas appellate court candidate Lawrence Praeger. Despite their 
desire for a seemingly endless supply of campaign contributions, there is a limited supply 
of money that the electorate is willing to donate in any given election year. “The 
difficulty is the fact that you’re trying to run a race when there’s not enough money to do 
so,” says Clair Dickinson. Judicial candidates compete for campaign donations that could 
fund legislative or executive office candidates and frequently find themselves attempting 
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to pull in donations from the same individuals their opponents solicit. “[It’s difficult] 
when you have five court of appeals judges out there with their hand out to the same 
contributors for the same money,” David Towler explained. 
 External Group Involvement. Tables 5.30 and 5.31 breakdown the data 
concerning candidates’ perceptions of the level of involvement interest groups and 
political parties had in their electoral contests. As evident in the tables, incumbents (M = 
1.50, SD = 0.77) and election winners (M = 1.53, SD = 0.85) reported less involvement 
from external groups than their counterparts (non-incumbents: M = 1.77, SD = 0.88; 
defeated candidates: M = 1.81, SD = 0.86). Notably, supreme court candidates reported a 
high degree of interest group involvement (M = 2.59, SD = 0.87) – much higher than 
appellate court (M = 1.89, SD = 0.88) or trial court (M = 1.58, SD = 0.81) candidates. 
Political parties are more involved with judicial elections than are interest groups, 
with over half of all candidates (n = 248, 53%) reporting some level of activity by 
political parties. Unsurprisingly, political parties are more involved with partisan 
elections (M = 2.56, SD = 0.99) than non-partisan (M = 2.05, SD = 0.98) or retention (M 
= 1.53, SD = 0.94) elections. Parties appear to also take a more active role in supreme 
court contests (M = 2.65, SD = 1.17) than appellate court (M = 2.11, SD = 1.09) or trial 
court (M = 2.06, SD = 1.01) elections. Incumbents and election winners report far lower 
party activity (M = 1.91, SD = 0.92 and M = 1.85, SD = 1.01 respectively) than do non-
incumbents (M = 2.38, SD = 1.02) and defeated candidates (M = 2.38, SD = 0.99). 
 
 
 
Table 5.30. “In the election you were involved in, how active were interest groups  
(including PACs)?”  
 
 
 
  
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 85). 
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0.86 
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Table 5.31. “In the election you were involved in, how active were political 
parties?”  
 
 
 
  
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 86). 
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Candidates held a divided view regarding the involvement of external groups in 
judicial elections, as Tables 5.32.1, 5.32.2, 5.33.1, and 5.33.2 demonstrate. Overall, 
findings demonstrate candidates overall hold negative attitudes toward the involvement 
of political parties (M = 2.41, SD = 1.17) and interest groups (M = 2.34, SD = 1.09) in 
judicial elections.   
All categories of candidates expressed somewhat negative attitudes regarding 
interest groups involved in judicial campaigns. Retention candidates held more negative 
views (M = 2.03, SD = 0.99) than did partisan (M = 2.41, SD =1.19) or non-partisan (M = 
2.40, SD = 1.07) candidates.  Supreme court candidates were less critical (M = 2.75, SD = 
0.86) than appellate (M = 2.30, SD = 1.04) or trial (M = 2.31, SD = 1.12) court candidates. 
Incumbents (M = 2.18, SD = 1.11) were more critical of interest group involvement than 
were non-incumbents (M = 2.51, SD = 1.11). 
Attitudes toward political party involvement differ. Partisan candidates held 
slightly more favorable views toward political parties (M = 2.96, SD = 1.25) than 
retention (M = 2.14, SD = 1.01) or non-partisan (M = 2.23, SD = 1.18) candidates. 
Supreme court candidates (M = 2.63, SD = 1.02) were slightly more receptive to party 
involvement than trial court candidates (M = 2.34, SD = 1.22). Incumbents (M = 2.40, SD 
= 1.25) and non-incumbents (M = 2.49, SD = 1.26) were similar, as were election winners 
(M = 2.51, SD = 1.17) and defeated candidates (M = 2.27, SD = 1.25). 
Despite having slightly negative attitudes toward party involvement, candidates 
praised them for providing logistical support and much-needed resources. For Texas 
appellate court candidate, Penny Philips, party support was a godsend:  
 
 
Table 5.32.1. “When it comes to interest groups (including PACs) involved in 
judicial campaigns, is your attitude toward them:” (Percentages). 
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Table 5.32.2. “When it comes to interest groups (including PACs) involved in 
judicial campaigns, is your attitude toward them:” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* 
n M SD 
Election type 
   Retention 64 2.03 0.99 
Partisan 92 2.41 1.19 
Non-Partisan 197 2.40 1.07 
Unspecified 20 2.30 0.92 
Office sought 
   Supreme Court 16 2.75 0.86 
Appellate Court 43 2.30 1.04 
Trial Court 286 2.31 1.12 
Other 19 2.53 0.96 
Unspecified 9 2.22 0.83 
Incumbent 
   Incumbent 100 2.18 1.11 
Non-Incumbent 187 2.51 1.08 
Unspecified 86 2.13 1.00 
Elected 
   Won 191 2.27 1.08 
Lost 172 2.41 1.10 
Unspecified 10 2.30 1.06 
Total 373 2.34 1.09 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 99). 
 
“The deadline to have your signatures in was Friday at six o'clock PM, so I had to 
get all those signatures and I could have never done it myself. I think I personally 
got 10 of them, so the party overwhelmingly got those signatures for me … 
Without the support of the party, I would never have run. It wouldn't have 
occurred to me to run and I would not have been able to get the signatures and be 
on the ballot.” 
 
 
Table 5.33.1. “When it comes to political parties involved in judicial campaigns, 
is your attitude toward them:” (Percentages). 
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Table 5.33.2. “When it comes to political parties involved in judicial campaigns, is 
your attitude toward them:” (Scale).* 
  
Scale* 
n M SD 
Election type    
Retention 64 2.14 1.01 
Partisan 95 2.96 1.25 
Non-Partisan 198 2.23 1.18 
Unspecified 20 2.50 1.05 
Office sought    
Supreme Court 16 2.63 1.02 
Appellate Court 43 2.53 1.20 
Trial Court 288 2.34 1.22 
Other 21 2.71 1.10 
Unspecified 9 3.11 0.78 
Incumbent    
Incumbent 103 2.40 1.25 
Non-Incumbent 188 2.49 1.26 
Unspecified 86 2.27 1.02 
Elected    
Won 193 2.51 1.17 
Lost 174 2.27 1.25 
Unspecified 10 3.00 0.82 
Total 377 2.41 1.20 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 95). 
 
Resources afforded by external groups can combat the limited availability of 
campaign contributions. “When you're running as a partisan part of the ticket,” Susan 
Burch explained, “The party itself is putting out materials and they're there promoting the 
candidates of that party and so you get the benefit of their expenditures because you're 
included in their information.”
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Despite the potential for external groups to help judicial candidates campaign, 
candidates also note their vulnerability to attacks from resource-laden interest groups. “I 
was the canary in the coal mine,” Elizabeth Best observed, “I was the first one in this 
state at least to be targeted by dark money …We felt like we were in a pretty good 
position but what we didn't know was that more than I had raised and more than my 
opponents had raised combined was going to be spent in the last two weeks by another 
entity ... it had never happened before.” 
 Michigan Supreme Court candidate Bridget Mary McCormack described a similar 
experience:  
“[Interest groups ran] one big bad TV ad about how bad I am. They bought a 
million dollars’ worth of TV in one week. If any group spends a million dollars 
against one of my opponents, I'd feel similarly disgusted by it … In judicial 
elections, the electorate walks into the ballot and at least in Michigan it's non-
partisan - they just see a list of names and so a Swift Boat-type ad, I think, has the 
potential to do a lot more damage.” 
Is it worth it? Given the potential for an arduous campaign deterring would-be 
candidates from tossing their hats in the ring, it is worth exploring whether candidates felt 
the experience is truly worth enduring the undesirable consequences of campaigning for 
public office.   
Campaign effectiveness. To examine this aspect of judicial campaigns, it is 
valuable to first examine whether candidates felt their campaigns reached the electorate.  
As Table 5.34 shows, the majority of judicial candidates (n = 259, 58%) felt that voters 
were “slightly” or “somewhat” informed about their qualifications for office. Few 
 
 
Table 5.34. “All in all, what level of knowledge would you say voters had 
about your candidacy?” 
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candidates felt that voters were “uninformed” about their candidacy (n = 68, 14%), and 
few (n = 54, 11%) felt that voters were “well-informed.” 
A higher proportion of candidates in partisan races felt that voters were 
uninformed (n = 22, 23%) than nonpartisan candidates (n = 30, 15%). This pattern held 
true for the proportion of candidates reporting that voters were well-informed (partisan 
candidates: n = 17, 18%; nonpartisan candidates: n = 22, 11%). Over one-third of 
appellate court candidates (n = 17, 37%) felt voters were completely uninformed about 
their candidacy – a higher proportion than any other category of candidate included in 
this analysis. Trial court candidates, on the other hand, held far more positive views – 
with precisely half (n = 148, 50%) reporting voters were “somewhat” or “well” informed 
about their candidacy. Minor differences were found across incumbency status and not so 
surprisingly, those defeated in the election largely felt that voters were uninformed about 
their candidacy (n = 46, 26%) compared to election winners, who held more positive 
views regarding the effectiveness of their campaign (n = 39, 19% felt that voters were 
well informed of their qualifications for office). 
 Overall experience. Examining whether candidates felt running for office was a 
positive or a negative experience is another way to assess whether candidates felt running 
for office was worth it. For most candidates, running for office is a positive experience, 
as Table 5.35 shows. Treating response options as a scale, results the “average candidate” 
would place the experience between neither positive nor negative and somewhat positive 
(M = 3.45, SD=1.29). In fact, across all levels of the variables analyzed here, candidates 
tended to report positive experiences. Even those who lost the election reported an overall 
positive experience (M = 3.22, SD = 1.36), though, as we might expect, those who won 
 
 
Table 5.35. “For you, personally, would you say that the experience of running 
for public office was:” 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 90). 
 
 
V
ery 
negative 
Som
e-
w
hat 
negative 
N
either 
negative 
nor 
positive 
Som
e-
w
hat 
positive 
V
ery 
positive 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
2 
3 
11 
15 
28 
39 
15 
21 
13 
18 
2 
3 
69 
3.38 
1.06 
Partisan 
7 
7 
27 
28 
7 
7 
24 
25 
31 
32 
1 
1 
96 
3.47 
1.38 
N
on-Partisan 
16 
8 
49 
24 
20 
10 
58 
29 
56 
28 
2 
1 
199 
3.45 
1.34 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
5 
5 
1 
1 
8 
8 
4 
4 
85 
83 
18 
3.61 
1.14 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
Suprem
e C
ourt 
1 
6 
6 
35 
3 
18 
6 
35 
1 
6 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.00 
1.12 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
3 
7 
10 
22 
9 
20 
9 
20 
13 
28 
2 
4 
44 
3.43 
1.32 
T
rial C
ourt 
20 
7 
71 
24 
41 
14 
82 
28 
79 
27 
3 
1 
293 
3.44 
1.30 
O
ther 
1 
5 
4 
19 
2 
10 
6 
29 
8 
38 
-- 
-- 
21 
3.76 
1.30 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
85 
92 
7 
4.00 
1.15 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
Incum
bent 
6 
6 
30 
28 
21 
20 
25 
24 
22 
21 
2 
2 
104 
3.26 
1.25 
N
on-Incum
bent 
16 
8 
45 
24 
5 
3 
59 
31 
64 
34 
1 
1 
189 
3.58 
1.38 
U
nspecified 
3 
2 
17 
10 
30 
17 
21 
12 
18 
10 
87 
49 
89 
3.38 
1.11 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
W
on 
5 
2 
37 
18 
44 
22 
49 
24 
65 
32 
3 
1 
200 
3.66 
1.18 
L
ost 
19 
11 
52 
30 
11 
6 
55 
31 
37 
21 
2 
1 
174 
3.22 
1.36 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
85 
91 
8 
3.00 
1.51 
T
otal 
25 
5 
92 
19 
56 
12 
105 
22 
104 
22 
90 
19 
382 
3.45 
1.29 
234 
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reported a slightly better time (M = 3.66, SD = 1.18). That said, the mean for candidates 
for state supreme court was directly in the middle (M = 3.00, SD = 1.12), the lowest mean 
scale score out of all types of candidates.  
 Plans for the future. As a final indicator of whether candidates believe running 
for office was worth it, Table 5.36 summarizes candidates’ responses as to whether they 
plan to run for public office in the future. Less than one third of candidates (n = 150, 
32%) report any level of unlikeliness to run again. Given that even some election winners 
report some level of unlikeliness to run again in the future (n = 55, 27%), these results 
should be comforting to those concerned over whether the rough and tumble, new-style 
campaigns discourage potential candidates from running for office. Overall, more than 
one quarter of all candidates (n = 129, 27%) report that they “almost certainly” will run 
for office again in the future. Nearly half of all candidates report that they will likely run 
again in the future (n = 231, 49% report some level of likelihood (“fairly,” “very”, or 
“almost certainly”) of running again in the future). Those who lost their elections are 
consistent with the overall findings, with about half (n = 91, 52%) reporting some level of 
unlikeliness of running again.   
 Summary. Candidates noted a number of concerning issues with judicial 
elections and campaigns. Most found the tone of their contest positive, but nearly one-
third of all candidates reported being misrepresented by another individual or group. This 
is significant as candidates generally do not have the resources (campaign funds, access 
to paid media) to launch effective counter campaigns, though they cited a number of 
other reasons why responding to such misrepresentations would be unproductive (e.g., a 
candidate’s response may simply “fan the flames” and “start a war”).  
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Candidates expressed frustration with the regulations that guide their campaign 
activities. To some, restrictions make candidates “appear aloof” and force their campaign 
communications to be overly general to be of any use to voters. 
Other concerns aligned with the ones discussed in Chapter Three. Candidates 
discussed overcrowded ballots, the difficult of campaigning when facing a large 
electorate, and the arbitrariness of judicial elections (e.g., the importance of how their 
name appears on the ballot, the overriding power of the partisan designation).  
Surprisingly, candidates report fundraising as a minor activity, comprising an 
average of around 20% of their total time spent on their campaign. This may be due to the 
unique regulations that prohibit candidates from personally asking for campaign 
contributions. Despite this finding, candidates expressed concerns over the corruptive 
nature of campaign financing in judicial campaigns. 
Political parties were generally more involved in judicial elections than interest 
groups, who tended to focus their efforts on supreme court races. Overall, candidates held 
negative attitudes toward both groups’ involvement in judicial campaigns, though 
candidates identified a number of ways political parties aided in their campaigns (e.g., 
acquiring the required amount of signatures to get on the ballot). Interestingly, state 
supreme court candidates held less negative views toward interest groups, though follow-
up interviews revealed some candidates felt their involvement completely undermined 
their campaigns. 
Despite the view that the public is largely disinterested in judicial elections, most 
candidates felt that voters were at least slightly to somewhat informed of their 
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qualifications for office. For most candidates, running for judicial office proved to be a 
positive experience and few candidates said they would not run again in the future. 
Interviews revealed a number of positive outcomes associated with campaigning. 
Judicial campaigns help strengthen the connection between the candidates and the 
community and serve as an opportunity for civic education. Elections provide a reason to 
remind voters of the judiciary and its role in our government. Candidates also note 
personal rewards as a result of winning – including feelings of self-validation, as well as 
commercial success (as campaigns can act as advertising for their law practice). 
Crafting a Better System 
Tables 5.37.1-5.39.6 summarize the responses to the reform proposals described 
in Chapter Three. 
Voluntarist reforms. In general, candidates supported the voluntary reforms 
assessed in this study (see Tables 5.37.1 and 5.37.2), with stronger support for voluntary 
campaign agreements concerning campaign speech and conduct (M = 3.74, SD = 1.09) 
than for public financing (M = 3.31, SD = 1.41).    
Voluntary campaign agreements were supported across all levels of the variables 
included for analysis. Election winners (M = 3.77, SD = 1.05) and defeated candidates (M 
= 3.71, SD = 1.14) approached the same level of support, as did incumbents supportive 
(M = 3.62, SD = 1.12) and non-incumbents (M = 3.84, SD = 1.09). Although there were 
minor differences across election type and office sought, the overall results suggest 
voluntary campaign agreements have a broad base of support from judicial candidates. 
 
 
Table 5.36. “Which of the following statements comes closest to your plans for 
the future?” 
 
 
 
 
 
I alm
ost 
certainly 
w
ill not 
run for 
public 
office in 
the future 
It is very 
unlikely 
that I w
ill 
run for 
public 
office in 
the future 
It is fairly 
unlikely 
that I w
ill 
run for 
public 
office in 
the future 
It is fairly 
likely that 
I w
ill run 
for public 
office in 
the future 
It is very 
likely that 
I w
ill run 
for public 
office in 
the future 
I alm
ost 
certainly 
w
ill run 
for public 
office in 
the future 
U
n-
specified 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
8 
11 
8 
11 
8 
11 
10 
14 
11 
15 
22 
31 
4 
6 
Partisan 
6 
6 
16 
16 
16 
16 
14 
14 
12 
12 
33 
34 
-- 
-- 
N
on-Partisan 
30 
15 
21 
10 
32 
16 
26 
13 
24 
12 
66 
33 
2 
1 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
8 
8 
85 
83 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
2 
12 
4 
24 
6 
35 
3 
18 
2 
12 
-- 
-- 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
8 
17 
8 
17 
4 
9 
5 
11 
4 
9 
13 
28 
4 
9 
T
rial C
ourt 
34 
11 
34 
11 
48 
16 
41 
14 
37 
13 
100 
34 
2 
1 
O
ther 
2 
10 
3 
14 
2 
10 
-- 
-- 
5 
24 
9 
43 
  
  
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
1 
1 
5 
5 
85 
92 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
11 
10 
10 
9 
21 
20 
9 
8 
14 
13 
41 
39 
  
  
N
on-Incum
bent 
24 
13 
26 
14 
28 
15 
30 
16 
24 
13 
56 
29 
2 
1 
U
nspecified 
10 
6 
11 
6 
9 
5 
13 
7 
12 
7 
32 
18 
89 
51 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
16 
8 
13 
6 
26 
13 
15 
7 
29 
14 
99 
49 
5 
2 
L
ost 
26 
15 
33 
19 
32 
18 
37 
21 
20 
11 
27 
15 
1 
1 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
1 
1 
  
  
  
  
1 
1 
3 
3 
85 
91 
T
otal 
45 
10 
47 
10 
58 
12 
52 
11 
50 
11 
129 
27 
91 
19 
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Table 5.37.1. Voluntarist Reform: Provide public funding for all ballot-
qualified candidates. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 104). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
6 
8 
8 
11 
22 
31 
15 
21 
12 
17 
8 
11 
63 
3.30 
1.20 
Partisan 
18 
19 
13 
13 
11 
11 
22 
23 
30 
31 
3 
3 
94 
3.35 
1.52 
N
on-Partisan 
37 
18 
19 
9 
42 
21 
51 
25 
49 
24 
3 
1 
198 
3.28 
1.42 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
90 
87 
13 
3.46 
1.56 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
5 
29 
1 
6 
2 
12 
4 
24 
5 
29 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.18 
1.67 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
4 
9 
4 
9 
9 
20 
8 
17 
17 
37 
4 
9 
42 
3.71 
1.35 
T
rial C
ourt 
49 
17 
34 
11 
62 
21 
77 
26 
64 
22 
10 
3 
286 
3.26 
1.38 
O
ther 
5 
24 
1 
5 
4 
19 
3 
14 
7 
33 
1 
5 
20 
3.30 
1.63 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
89 
97 
3 
3.67 
2.31 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
18 
17 
10 
9 
24 
23 
30 
28 
24 
23 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.30 
1.37 
N
on-Incum
bent 
36 
19 
21 
11 
30 
16 
42 
22 
55 
29 
6 
3 
184 
3.32 
1.49 
U
nspecified 
10 
6 
9 
5 
23 
13 
20 
11 
16 
9 
98 
56 
78 
3.29 
1.28 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
36 
18 
20 
10 
47 
23 
53 
26 
37 
18 
10 
5 
193 
3.18 
1.37 
L
ost 
27 
15 
19 
11 
30 
17 
39 
22 
56 
32 
5 
3 
171 
3.46 
1.44 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
89 
96 
4 
3.25 
2.06 
T
otal 
64 
14 
40 
8 
77 
16 
92 
19 
95 
20 
104 
22 
368 
3.31 
1.41 
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Table 5.37.2. Voluntarist Reform: Voluntary campaign agreements 
concerning campaign speech and conduct. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 108). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
-- 
-- 
6 
8 
24 
34 
15 
21 
17 
24 
9 
13 
62 
3.69 
0.98 
Partisan 
5 
5 
6 
6 
24 
25 
25 
26 
33 
34 
4 
4 
93 
3.81 
1.15 
N
on-Partisan 
5 
2 
18 
9 
61 
30 
50 
25 
62 
31 
5 
2 
196 
3.74 
1.08 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
90 
87 
13 
3.46 
1.33 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
2 
12 
2 
12 
2 
12 
5 
29 
6 
35 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.65 
1.41 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
1 
2 
1 
2 
16 
35 
6 
13 
18 
39 
4 
9 
42 
3.93 
1.07 
T
rial C
ourt 
9 
3 
26 
9 
88 
30 
79 
27 
81 
27 
13 
4 
283 
3.70 
1.08 
O
ther 
-- 
-- 
1 
5 
5 
24 
4 
19 
9 
43 
2 
10 
19 
4.11 
0.99 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
89 
97 
3 
3.67 
1.15 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
5 
5 
9 
8 
36 
34 
27 
25 
29 
27 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.62 
1.12 
N
on-Incum
bent 
5 
3 
15 
8 
49 
26 
47 
25 
65 
34 
9 
5 
181 
3.84 
1.09 
U
nspecified 
2 
1 
6 
3 
28 
16 
20 
11 
21 
12 
99 
56 
77 
3.68 
1.04 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
4 
2 
16 
8 
62 
31 
50 
25 
61 
30 
10 
5 
193 
3.77 
1.05 
L
ost 
8 
5 
14 
8 
50 
28 
42 
24 
53 
30 
9 
5 
167 
3.71 
1.14 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
89 
96 
4 
4.00 
0.82 
T
otal 
12 
3 
30 
6 
113 
24 
94 
20 
115 
24 
108 
23 
364 
3.74 
1.09 
240 
241  
 
 Public financing was supported across all categories of candidates included in 
analysis. Appellate court candidates were largely supportive of this potential reform (M = 
3.71, SD = 1.35), whereas supreme court candidates were one of the least supportive (M 
= 3.18, SD = 1.67), along with election winners (M = 3.18, SD = 1.37). That said, the 
survey data show candidates largely approve of voluntary reform efforts, with minor 
variations of support. 
 Informational reforms. As with voluntarist reforms, judicial candidates 
supported several of the informational reforms included in the survey (see Tables 5.38.1-
5.38.6). 
As shown in Table 5.38.1, voter guides were strongly supported by judicial 
candidates (M = 4.18, SD = 1.11), contrary to Rottman’s (2002) conclusion. Across all 
levels of variables included for analysis, candidates greatly favored this reform. 
Including candidates’ incumbency status on the ballots was somewhat supported (M = 
3.30, SD = 1.46), as Table 5.38.2 shows. Closer examination of the results reveals stark 
divides between incumbents (M = 4.04, SD = 1.19) and non-incumbents (M = 2.90, SD = 
1.48) and between election winners (M = 3.67, SD = 1.35) and defeated candidates (M = 
2.87, SD = 1.47). Appellate court candidates were also far less supportive (M = 2.98, SD 
= 1.51) than candidates for other levels of the judiciary. 
Judicial candidates were more divided when it came to including candidates’ 
occupations on ballots (M = 3.02, SD = 1.36) (see Table 5.38.2). Both partisan candidates 
(M = 2.66, SD = 1.35) and non-incumbents (M = 2.89, SD = 1.38) disliked this reform 
proposal whereas those who benefit from already having the position (retention  
 
 
Table 5.38.1. Information Reform: State-provided voter guides with 
information on all ballot-qualified candidates. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 106). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
-- 
-- 
4 
6 
11 
15 
15 
21 
32 
45 
9 
13 
62 
4.21 
0.96 
Partisan 
3 
3 
6 
6 
17 
18 
22 
23 
46 
47 
3 
3 
94 
4.09 
1.10 
N
on-Partisan 
11 
5 
5 
2 
24 
12 
44 
22 
113 
56 
4 
2 
197 
4.23 
1.12 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
8 
90 
87 
13 
3.85 
1.72 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
1 
6 
1 
6 
3 
18 
5 
29 
7 
41 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.94 
1.20 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
1 
2 
9 
20 
5 
11 
27 
59 
4 
9 
42 
4.38 
0.91 
T
rial C
ourt 
15 
5 
13 
4 
39 
13 
66 
22 
151 
51 
12 
4 
284 
4.14 
1.15 
O
ther 
1 
5 
-- 
-- 
2 
10 
4 
19 
13 
62 
1 
5 
20 
4.40 
1.05 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
1 
1 
89 
97 
3 
4.33 
0.58 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
5 
5 
3 
3 
23 
22 
24 
23 
51 
48 
-- 
-- 
106 
4.07 
1.11 
N
on-Incum
bent 
8 
4 
8 
4 
18 
9 
41 
22 
108 
57 
7 
4 
183 
4.27 
1.09 
U
nspecified 
4 
2 
4 
2 
12 
7 
17 
10 
40 
23 
99 
56 
77 
4.10 
1.17 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
8 
4 
6 
3 
34 
17 
48 
24 
97 
48 
10 
5 
193 
4.14 
1.08 
L
ost 
9 
5 
8 
5 
19 
11 
33 
19 
100 
57 
7 
4 
169 
4.22 
1.15 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
89 
96 
4 
4.00 
1.41 
T
otal 
17 
4 
15 
3 
53 
11 
82 
17 
199 
42 
106 
22 
366 
4.18 
1.11 
242 
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candidates and incumbents) were, unsurprisingly, the strongest supporters of this 
proposal (M = 3.21, SD = 1.31 and M = 3.14, SD = 1.34 respectively). 
Given those results, it is surprising that candidates were more supportive of 
including the candidates’ incumbency status on ballots (M = 3.30, SD = 1.46) (see Table 
5.38.3). Appellate court candidates (M = 2.98, SD = 1.51), non-incumbents (M = 2.90, SD 
= 1.48), and defeated candidates (M = 2.87, SD = 1.47) were less supportive of this 
measure. 
Findings related to campaign oversight committees (Table 5.38.4) also ran 
contrary to Rottman’s (2002) conclusion, which suggested judges were less supportive of 
such measures. This particular reform had broad support from candidates (M = 3.43, SD 
= 1.25). Oversight committees received some support from all but supreme court 
candidates, who were evenly divided (M = 3.00, SD = 1.41).   
Candidates also favored voluntary campaign workshops (M = 3.49, SD = 0.99) 
(see Table 5.38.5) and judicial performance evaluations conducted by an independent 
committee (M = 3.84, SD = 1.27) (see Table 5.38.6). Although most candidates were 
somewhat supportive of voluntary campaign workshops, supreme court candidates leaned 
more toward neutrality (M = 3.19, SD = 1.17). However, they were the most supportive 
when it came to performance evaluations (M = 4.06, SD = 1.09).    
 
 
Table 5.38.2. Informational Reform: Include the candidates’ occupations on 
ballots. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 109). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
9 
13 
7 
10 
21 
30 
12 
17 
13 
18 
9 
13 
62 
3.21 
1.31 
Partisan 
26 
27 
13 
13 
32 
33 
8 
8 
13 
13 
5 
5 
92 
2.66 
1.35 
N
on-Partisan 
32 
16 
25 
12 
68 
34 
28 
14 
43 
21 
5 
2 
196 
3.13 
1.34 
U
nspecified 
4 
4 
-- 
-- 
5 
5 
1 
1 
3 
3 
90 
87 
13 
2.92 
1.55 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
4 
24 
1 
6 
5 
29 
3 
18 
4 
24 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.12 
1.50 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
6 
13 
5 
11 
18 
39 
5 
11 
7 
15 
5 
11 
41 
3.05 
1.24 
T
rial C
ourt 
58 
20 
34 
11 
97 
33 
39 
13 
55 
19 
13 
4 
283 
3.00 
1.36 
O
ther 
3 
14 
5 
24 
3 
14 
2 
10 
6 
29 
2 
10 
19 
3.16 
1.54 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
3 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
89 
97 
3 
3.00 
0.00 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
17 
16 
13 
12 
38 
36 
14 
13 
24 
23 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.14 
1.34 
N
on-Incum
bent 
42 
22 
23 
12 
62 
33 
21 
11 
33 
17 
9 
5 
181 
2.89 
1.38 
U
nspecified 
12 
7 
9 
5 
26 
15 
14 
8 
15 
9 
100 
57 
76 
3.14 
1.31 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
33 
16 
30 
15 
66 
33 
28 
14 
35 
17 
11 
5 
192 
3.01 
1.31 
L
ost 
37 
21 
15 
9 
59 
34 
19 
11 
37 
21 
9 
5 
167 
3.02 
1.41 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
89 
96 
4 
3.00 
1.41 
T
otal 
71 
15 
45 
10 
126 
27 
49 
10 
72 
15 
109 
23 
363 
3.02 
1.36 
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Table 5.38.3. Informational Reform: Include the candidates’ incumbency 
status on ballots. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 107). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
9 
13 
7 
10 
17 
24 
13 
18 
16 
23 
9 
13 
62 
3.32 
1.36 
Partisan 
21 
22 
11 
11 
21 
22 
14 
14 
27 
28 
3 
3 
94 
3.16 
1.52 
N
on-Partisan 
31 
15 
25 
12 
43 
21 
31 
15 
66 
33 
5 
2 
196 
3.39 
1.46 
U
nspecified 
4 
4 
1 
1 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
90 
87 
13 
2.77 
1.48 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
1 
6 
1 
6 
5 
29 
5 
29 
5 
29 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.71 
1.16 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
11 
24 
5 
11 
9 
20 
8 
17 
9 
20 
4 
9 
42 
2.98 
1.51 
T
rial C
ourt 
48 
16 
36 
12 
65 
22 
43 
15 
91 
31 
13 
4 
283 
3.33 
1.46 
O
ther 
5 
24 
2 
10 
3 
14 
4 
19 
6 
29 
1 
5 
20 
3.20 
1.61 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
3 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
89 
97 
3 
3.00 
0.00 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
7 
7 
2 
2 
24 
23 
20 
19 
53 
50 
-- 
-- 
106 
4.04 
1.19 
N
on-Incum
bent 
45 
24 
33 
17 
40 
21 
24 
13 
40 
21 
8 
4 
182 
2.90 
1.48 
U
nspecified 
13 
7 
9 
5 
21 
12 
16 
9 
18 
10 
99 
56 
77 
3.22 
1.38 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
21 
10 
15 
7 
45 
22 
37 
18 
75 
37 
10 
5 
193 
3.67 
1.35 
L
ost 
43 
24 
28 
16 
40 
23 
22 
13 
35 
20 
8 
5 
168 
2.87 
1.47 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
89 
96 
4 
3.00 
1.83 
T
otal 
65 
14 
44 
9 
85 
18 
60 
13 
111 
24 
107 
23 
365 
3.30 
1.46 
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Table 5.38.4. Informational Reform: Independent campaign oversight 
committees. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 108). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
3 
4 
11 
15 
12 
17 
25 
35 
12 
17 
8 
11 
63 
3.51 
1.13 
Partisan 
12 
12 
12 
12 
23 
24 
23 
24 
23 
24 
4 
4 
93 
3.35 
1.33 
N
on-Partisan 
19 
9 
28 
14 
45 
22 
59 
29 
44 
22 
6 
3 
195 
3.42 
1.25 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
90 
87 
13 
3.69 
1.25 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
3 
18 
4 
24 
3 
18 
4 
24 
3 
18 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.00 
1.41 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
2 
4 
5 
11 
13 
28 
15 
33 
6 
13 
5 
11 
41 
3.44 
1.05 
T
rial C
ourt 
29 
10 
40 
14 
64 
22 
81 
27 
69 
23 
13 
4 
283 
3.43 
1.28 
O
ther 
1 
5 
3 
14 
3 
14 
9 
43 
4 
19 
1 
5 
20 
3.60 
1.14 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
1 
1 
89 
97 
3 
4.33 
0.58 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
12 
11 
12 
11 
24 
23 
36 
34 
20 
19 
2 
2 
104 
3.38 
1.25 
N
on-Incum
bent 
19 
10 
27 
14 
42 
22 
48 
25 
47 
25 
7 
4 
183 
3.42 
1.30 
U
nspecified 
4 
2 
13 
7 
17 
10 
27 
15 
16 
9 
99 
56 
77 
3.49 
1.15 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
20 
10 
31 
15 
43 
21 
62 
31 
36 
18 
11 
5 
192 
3.33 
1.25 
L
ost 
15 
9 
21 
12 
39 
22 
49 
28 
44 
25 
8 
5 
168 
3.51 
1.25 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
3 
3 
89 
96 
4 
4.50 
1.00 
T
otal 
35 
7 
52 
11 
83 
18 
111 
24 
83 
18 
108 
23 
364 
3.43 
1.25 
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Table 5.38.5. Informational Reform: Judicial campaign workshops. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 109). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
1 
1 
5 
7 
31 
44 
17 
24 
8 
11 
9 
13 
62 
3.42 
0.88 
Partisan 
7 
7 
4 
4 
40 
41 
27 
28 
14 
14 
5 
5 
92 
3.40 
1.05 
N
on-Partisan 
8 
4 
10 
5 
80 
40 
60 
30 
38 
19 
5 
2 
196 
3.56 
0.99 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
5 
5 
2 
2 
90 
87 
13 
3.46 
1.13 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
2 
12 
1 
6 
7 
41 
4 
24 
2 
12 
1 
6 
16 
3.19 
1.17 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
1 
2 
3 
7 
21 
46 
14 
30 
3 
7 
4 
9 
42 
3.36 
0.82 
T
rial C
ourt 
14 
5 
15 
5 
119 
40 
85 
29 
49 
17 
14 
5 
282 
3.50 
1.00 
O
ther 
-- 
-- 
1 
5 
6 
29 
6 
29 
7 
33 
1 
5 
20 
3.95 
0.94 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
89 
97 
3 
3.67 
1.15 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
7 
7 
8 
8 
44 
42 
28 
26 
17 
16 
2 
2 
104 
3.38 
1.06 
N
on-Incum
bent 
8 
4 
6 
3 
76 
40 
57 
30 
35 
18 
8 
4 
182 
3.58 
0.98 
U
nspecified 
2 
1 
6 
3 
35 
20 
24 
14 
10 
6 
99 
56 
77 
3.44 
0.91 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
8 
4 
8 
4 
92 
45 
55 
27 
29 
14 
11 
5 
192 
3.46 
0.94 
L
ost 
9 
5 
12 
7 
63 
36 
52 
30 
31 
18 
9 
5 
167 
3.50 
1.05 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
2 
2 
89 
96 
4 
4.50 
0.58 
T
otal 
17 
4 
20 
4 
155 
33 
109 
23 
62 
13 
109 
23 
363 
3.49 
0.99 
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Table 5.38.6. Informational Reform: Judicial performance evaluations. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 105). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
2 
3 
5 
7 
11 
15 
18 
25 
28 
39 
7 
10 
64 
4.02 
1.11 
Partisan 
10 
10 
9 
9 
11 
11 
21 
22 
42 
43 
4 
4 
93 
3.82 
1.38 
N
on-Partisan 
14 
7 
20 
10 
32 
16 
57 
28 
74 
37 
4 
2 
197 
3.80 
1.25 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
5 
5 
5 
5 
90 
87 
13 
3.69 
1.60 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
2 
12 
3 
18 
4 
24 
8 
47 
-- 
-- 
17 
4.06 
1.09 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
3 
7 
5 
11 
6 
13 
13 
28 
14 
30 
5 
11 
41 
3.73 
1.27 
T
rial C
ourt 
25 
8 
24 
8 
42 
14 
81 
27 
114 
39 
10 
3 
286 
3.82 
1.28 
O
ther 
1 
5 
2 
10 
3 
14 
3 
14 
11 
52 
1 
5 
20 
4.05 
1.28 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
89 
97 
3 
4.00 
1.73 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
9 
8 
10 
9 
18 
17 
29 
27 
40 
38 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.76 
1.28 
N
on-Incum
bent 
15 
8 
19 
10 
23 
12 
49 
26 
77 
41 
7 
4 
183 
3.84 
1.30 
U
nspecified 
5 
3 
5 
3 
13 
7 
23 
13 
32 
18 
98 
56 
78 
3.92 
1.19 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
15 
7 
22 
11 
32 
16 
54 
27 
71 
35 
9 
4 
194 
3.74 
1.27 
L
ost 
14 
8 
12 
7 
21 
12 
46 
26 
76 
43 
7 
4 
169 
3.93 
1.27 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
89 
96 
4 
4.25 
0.96 
T
otal 
29 
6 
34 
7 
54 
11 
101 
21 
149 
32 
105 
22 
367 
3.84 
1.27 
248 
249  
Structural reforms. Structural reforms, including changes in policy related to 
recusal and disqualification rules, regulating non-candidate groups, and campaign finance, 
varied in support (see Tables 5.39.1-5.39.6).  
Candidates were somewhat supportive of stronger recusal/disqualification rules 
for judges (M = 3.55, SD = 1.12) (see Table 5.39.1). Judges standing for retention were 
more supportive of this measure (M = 3.76, SD = 1.07) than judges running for election 
(partisan candidates: M = 3.47, SD = 1.10, non-partisan candidates: M = 3.52, SD = 1.14). 
Appellate court candidates were also more supportive of this type of reform (M = 3.86, 
SD = 1.05) compared against trial court candidates (M = 3.46, SD = 1.12). Incumbents 
were the least supportive (M = 3.37, SD = 0.99) of all, followed closely by election 
winners (M = 3.41, SD = 1.08), though both still somewhat supported reform in this area.   
Candidates were more supportive of limiting expenditures from non-candidate 
groups (M = 3.78, SD = 1.36) (see Table 5.39.2). Incumbents, non-incumbents, winners, 
losers – across all levels, candidates were supportive except in the case of supreme court 
candidates, who were the lone group of candidates who disapproved of such limitations 
(M = 2.71, SD = 1.53).  
Candidates supported the campaign finance reforms measured by the survey. 
Overall, candidates preferred strong disclosure rules (see Table 5.39.3) over limiting 
campaign donations/expenditures (see Tables 5.39.2 and 5.39.4), consistent with 
Rottman’s (2002) findings.   
Requiring candidates to disclosure the source of all campaign contributions 
received the most support of any of the reforms assessed by the survey  
  
Table 5.39.1. Structural Reform: Stronger recusal/disqualification rules. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 107). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
2 
3 
4 
6 
21 
30 
16 
23 
20 
28 
8 
11 
63 
3.76 
1.07 
Partisan 
5 
5 
8 
8 
41 
42 
18 
19 
22 
23 
3 
3 
94 
3.47 
1.10 
N
on-Partisan 
10 
5 
18 
9 
80 
40 
34 
17 
53 
26 
6 
3 
195 
3.52 
1.14 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
8 
8 
1 
1 
3 
3 
90 
87 
13 
3.38 
1.12 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
2 
12 
7 
41 
3 
18 
5 
29 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.65 
1.06 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
4 
9 
14 
30 
8 
17 
16 
35 
4 
9 
42 
3.86 
1.05 
T
rial C
ourt 
18 
6 
21 
7 
123 
42 
54 
18 
67 
23 
13 
4 
283 
3.46 
1.12 
O
ther 
-- 
-- 
2 
10 
6 
29 
4 
19 
8 
38 
1 
5 
20 
3.90 
1.07 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
89 
97 
3 
4.00 
1.73 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
3 
3 
11 
10 
55 
52 
18 
17 
19 
18 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.37 
0.99 
N
on-Incum
bent 
12 
6 
14 
7 
67 
35 
33 
17 
55 
29 
9 
5 
181 
3.58 
1.19 
U
nspecified 
3 
2 
5 
3 
28 
16 
18 
10 
24 
14 
98 
56 
78 
3.71 
1.09 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
10 
5 
18 
9 
87 
43 
38 
19 
40 
20 
10 
5 
193 
3.41 
1.08 
L
ost 
8 
5 
12 
7 
62 
35 
29 
16 
57 
32 
8 
5 
168 
3.68 
1.15 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
89 
96 
4 
4.00 
0.82 
T
otal 
18 
4 
30 
6 
150 
32 
69 
15 
98 
21 
107 
23 
365 
3.55 
1.12 
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Table 5.39.2. Structural Reform: Limit expenditures from non-candidate 
groups. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 105). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
4 
6 
9 
13 
6 
8 
16 
23 
28 
39 
8 
11 
63 
3.87 
1.30 
Partisan 
14 
14 
11 
11 
12 
12 
22 
23 
35 
36 
3 
3 
94 
3.56 
1.46 
N
on-Partisan 
19 
9 
18 
9 
24 
12 
53 
26 
83 
41 
4 
2 
197 
3.83 
1.33 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
3 
8 
8 
90 
87 
13 
4.15 
1.46 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
5 
29 
4 
24 
2 
12 
3 
18 
3 
18 
-- 
-- 
17 
2.71 
1.53 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
2 
4 
4 
9 
6 
13 
12 
26 
18 
39 
4 
9 
42 
3.95 
1.19 
T
rial C
ourt 
30 
10 
29 
10 
29 
10 
74 
25 
123 
42 
11 
4 
285 
3.81 
1.36 
O
ther 
2 
10 
1 
5 
4 
19 
5 
24 
8 
38 
1 
5 
20 
3.80 
1.32 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
89 
97 
3 
4.33 
1.15 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
12 
11 
13 
12 
13 
12 
23 
22 
45 
42 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.72 
1.41 
N
on-Incum
bent 
21 
11 
15 
8 
23 
12 
50 
26 
74 
39 
7 
4 
183 
3.77 
1.36 
U
nspecified 
6 
3 
10 
6 
6 
3 
21 
12 
35 
20 
98 
56 
78 
3.88 
1.32 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
15 
7 
23 
11 
25 
12 
45 
22 
85 
42 
10 
5 
193 
3.84 
1.32 
L
ost 
24 
14 
15 
9 
17 
10 
45 
26 
69 
39 
6 
3 
170 
3.71 
1.43 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
4 
4 
-- 
-- 
89 
96 
4 
4.00 
0.00 
T
otal 
39 
8 
38 
8 
42 
9 
94 
20 
154 
33 
105 
22 
367 
3.78 
1.36 
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Table 5.39.3. Structural Reform: Require the disclosure of the source of all 
campaign contributions. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 107). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
2 
3 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
6 
8 
54 
76 
8 
11 
63 
4.75 
0.78 
Partisan 
3 
3 
2 
2 
6 
6 
10 
10 
73 
75 
3 
3 
94 
4.57 
0.94 
N
on-Partisan 
4 
2 
2 
1 
8 
4 
22 
11 
159 
79 
6 
3 
195 
4.69 
0.78 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
9 
9 
90 
87 
13 
4.38 
1.19 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
1 
6 
-- 
-- 
1 
6 
1 
6 
14 
82 
-- 
-- 
17 
4.59 
1.06 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
4 
1 
2 
39 
85 
4 
9 
42 
4.88 
0.45 
T
rial C
ourt 
9 
3 
4 
1 
10 
3 
35 
12 
226 
76 
12 
4 
284 
4.64 
0.88 
O
ther 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
14 
3 
14 
13 
62 
2 
10 
19 
4.53 
0.77 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
3 
89 
97 
3 
5.00 
0.00 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
3 
3 
1 
1 
7 
7 
9 
8 
85 
80 
1 
1 
105 
4.64 
0.88 
N
on-Incum
bent 
4 
2 
3 
2 
7 
4 
21 
11 
147 
77 
8 
4 
182 
4.67 
0.81 
U
nspecified 
3 
2 
-- 
-- 
2 
1 
10 
6 
63 
36 
98 
56 
78 
4.67 
0.86 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
5 
2 
1 
0 
8 
4 
18 
9 
161 
79 
10 
5 
193 
4.70 
0.80 
L
ost 
5 
3 
3 
2 
7 
4 
21 
12 
132 
75 
8 
5 
168 
4.62 
0.89 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
89 
96 
4 
4.25 
0.96 
T
otal 
10 
2 
4 
1 
16 
3 
40 
8 
295 
63 
107 
23 
365 
4.66 
0.84 
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Table 5.39.4. Structural Reform: Limit campaign contributions from 
attorneys and law firms. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 105). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
5 
7 
13 
18 
9 
13 
15 
21 
20 
28 
9 
13 
62 
3.52 
1.35 
Partisan 
20 
21 
12 
12 
15 
15 
19 
20 
28 
29 
3 
3 
94 
3.24 
1.53 
N
on-Partisan 
32 
16 
35 
17 
45 
22 
47 
23 
39 
19 
3 
1 
198 
3.13 
1.36 
U
nspecified 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
90 
87 
13 
3.38 
1.61 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
4 
24 
1 
6 
4 
24 
2 
12 
6 
35 
-- 
-- 
17 
3.29 
1.61 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
1 
2 
12 
26 
9 
20 
9 
20 
11 
24 
4 
9 
42 
3.40 
1.23 
T
rial C
ourt 
51 
17 
46 
16 
50 
17 
70 
24 
68 
23 
11 
4 
285 
3.20 
1.43 
O
ther 
3 
14 
2 
10 
6 
29 
4 
19 
5 
24 
1 
5 
20 
3.30 
1.38 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
89 
97 
3 
3.00 
2.00 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
22 
21 
17 
16 
18 
17 
29 
27 
20 
19 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.08 
1.43 
N
on-Incum
bent 
30 
16 
29 
15 
42 
22 
37 
19 
46 
24 
6 
3 
184 
3.22 
1.41 
U
nspecified 
8 
5 
15 
9 
10 
6 
19 
11 
25 
14 
99 
56 
77 
3.49 
1.39 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
29 
14 
36 
18 
39 
19 
48 
24 
40 
20 
11 
5 
192 
3.18 
1.36 
L
ost 
30 
17 
25 
14 
29 
16 
36 
20 
51 
29 
5 
3 
171 
3.31 
1.47 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
89 
96 
4 
2.75 
1.26 
T
otal 
60 
13 
61 
13 
70 
15 
85 
18 
91 
19 
105 
22 
367 
3.23 
1.41 
253 
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(M = 4.66, SD = 0.84) (see Table 5.39.3). Of the 367 candidates who responded to this 
survey item, only 14 candidates indicated any opposition to such policy reform.   
Across all levels of the variables of interest, candidates leaned in favor of limiting 
campaign contributions from lawyers and firms (M = 3.23, SD = 1.41) (see Table 5.39.4).  
Judges standing for retention (M = 3.52, SD = 1.35) and appellate court candidates  
 (M = 3.40, SD = 1.23) were among the strongest supporters of this reform, whereas 
incumbents (M = 3.08, SD = 1.43), non-partisan candidates (M = 3.13, SD = 1.36), and 
election winners (M = 3.18, SD = 1.36) held more neutral positions on this reform. 
Limiting campaign expenditures received strong support from candidates (M = 
3.40, SD = 1.38) (see Table 5.39.5). Despite the claim that capping expenditures is 
advantageous for incumbents (Bonneau, 2007b; Bonneau & Cann, 2011), non-
incumbents held more favorable opinions regarding this reform (M = 3.47, SD = 1.42) 
than incumbents (M = 3.13, SD = 1.33). Appellate candidates were the strongest 
supporters of this proposed measure (M = 3.80, SD = 1.16), whereas supreme court 
candidates were least supportive (M = 2.94, SD = 1.71). 
Though results show candidates overall are supportive of a number of reforms, 
candidates opposed any additional state-imposed regulations of campaign speech (M = 
2.44, SD = 1.20) (see Table 3.39.6). Candidates for supreme court voiced the strongest 
opposition to this particular reform proposal (M = 1.94, SD = 1.14). Overall, every type 
of candidate included for analysis stood in opposition to any further campaign speech 
regulations.
 
 
Table 5.39.5. Structural Reform: Limit campaign expenditures. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 107). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
5 
7 
12 
17 
7 
10 
18 
25 
21 
30 
8 
11 
63 
3.60 
1.34 
Partisan 
22 
23 
10 
10 
15 
15 
25 
26 
21 
22 
4 
4 
93 
3.14 
1.49 
N
on-Partisan 
25 
12 
25 
12 
36 
18 
60 
30 
51 
25 
4 
2 
197 
3.44 
1.34 
U
nspecified 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
6 
6 
3 
3 
91 
88 
12 
3.67 
1.37 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
6 
35 
1 
6 
3 
18 
2 
12 
5 
29 
-- 
-- 
17 
2.94 
1.71 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
1 
2 
6 
13 
7 
15 
12 
26 
14 
30 
6 
13 
40 
3.80 
1.16 
T
rial C
ourt 
44 
15 
40 
14 
43 
15 
90 
30 
69 
23 
10 
3 
286 
3.35 
1.39 
O
ther 
3 
14 
-- 
-- 
5 
24 
5 
24 
7 
33 
1 
5 
20 
3.65 
1.39 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
  
  
1 
1 
90 
98 
2 
4.00 
1.41 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
20 
19 
11 
10 
26 
25 
33 
31 
16 
15 
-- 
-- 
106 
3.13 
1.33 
N
on-Incum
bent 
27 
14 
24 
13 
24 
13 
52 
27 
56 
29 
7 
4 
183 
3.47 
1.42 
U
nspecified 
7 
4 
12 
7 
9 
5 
24 
14 
24 
14 
100 
57 
76 
3.61 
1.33 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
29 
14 
25 
12 
37 
18 
60 
30 
41 
20 
11 
5 
192 
3.31 
1.35 
L
ost 
24 
14 
22 
13 
21 
12 
47 
27 
55 
31 
7 
4 
169 
3.51 
1.42 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
89 
96 
4 
3.00 
1.41 
T
otal 
54 
11 
47 
10 
59 
13 
109 
23 
96 
20 
107 
23 
365 
3.40 
1.38 
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Table 5.39.6. Structural Reform: More state regulations concerning 
campaign speech. 
 
* Scale results exclude cases that had missing values for survey item (n = 109). 
 
 
Strongly 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
oppose 
N
either 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Som
e-
w
hat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
U
n-
specified 
Scale* 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
M
 
SD
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
14 
20 
17 
24 
17 
24 
11 
15 
3 
4 
9 
13 
62 
2.55 
1.17 
Partisan 
32 
33 
22 
23 
28 
29 
5 
5 
7 
7 
3 
3 
94 
2.29 
1.21 
N
on-Partisan 
52 
26 
43 
21 
63 
31 
22 
11 
14 
7 
7 
3 
194 
2.50 
1.21 
U
nspecified 
7 
7 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
90 
87 
13 
2.00 
1.22 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
8 
47 
4 
24 
4 
24 
-- 
-- 
1 
6 
-- 
-- 
17 
1.94 
1.14 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
10 
22 
13 
28 
16 
35 
1 
2 
2 
4 
4 
9 
42 
2.33 
1.03 
T
rial C
ourt 
82 
28 
60 
20 
84 
28 
34 
11 
21 
7 
15 
5 
281 
2.47 
1.24 
O
ther 
5 
24 
4 
19 
7 
33 
4 
19 
-- 
-- 
1 
5 
20 
2.50 
1.10 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
89 
97 
3 
2.67 
1.15 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
23 
22 
28 
26 
34 
32 
13 
12 
7 
7 
1 
1 
105 
2.55 
1.16 
N
on-Incum
bent 
61 
32 
36 
19 
57 
30 
14 
7 
13 
7 
9 
5 
181 
2.35 
1.22 
U
nspecified 
21 
12 
19 
11 
20 
11 
13 
7 
4 
2 
99 
56 
77 
2.48 
1.21 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
47 
23 
46 
23 
61 
30 
27 
13 
10 
5 
12 
6 
191 
2.51 
1.16 
L
ost 
58 
33 
36 
20 
48 
27 
13 
7 
13 
7 
8 
5 
168 
2.33 
1.24 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
89 
96 
4 
3.25 
1.26 
T
otal 
105 
22 
83 
18 
111 
24 
40 
8 
24 
5 
109 
23 
363 
2.44 
1.20 
256 
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 Candidates simultaneously appreciate the reasoning behind campaign speech 
regulations and recognize their faults. “I can understand the motivation for [regulations],” 
said Darren Kugler, a New Mexico trial court candidate, “but, it does make it somewhat 
more difficult because you feel like you're hogtied.” David Towler, a Texas appellate 
court candidate, echoed Kugler’s sentiments: “I agree with the rule, but at the same time, 
for a voter to inform themselves about the qualifications of a judicial candidate. It's work. 
I mean, it's not easy.”  
Candidates see speech restrictions as barriers to open and transparent elections, 
which could better connect the electorate to the judiciary. “I would severely roll back the 
limits upon judicial comment,” said California trial court candidate, John Henry, “I 
would try to do something to … strongly encourage the candidates to be more open, 
honest, and free about their judicial views.” 
 Beyond acting as a barrier between the public and the judiciary, candidates also 
noted the idealism that motivates speech restrictions – namely that judicial candidates are 
devoid of personal political opinions. Courtney McAllister, a California trial court 
candidate, observed: 
“I think judges and judicial candidates are way too hampered in what they can say 
in campaigns. We know so much about them based on their backgrounds and … 
who's supporting them or opposing them, but yet they're not allowed to tell us that. 
It doesn't make any sense to me … Just because you express an opinion about 
something - to me - does not go to whether you can rule on it in an objective 
fashion. I mean that's ridiculous. We know these people have opinions, but we 
make it out like they don't and they're not allowed to, when we all know they do. 
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So wouldn't we rather know what those are before we put them in? That just 
seems obvious to me, but a lot of people in my profession don't agree with that. 
They think that no one is supposed to know what a judge possibly thinks about 
something. And that seems silly.” 
Judicial selection. Merit selection proved popular amongst candidates (see 
Tables 5.40.1 and 5.40.2) – it was the overall selection method of choice for both 
appellate judges (supported by n = 181, 38% of all candidates) and trial judges (supported 
by n = 149, 32% of all candidates). There was also strong support for non-partisan 
elections for both appellate judges (supported by n = 104, 22% of all candidates) and trial 
judges (supported by n = 148, 31%). Few candidates reported partisan elections as the 
system of choice for appellate judges (n = 33, 7%) or trial judges (n = 42, 9%). Even 
fewer candidates were supportive of the appointive systems, including appointment by 
the governor with/without legislative confirmation and legislative appointment or 
election. 
Examining the breakdown of the data in Tables 5.40.1 and 5.40.2 reveals that 
even partisan candidates were not keen on partisan elections, with only 15% (n=15) 
supporting such a selection system for appellate judges and 19% (n = 18) supporting this 
system for the selection of trial judges. Candidates for trial court were supportive of non-
partisan elections of trial judges (n = 119, 40%), more so than any other selection method.  
Likewise, candidates in partisan/non-partisan contests, non-incumbents, and those 
defeated in the election were also more supportive of non-partisan election of trial judges 
than other selection methods. 
 
 
 
Table 5.40.1. “How do you think the following types of judges should be 
selected in your state?” (Appellate Judges). 
 
M
erit 
selection 
follow
ed 
by 
retention 
election 
N
on-
partisan 
popular 
election 
A
ppoint-
m
ent by 
the 
governor 
w
ith 
legislative 
con-
firm
ation 
A
ppoint-
m
ent by 
the 
governor 
w
/o 
legislative 
con-
firm
ation 
Partisan 
popular 
election 
L
egislative 
appoint-
m
ent or 
election 
U
n-
specified 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
45 
63 
10 
14 
4 
6 
2 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
6 
8 
Partisan 
40 
41 
27 
28 
9 
9 
1 
1 
15 
15 
1 
1 
4 
4 
N
on-Partisan 
90 
45 
64 
32 
16 
8 
12 
6 
14 
7 
1 
1 
4 
2 
U
nspecified 
6 
6 
3 
3 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
91 
88 
O
ffice sought 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Suprem
e C
ourt 
7 
41 
6 
35 
2 
12 
1 
6 
1 
6 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
A
ppellate C
ourt 
21 
46 
14 
30 
2 
4 
1 
2 
5 
11 
-- 
-- 
3 
7 
T
rial C
ourt 
142 
48 
78 
26 
25 
8 
13 
4 
24 
8 
2 
1 
12 
4 
O
ther 
10 
48 
6 
29 
2 
10 
-- 
-- 
1 
5 
1 
5 
1 
5 
U
nspecified 
1 
1 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
89 
97 
Incum
bent 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Incum
bent 
50 
47 
28 
26 
11 
10 
7 
7 
6 
6 
1 
1 
3 
3 
N
on-Incum
bent 
79 
42 
63 
33 
13 
7 
6 
3 
23 
12 
1 
1 
5 
3 
U
nspecified 
52 
30 
13 
7 
7 
4 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
97 
55 
E
lected 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
W
on 
102 
50 
50 
25 
15 
7 
6 
3 
14 
7 
2 
1 
14 
7 
L
ost 
79 
45 
52 
30 
14 
8 
9 
5 
19 
11 
1 
1 
2 
1 
U
nspecified 
-- 
-- 
2 
2 
2 
2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
89 
96 
T
otal 
181 
38 
104 
22 
31 
7 
15 
3 
33 
7 
3 
1 
105 
22 
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Table 5.40.1. “How do you think the following types of judges should be 
selected in your state?” (Trial Judges). 
 
M
erit 
selection 
follow
ed 
by 
retention 
election 
N
on-
partisan 
popular 
election 
A
ppoint-
m
ent by 
the 
governor 
w
ith 
legislative 
con-
firm
ation 
A
ppoint-
m
ent by 
the 
governor 
w
/o 
legislative 
con-
firm
ation 
Partisan 
popular 
election 
L
egislative 
appoint-
m
ent or 
election 
U
n-
specified 
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
n 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
n 
%
 
E
lection type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
etention 
43 
61 
16 
23 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
5 
7 
Partisan 
34 
35 
35 
36 
3 
3 
1 
1 
18 
19 
1 
1 
5 
5 
N
on-Partisan 
68 
34 
93 
46 
7 
3 
8 
4 
18 
9 
1 
1 
6 
3 
U
nspecified 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
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Candidates are well aware that no selection process is perfect and that regardless 
of the method used, politics are bound to be present. “Both [elections and merit selection] 
are adequate generally to screen out anybody that's quite unsuitable,” said one trial court 
candidate, “Neither one is guaranteed to select the best person for the job, but it's kind of 
like what they say about democracy ... it's not that good but you can't find a better way.”   
James Rowe, West Virginia Supreme Court candidate, further observed the inevitability 
of politics involved in the selection of judges: “The process, regardless of what approach 
you take, it's a political process.”   
Though scholars see them as the catalyst for diminished public trust in the 
judiciary, elections are not completely out of fashion with judicial candidates. “In some 
contexts, [the elective system is] a really good thing,” said Texas appellate court 
candidate, Lawrence Praeger, “but when you get into a large community where number 
one, there's no media interest and number two, there's so many judges on the ballot it 
becomes simply an exercise in party politics.” According to judicial candidates, there is a 
time and place for judicial elections – particularly at the trial court level where a smaller 
electorate can be more effectively reached by campaigns.   
Candidates, though favorable toward merit selection of judges, recognize the 
inherent weaknesses of such a selection system – namely the politics of appointment. “I 
haven't heard a good [selection method] because if we had an appointment system, it 
would just be the same old thing,” said one Texas appellate court candidate, “It would be 
a good ole' boy system – favoritism.” The feeling that merit selection is equally political 
as elections, if not more so, was a common theme amongst candidates. As one California 
trial court candidate put it, “[The appointment process] is way more political because it's 
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all about connections and who you know and how much money you contributed to 
governors and legislators. I mean, that's what it comes down to.”   
Candidates’ fears over the politics of appointment appears to conflate 
appointment with merit selection, such as one candidate who in expressing his view on 
selection systems noted, “Overall I think [the elective system] is better than somebody 
doing the appointing because ultimately it's going to be one person's view as opposed to 
the total population's view.” However, in the case of merit selection, as John Baker, an 
Indiana judge standing for retention, explained, no one person selects judges under such a 
system. “The governor can pick from those three people [nominated by the commission] - 
he can't pick anybody he wants, “explained Baker, “If the nominating commission picks 
the right three people then that - theoretically the governor can't make a mistake.” 
Transitioning to merit selection, as discussed in Chapter Two, has been the 
subject of debate since the inception of the Missouri plan in 1940. Despite recent calls for 
selection reform, “It’s never really gotten ground and taken off,” said North Carolina trial 
court candidate, Susan Burch. States that choose to elect their judges have an arduous 
path ahead of them should they opt to select their judges through other means.  Kentucky 
Supreme Court candidate, Janet Stumbo, explained:  
“Well we've all talked about for many years whether to go to appointed judges or 
even the Missouri Plan with retention elections. I don't think that will happen in 
Kentucky. Kentucky citizens like to elect their officials and I just don't see us 
being able to amend the constitution to make any major changes and that's what it 
would take.”   
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Powerful groups, as Clair Dickinson explained, also act as a barrier to change. “It's not 
going to happen in Ohio,” said Dickinson, “As soon as you start talking about it, interest 
groups including the political parties … come out against.” 
 Summary. Overall, candidates support the voluntarist, informational, and 
structural reforms included in the survey, with one key exception – candidates did not 
favor additional state-imposed campaign speech regulations. Candidates understood the 
reasoning behind speech regulations, but view them as being the product of naïve 
idealism. Judicial candidates, they noted, are not completely devoid of personal political 
opinions. 
 Candidates favored merit selection for both trial and appellate courts, though the 
majority supported non-partisan popular elections for trial court judges. Despite this 
finding, candidates identified a number of issues with both merit and elective systems. 
Despite the popularity of merit systems, candidates expressed concern over the feasibility 
of switching selection systems given the barriers to change (e.g., gaining enough 
popularity to pass a state constitutional amendment, overcoming attacks from political 
parties and interest groups, etc.). 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 This study examined the role of the media in judicial campaigns, the methods 
candidates use in their campaigns, how candidates develop campaign messages, 
controversial campaign speech, the consequences of campaigning, and judicial candidates’ 
beliefs as to how elections could be improved. Survey data along with data from follow-
up interviews were used to address these issues. The findings are discussed further in this 
section. 
The Media 
For judicial candidates, substantial coverage from the traditional press is neither 
expected (73% of candidates did not expect to receive significant coverage) nor is it 
received (51% report receiving minimal or no coverage). Non-traditional media sources 
(e.g., talk radio, political blogs, social media) played a minor part in providing campaign 
coverage (41% did not receive any coverage from talk radio, political blogs, or social 
media), with the exception of social media, which proved to be a popular venue for 
campaign coverage (39% of candidates reported receiving significant attention from 
social media). Many candidates find media coverage lacking in terms of amount (45% 
felt that coverage was inadequate) and focus on important issues, though few find it 
sensationalist (31% of candidates), biased (28% of candidates), or focused on strategy 
(7% of candidates) or horserace aspects of the race (6% of candidates). Judicial 
campaigns simply lack the appeal of other, more high profile campaigns that feature “red 
meat” political topics, such as personal views on abortion or immigration, to generate 
substantial coverage. Candidates understand the market pressures that ultimately decide 
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who and what gets covered in the press and they are aware of the little interest the public 
has in the court’s operation. Overall, the media are simply passive and non-investigative 
when it comes to covering judicial campaigns.  
The media are active when it comes to initiating various events (i.e., interviews, 
talk shows, addressing editorial boards, etc.). Candidates do everything they can to 
generate news, though they are somewhat selective when it comes to getting in front of 
community groups (10% report turning down offers to speak to such groups). Group 
support can quickly wane in partisan contests, as Florida candidate Stephen Burk learned 
once the local Tea Party chapter discovered his affiliation with the Democratic Party. 
Many candidates (48%) report having a somewhat positive relationship with the news 
media, though some express frustration over the media’s reasoning for endorsing 
candidates and the politics of gaining (positive) media coverage. Overall, candidates do 
not feel the media are a complete failure.  
Traditional media coverage is viewed as helpful but not entirely essential for 
securing electoral success. Candidates expressed doubt in the influence newspapers play 
in judicial elections due to both changes in how elections are covered (i.e., passive, non-
investigative) and declining readership.   
Campaign Methods 
Candidates attempt to gain media coverage through giving interviews to 
journalists (45%), sending out press releases (38%), meeting with editorial boards (30%), 
and by other means, but they find them largely ineffective in terms of disseminating 
campaign information (none fell between “somewhat” or “very” effective). The press 
simply does not cover most candidates. Candidates held more favorable opinions of the 
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effectiveness of having a professional press coordinator/secretary on staff. Hired staffers 
likely played more than one role, serving more as general campaign gurus than in one 
particular capacity. Regardless, candidates, many of whom simultaneously serve as judge 
or run their own practice and campaign, no doubt appreciate any help they can get. 
Paid media were rated higher in terms of effectiveness (with the exception of 
newspaper advertising, all paid media were rated between “somewhat” and “very” 
effective) compared to free media. TV ads are popular among supreme court candidates 
(59%) and, to a lesser degree, appellate court candidates (26%). Trial court candidates 
primarily stick with radio, newspaper and outdoor ads, though a fraction (18%) of these 
candidates report using television ads in their campaigns. Candidates do not doubt the 
effectiveness of expensive, but far-reaching TV ads (the third highest rated form of 
campaign communications behind personal canvassing and direct mail) – some going so 
far as to cite TV ads as the ultimate deciding factor in their election.   
Direct communications proved to be the most heavily used form of campaign 
communications. Candidates commonly used low-cost methods, such as e-mail (49%), 
social media (53%), and websites (56%). Despite some skepticism that direct mail (or 
“slick pieces of mail” as one candidate described them) may be getting drowned out by 
other campaigns, candidates find the method effective (the second most effective method 
behind personal canvassing), no doubt in part due to the availability of mailing lists that 
allow candidates to target likely voters or other specific segments of the public in a cost 
effective manner. Direct communications may also be popular due to the degree of 
control candidates have over the message (as opposed to media coverage) and the 
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richness of the media, with electronic communications providing a platform for in-depth 
information about the candidates and campaigns. 
Candidates have a difficult time determining what communications are working 
for their campaign. Measuring audience feedback is often difficult or virtually impossible. 
Electronic communications (e-mail, websites, social media) allow for greater 
measurement of audiences, but are seen as less effective than costlier methods (e.g., 
direct mail, yard signs, personal canvassing, and brochures). 
The most effective campaign methods are also the most costly. The most effective 
method, personal canvassing, is time-intensive and would likely require most candidates 
to temporarily shutter their legal practices for the duration of the election. Direct mail, 
perceived to be the second most effective communication method, is costly (due to 
production and distribution costs) but enticing given the perceived cost effective appeal 
of targeting likely voters. Television spots were also highly rated and, given their growth 
in popularity over the past decade, will remain a desirable choice for candidates.    
Budgets ultimately dictate which campaign methods candidates use. Candidates 
focus on cost effective methods, such as direct mail, paid media, websites, that allow 
them to “get the biggest bang for the buck.” Candidates hire consultants who can produce 
professional content (e.g., websites and paid forms of advertising), but they rely on a 
number of perceived experts in their method selection. Candidates turned to other elected 
officials to determine what worked in their campaign – either through direct contact or 
through their own observation of the campaign. Professional campaign consultants and 
political science research are also queried by candidates for advice on what methods to 
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use in their campaign. The constraints of the medium (e.g., length of message, leanness 
of messages) and reach are often taken into consideration.   
Voters’ expectations also drove candidates’ campaign methods. Candidates may 
be doubtful of the impact social media had on their election, but for some, such as one 
Texas candidate, they were essential to demonstrate that the candidate exists and is “with 
it.” Candidates sometimes have no choice but to show up at candidate forums, even when 
doing so may not result in more votes. Not all appearances result in more votes, but not 
showing would almost certainly cost one’s reputation in some communities. 
Campaign Messages 
Despite the White decision, candidates typically refrain from addressing political 
issues in their campaigns. Regulations, according to some candidates, mandate a bland 
campaign – nothing beyond vague discussions of character and a resumé. Although 
regulations place boundaries around a candidate’s campaign, a number of other factors 
(e.g., the candidate’s personal experience, family and friends, voter expectations, political 
consultants, other candidates and campaigns) influence the campaign messages 
candidates develop. Ultimately, candidates develop messages they believe will get them 
elected and, for the majority of candidates, that means discussing why they believe they 
are qualified for office. 
Politics is not foreign to judicial candidates, many of whom report being involved 
in politics for most of their lives either by serving in public office – both within and 
outside of the judiciary – through a family member or, at the very least, by maintaining 
an active interest in public policy. Candidates use this base of experience to inform their 
expectations of judicial campaigns, such as the case with Oregon appellate court 
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candidate, James Egan, who knew to expect a rather boring, uneventful campaign based 
on his interactions with elected officials.  
Although campaigns are becoming more professionalized, must remain 
resourceful due to the high costs of campaigning. Any possible resource that they are 
connected to is tapped – whether that means enlisting family members to help with their 
campaigns or using a family member’s connection to the cast of West Wing to reunite the 
cast for a campaign ad, as Michigan Supreme Court candidate Bridget McCormack did 
(Haglund, 2012). They borrow campaign ideas from other candidates. They actively 
attempt to target communications to specific voters and try to create campaign messages 
that resonate with those likely to vote in the election.  
Paid consultants are likely to enjoy a fruitful future in judicial campaigns as more 
than one third of all candidates (35%) hired a paid professional to help with their 
campaign. Many candidates use professionals for media advertising (61%), direct mail 
services (50%), and campaign management (50%). Few candidates report relying on 
consultants for research (either issue or opposition research – 8% - or polling – 19%), 
legal advice (7%), financial activities (accounting – 22% - and fundraising – 24%), or for 
direct campaigning purposes (mass telephone calling – 21% - and get-out-the-vote 
activities – 13%). Rather than acting as campaign architects in total control of all aspects 
of the campaign, they are hired for logistical reasons (e.g., making media purchases) and 
for their knowledge and experience. Though candidates seek advice from consultants, 
they believe that they are ultimately the ones who craft their campaign messages. 
Candidates for supreme court branch out into other activities, such as polling 
(used by more than half of such candidates), fundraising (also used by half), and 
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issue/opposition research (used by one-third). Consultants act as a sounding board for 
candidates and help in areas where candidates have limited knowledge, but are not 
generally in positions to call all the shots as few have direct experience with judicial 
campaigns or with the candidates’ specific electorate. 
Controversial Campaign Speech 
Issue positions. Experience and qualifications and character and ethics are still 
the primary themes of judicial campaign messages (almost two-thirds of candidates say 
they stressed them “a great deal” in their campaign communications). Few candidates 
focus their campaign communications on issue positions (42% did not discuss them). 
Looking at the issues that are discussed by judicial candidates, results are similar to 
Arbour and McKenzie (2011), who reported court administration issues or crime and 
sentencing issues were the predominant theme for the majority of lower court candidates 
in 2008. A small minority of judicial candidates discusses “hot button” issues (e.g., 
abortion, marriage equality). Most candidates who engage in policy talk limit their 
discussion to issues relevant to the office, such as court administration (81% of those who 
discussed issue positions) and crime and sentencing (discussed by 55% of those who 
focused on issue positions). 
Candidates’ attitudes toward discussing issue positions are guided by more than 
just the law. Many note the undesirability of outspoken judges and consider personal 
political beliefs irrelevant to the duties of a judge. They also recognize outspokenness as 
a hindrance to their professional performance because outspoken judges will face more 
scrutiny and potential recusal from cases. The increased scrutiny and recusal from cases 
can ultimately depriving them of their ability to fulfill the core functions of the office. 
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To avoid discussing issue positions, candidates respond with boilerplate answers 
to inquiries from the public or the press, such as Chris Cobey’s usual response (“I will 
enforce the law as I understand the law”), but they also opt to speak in general, quasi-
political terms, such as the case with Elizabeth Best, who reminded voters that she 
believed the US Constitution “protects life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” when 
confronted about her views on abortion.  Candidates also use interest group association 
(e.g., being connected to a local LGBT association) to convey their political beliefs. 
Negative campaigning. Candidates clearly do not like personally attacking their 
opponents (e.g., discussing an opponent’s religious beliefs or sexual orientation was 
deemed appropriate by less than 5% of candidates), but are willing to bring up recent 
subjects that have some legal implication (e.g., a DUI, using campaign funds for personal 
use, a bribery conviction were all considered appropriate topics). Some topics (e.g., 
marital infidelity, marijuana or cocaine use as a youth) may have lost their effectiveness 
due to social normalization. Despite these encouraging findings, the current political 
landscape allows for supposed third-party groups, including PACs, to act as surrogates 
for the rough and tumble politics candidates find distasteful.   
Consequences of Campaigning 
Positive outcomes. Candidates, though often critical of elections, did note a 
number of positive outcomes associated with them. Elections help bolster connections 
between the public and the courts. They serve as a venue for meaningful communication, 
particularly regarding content that encourages voters to learn about the courts or allows 
judges to better understand the community they serve. Campaigning for office 
encourages candidates to learn more about the community the office serves.   
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Elections fulfill democratic ideals. In an election, the public chooses who serves 
in office.  Running for office helps fulfill that ideal by providing voters a choice, but 
elections also help keep judges “in check” with the public, which according to some 
candidates helps strengthen the public’s perception of the judiciary as candidates must 
demonstrate their superior qualifications for office. Issues relevant to the community that 
would possibly go unnoticed may surface during a competitive election. 
Elections have a profound personal impact on candidates as they encourage self-
reflection and validate candidates. Candidates challenge themselves by stepping outside 
of what they are comfortable with and take risks that result in personal rewards. They 
demonstrate to themselves that they have the courage to stand up to public scrutiny, 
including opposing groups and individuals. On a more commercial level, candidates who 
run an active campaign also note a boom in business for their legal practices following 
the election. Candidates may not have to face judges they challenged in the courtroom 
following the election, which can also be viewed as a benefit.   
Troubling outcomes. Despite the concerns raised over “noisy and nasty” 
campaigns, most judicial candidates run positive campaigns (nearly a fifth of candidates 
reported the election was “overwhelmingly positive”). Misrepresentation is uncommon 
but not entirely absent; one-third of candidates were misrepresented during their 
campaigns. Candidates are frequently at a disadvantage when it comes to launching 
corrective counter campaigns due to limited resources and available communication 
channels. If an external group were to launch negative ads in the last week of an election, 
most candidates would be unable to find the funds or available advertising space to 
counter such an attack.  
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Candidates do not view negative campaigning as being effective or appropriate.  
They believe personal attacks are harmful to their electoral prospects and that such 
campaigning runs contrary to what judicial campaigns “should be” (i.e., professional 
affairs). Candidates believe voters expect more “above-bar” campaigns from them than 
they do from other elected officials. 
Candidates understand the rationale behind speech regulations, but find them 
frustrating nonetheless. Speech restrictions further the gap in the public’s knowledge of 
the judiciary, making information scarce and transparency impossible. Candidates find 
their communications are sometimes limited to general preformed responses, particularly 
when they are presented with questions concerning their personal political views. 
Restrictions have a declining impact as the amount of candidate information available to 
the general public through online channels increases. The public is better able to draw 
conclusions concerning candidates’ political leanings based on the candidate’s personal 
social media page and a number of other online resources (e.g., the candidate’s personal 
blog, law review articles concerning policy authored by the candidate, online news 
articles that reveal the candidate’s political associations, etc.). 
Most candidates cannot reach their electorate adequately due in large part to the 
cost of communications. Ballots are overcrowded and electorates can be massive in size 
for some candidates. It is no surprise that candidates share a general sense that judicial 
elections are largely arbitrary. Candidates recognize the corruptive power of campaign 
donations, but are not in a position to turn down funding. External groups are active in 
few contests outside of state supreme court contests (more than half of appellate and trial 
court candidates report political parties were not at all active or merely somewhat active, 
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whereas more than half of supreme court candidates felt they were very or extremely 
active). A greater proportion of candidates report receiving funding from interest groups 
(21%) than political parties (12%). Political parties provide a good deal of support 
through other means, such as the including the candidate in party campaign materials, 
hosting candidate forums, and providing the candidate access to networks of voters, 
which can be beneficial not only for donations and votes, but also for logistical reasons, 
such as gathering the number of required signatures to appear on the ballot.  
Despite the shortcomings of elections, most candidates report a positive 
experience, except for supreme court candidates, who were equally divided regarding 
whether they reported a positive or a negative experience. Appellate and trial court 
candidates report an equally more positive experience. Candidates are more than willing 
to run again in the future – 27% report that will “almost certainly” run again in the future. 
Improving Selection 
Candidates support voluntary campaign agreements among candidates and most 
informational reforms, though they are divided when it comes to including more 
information about the candidates on the ballots (candidates’ occupations, incumbency 
status). Candidates were supportive of campaign oversight committees.   
Strict disclosure rules were strongly supported and most other structural reforms 
(recusal/disqualification rules, limiting contributions from lawyers/law firms, limiting 
campaign expenditures) received some level of support, with a few noteworthy 
exceptions. Supreme court candidates were the lone dissenters in limiting expenditures 
from non-candidate groups (more than half of those candidates strongly or somewhat 
opposed such reform). Considering these candidates reported an overall negative attitude 
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toward external group involvement, this finding highlights the reluctantly dependent 
relationship between supreme court candidates and external groups. Candidates are well 
aware that money is necessary to win election and are willing to put aside their dislike for 
interest groups and political parties in order to secure funds. 
Candidates strongly oppose speech regulations. They favor more communication, 
not less – as indicated by the finding that disclosure reforms received the highest level of 
support. Respondents gave a sense that speech regulations are rather farcical. Candidates 
and voters are well aware that judges have personal political opinions but candidates 
must act as though they do not.  
Candidates have faith in both retention/merit selection systems and elections, but 
at different levels of the judiciary. At the appellate level, candidates are supportive of 
retention/merit systems (favored by 38% of candidates). Some candidates against merit 
selection appear to conflate it with appointment, where one individual (e.g., the governor) 
selects judges. Regardless, they identify issues with the politics of reaching nomination 
and ultimately appointment (i.e., having to deal with the “good ole’ boys” network, 
knowing the “right people”).   
At the trial court level, candidates are somewhat divided between retention 
(favored by 34%) and non-partisan elections (favored by 46%), with the latter being 
slightly more popular. Smaller in scale, trial court contests are unlikely to draw undesired 
attention from external interest groups or require large media-driven campaigns. Trial 
court candidates have a greater belief that their campaigns are effective at informing 
voters of their candidacy compare to other candidates. Most (55%) report never being 
misrepresented during the course of the campaign. 
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Limitations 
This study sought a census of all judicial candidates who ran for election or 
retention in 2012. However, due to a number of factors, including unavailable or 
incorrect contact information, the survey response rate (18%) was less than expected. 
Future studies could attempt to partner with legal organizations (e.g., the ABA, Justice at 
Stake Campaign, the Brennan Center for Justice) to further the reach and strengthen 
perceived credibility of the survey source, which in turn would hopefully spur a larger 
response rate. 
This study relied on self-reported data, which is subject to bias. Future studies 
could bolster self-reported data with data drawn from other sources and methods.  
Interviews with campaign staff, articles from newspapers, campaign website content – a 
number of data sources exist from which to construct a more detailed assessment of some 
of the questions posed by this investigation, as well as other research questions related to 
judicial campaigns and elections. 
Future Research 
Future research should continue to ask similar questions of judicial candidates 
over a number of years to monitor changes in judicial campaigns. However, a more 
focused approach could consider four specific findings of this study. First, as social 
media proved popular with candidates, further investigation could examine how 
candidates use social media in their campaigns. Previous research (Stromer-Galley, 2006) 
suggests candidates avoid online interactions with voters due to lack of ambiguity, loss of 
control, and due to the perceived burdensome nature of the medium. It is possible that 
candidates’ attitudes toward online interaction have changed in the past decade, though 
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given that judicial candidates are constrained in their speech, it is likely that the desire to 
remain in control of the message, as well as maintain ambiguity, remains with this 
particular type of candidate. 
Second, future studies could further investigate campaign communications 
methods used by candidates. As this study found, candidates are becoming more adept at 
using data to inform their campaigning methods – as with the case of using data-driven 
mailing lists to selectively target campaign communications. How effective – and costly 
– these particularly services are will become increasingly important to understand as 
resource-strapped candidates will continue to look for cost effective ways to campaign. 
The timing of campaign communications could also be studied further. Knowing the 
sequence of campaign communications could provide a better understanding of the 
dynamic nature of judicial campaigns (e.g., How do candidates respond to the 
oppositions’ campaign materials? What sequence do candidates’ campaign 
communications follow and why?). Content analyses could further examine not only the 
text of campaign communications, but the imagery used by candidates. Combined with 
survey and interview data, a study could examine how candidates determine what images 
to use to best represent their campaign. 
Third, investigations could study changes in attitudes toward controversial 
campaign speech topics (issue positions, negative campaign speech). The majority of 
candidates do not place a great deal of emphasis on their issue positions nor do a great 
deal of candidates face negative campaigning, though that may change, particularly if 
politically outspoken/mudslinging candidates are successful at getting elected to office as 
candidates learn how to campaign (in part) through the observation of others’ campaigns.  
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Lastly, the role interest groups are playing in judicial elections needs to be taken 
into consideration. As this study demonstrated, interest groups play an active role in 
judicial elections – sometimes to a greater extent than political parties. Candidates are 
typically ill-equipped to counter interest groups’ campaign messages. Well-funded 
interest groups can essentially take control of communications media through large media 
buys. How interest groups are involved in judicial campaigns continues to be an 
important area of research. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study contribute to the research related to judicial campaigns 
and elections and campaign communications in general in that the data gathered through 
surveys and interviews sheds light on a number of issues raised by legal scholars. Rather 
than resorting to speculation over the theorized changes in judicial campaigns, this study 
provides substantial evidence concerning the perspectives held by candidates. The 
findings demonstrate that though scholars were increasingly concerned with judicial 
candidate speech and campaign finance in the past, there is evidence that external group 
involvement in judicial elections – namely from interest groups – is bound to be 
increasingly controversial in the years to come.     
There are reasons to be concerned with the state of judicial elections, but the 
deregulation of judicial candidate speech is probably not among the greatest of them. The 
news media have little import in judicial campaigns, thereby making costly promotional 
communications essential. Judicial candidates, particularly at the appellate level, lack the 
ability to campaign effectively. Communication channels are expensive and are difficult 
to access at times when multiple campaigns for high-level office are occurring 
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simultaneously. Resource-rich interest groups have the potential to easily overwhelm 
elections. Countering misrepresentations from such groups or competitors is also 
challenging, given the lack of news coverage and common large resource deficits 
candidates face.  
Potentially harmful speech, such as communications related to issue positions or 
negative advertising, is not commonplace in most judicial elections. Simply because 
candidates are legally able to engage in discussion of their issue positions does not mean 
they will. A number of factors (e.g., perceived voter expectations, personal background 
and experience with campaigns, attitudes toward revealing personal opinions) affect how 
candidates craft campaign messages beyond what is legally allowed. Candidates favor 
transparent elections and speech regulations only further impede voters from having 
relevant information about judicial candidates. 
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Appendix A: Gibson’s Experiments 
 
Experimental vignettes used by Gibson (2008b)  
 
No commitment – no policy statement 
Judge Anderson’s campaign refuses to talk about issues of public policy, saying that a 
judge should not discuss issues that his court may have to decide some day.  Instead, his 
television ads focus mainly on his qualifications to be a judge – things like what his 
background is and where he went to law school. 
 
General policy – gives policy views 
Judge Anderson’s campaign broadcasts some ads on television which focus mainly on his 
views and positions on important legal issues like abortion, lawsuit abuse, and the use of 
the death penalty in Kentucky. 
 
Specific case decisions – Promises to decide certain way 
Judge Anderson’s campaign broadcasts some ads on television which focus mainly on his 
views and positions on important legal issues like abortion, lawsuit abuse, and the use of 
the death penalty in Kentucky.   He promises that, if re-elected, he will decide these kinds 
of cases in the way that most people in Kentucky want them decided.’ 
 
Selected questions asked by (Gibson, 2008a) 
 
Next, I would like you to think about a lawsuit concerning whether a woman has the right 
to have an abortion. Imagine if you will that the judge deciding the case made some 
statements about abortion during his last election campaign – the one back in November. 
If the judge said during the campaign that ‘I believe the constitution gives women the 
right to have abortions,’ would you think that this alone would mean that the judge 
cannot be fair and impartial in deciding the case, or would you think that irrespective of 
the statement the judge could be fair and impartial? 
 
If during the campaign the judge accepted campaign contributions from groups seeking to 
change Kentucky’s law on abortion, ‘‘Would you think that this alone would mean that 
the judge cannot be fair and impartial in deciding the case, or would you think that 
irrespective of the statement the judge could be fair and impartial?’’ And what if the 
judge said during the campaign, ‘‘If elected, I will change Kentucky’s law on abortion?’’ 
Would you think that this alone would mean that the judge cannot be fair and impartial in 
deciding the case, or would you think that irrespective of the statement the judge could be 
fair and impartial? 
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Appendix B: Survey Materials 
E-mail Invitation 
 
Dear candidate for public office: 
 
My name is James K. Hertog. I'm an Associate Professor of Telecommunications at the 
University of Kentucky. I am contacting you concerning a study my students and I are 
conducting.  We have developed a survey asking judicial candidates like yourself about 
your personal and professional experiences campaigning for public office and your 
evaluation of the campaign process. As a candidate, you are one of only a small number 
of people who can provide personal insight into what it is like to run for office, how you 
communicate with voters and how you evaluate the performance of media in covering 
campaigns. 
 
This is not an issues questionnaire and you will not be asked your position on any 
controversial political issues.  
 
Completion of the survey has averaged between 10 and 20 minutes, but could take longer 
depending on your responses. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may quit at 
any time. Your answers will be entirely confidential unless you indicate that you are 
willing to share your identity with us. Also, you may request to be sent a summary of the 
study's results.   
 
If you have any questions about the study you may contact me via e-mail at 
jim.hertog@uky.edu or phone me at 859-257-8204. I will be happy to respond to any 
questions or concerns in a timely manner. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or call 
toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
The web address for the online survey follows. You may either click on the link below to 
be taken directly to the survey or else copy the address and paste it in your web browser 
(Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, etc.). The Candidate Campaign 
Experience survey address is: 
Take the Survey 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
https://uky.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsSurveyEngine/?Q_SS=5vzVNf2b5PftuO9_e2vbP6
80oInjENL&_=1  
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Alternatively, we can mail you a physical copy of the survey with a postage-paid return 
envelope. If you would prefer a physical copy, please contact me with your preferred 
mailing address. 
 
Thank you very much for any help you can provide to this important research. 
 
 Sincerely, 
 Dr. James K. Hertog 
Associate Professor of Telecommunications 
University of Kentucky 
jim.hertog@uky.edu 
office: 859-257-8204
302  
E-Mail Reminder 
 
Dear 2012 candidate for public office: 
 
A little while ago we sent you a survey on behalf of the University of Kentucky. We 
asked for your experiences and perceptions as a judicial candidate. In case you were 
unable at that time to participate we are sending this message in hopes that you might 
now have some time to contribute to this important study. As a candidate, you are one of 
only a small number of people who can provide personal insight into what it is like to run 
for office, how you communicate with voters, and how you evaluate the performance of 
media in covering campaigns. It is for these reasons that we ask for your participation in 
this survey. This is the last time we will contact you regarding this opportunity to share 
your experiences and insights. 
 
Completion of the survey has averaged between 10 and 20 minutes, but could take longer 
depending on your responses. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may quit at 
any time. Your answers will be entirely confidential unless you indicate that you are 
willing to share your identity with us. Also, you may request to be sent a summary of the 
study's results.  If you have any questions about the study you may contact me via e-mail 
at jim.hertog@uky.edu or phone me at 859-257-8204. I will be happy to respond to any 
questions or concerns in a timely manner. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or call 
toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
The web address for the online survey follows. You may either click on the link below to 
be taken directly to the survey or else copy the address and paste it in your web browser 
(Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, etc.). 
 
Follow this link to the Survey: 
Take the Survey 
 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
https://uky.qualtrics.com/WRQualtricsSurveyEngine/?Q_SS=5vzVNf2b5PftuO9_e2vbP6
80oInjENL&_=1 
 
Alternatively, we can mail you a physical copy of the survey with a postage-paid return 
envelope. If you would prefer a physical copy, please contact me with your preferred 
mailing address. 
 
Thank you very much for any help you can provide to this important research. 
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Sincerely, 
Dr. James K. Hertog 
Associate Professor of Media Studies, University of Kentucky 
jim.hertog@uky.edu   
office: 859-257-8204
304  
Mail Cover Letter 
Dear [candidate’s name]: 
 
My name is James K. Hertog. I am an Associate Professor of Media  
Studies at the University of Kentucky. My students and I are researching  
a set of critical issues for American representative democracy. We have  
developed a survey asking judicial candidates like yourself about your  
personal and professional experiences campaigning for public office  
and your evaluation of the campaign process. As a candidate, you are  
one of only a small number of people who can provide personal insight into what it is like 
to run for office, how you communicate with the electorate and how you evaluate the 
performance of media in covering campaigns. This address and many others were 
collected from lists of candidates maintained by Secretaries of State, Boards of Elections, 
and state bar associations. If you were not a judicial candidate during 2012, we apologize 
and ask that you disregard this message. 
 
We ask that you complete our survey concerning your experiences during your most 
recent campaign. Completion of the survey has averaged between 10 and 20 minutes, but 
could take longer depending upon your responses. Your participation is entirely voluntary 
and you may quit at any time. Your answers will be entirely confidential unless you 
indicate that you are willing to share your identity with us. Also, you may request to be 
sent a summary of the study's results. If you have any questions about the study you may 
contact me via e-mail at jim.hertog@uky.edu or phone me at 859-519-0093. I will be 
happy to respond to any questions or concerns in a timely manner. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or call 
toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
Along with the survey, we have included a postage-paid return envelope. Alternatively, 
you can complete the survey online. Please contact me via e-mail at jim.hertog@uky.edu 
if you prefer to complete the online survey. 
 
Thank you very much for any help you can provide to this important research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Zuercher       on behalf of James K. Hertog 
Doctoral Candidate    Associate Professor of Media Studies 
University of Kentucky   University of Kentucky 
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Online Survey Welcome Screen 
Hello. Welcome to the Judicial Candidate Survey website. This study is being conducted 
by Dr. James K. Hertog, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky. If you have 
any questions or concerns about this research, please contact Dr. Hertog 
at jim.hertog@uky.edu or 859-257-8204. 
 
You were contacted by e-mail because you were identified on your state's Secretary of 
State/Board of Elections website as being a candidate for judicial office at some point in 
time during 2012. If you were not a candidate during 2012, please do not complete the 
survey. If you have come to this website to complete the survey for a candidate, please 
ask the actual candidate to fill out the survey. The goal of this research is to understand 
the campaign experience from the perspective of someone who personally ran for public 
office during 2012. 
 
Little research exists that asks candidates for public office about the campaign experience, 
their relations with the media, their attempts to communicate with the public, or their 
opinions about the conduct of electoral campaigns. Given the crucial role of elections in a 
representative democracy, such a lack of knowledge and understanding is of great 
concern. You, as a candidate for judicial office, have unique insight into these issues. 
Your knowledge and perspective on these crucial issues simply cannot be obtained from 
anyone else but you. 
 
This is not an issues questionnaire and you will not be asked your position on any 
controversial political issues.  We invite you to browse the contents of this survey 
before responding. 
 
We greatly appreciate your willingness to provide your time and expertise to help us 
develop a better understanding of the campaign process and its effects on candidates. 
 
To complete the survey: 
 
There are two kinds of responses asked for on the following pages. For questions that 
allow you to choose from a set of responses, please simply click your mouse on the 
button next to the desired choice or choices. The button next to the response should fill in 
with black. When an open blank space or 'text field' is available, please type your answer 
into the space. 
 
If you do not wish to answer a particular question, please leave it blank and go on to the 
next item. 
 
If you prefer that the information you provide remain confidential, you will be able to 
indicate at the end of the survey that you wish your answers to be separated from any 
information that might identify you personally.  Unless you specifically provide us with 
your permission, no results of this survey will ever be tied to you in any publication and 
no one but study personnel will have access to information that might connect your 
answers and your identity. 
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For those who are interested in the results of this study, we provide an opportunity at the 
end of the survey to request that they be sent a summary of our findings. 
 
We have tried to limit the time necessary to complete the survey, and tests have indicated 
that it should average 10 to 20 minutes. It may take a bit longer, depending upon the 
specifics of your electoral campaign. 
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
  
307  
 
Appendix C: Interview Materials 
 
Interview E-Mail Invitation 
 
Dear [candidate]: 
 
Thank you for participating in our survey regarding judicial campaigns.  Your responses 
are crucial for this important line of research.  In order to expand upon and better 
interpret the information we have gained from the survey, a limited number of 
respondents will be re-contacted over the phone.  Would you be willing to talk over the 
phone in order to enhance our understanding of your campaign experience?  If so, when 
would be a good time to contact you and at what number would be best to reach 
you? 
 
If you have any questions about the study you may contact me via e-mail at 
robert.zuercher@uky.edu or by phone at 270-302-6062. I will be happy to respond to any 
questions or concerns in a timely manner.   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or call 
toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
Thank you very much for any help you can provide to this important research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Robert “Bob” Zuercher 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Kentucky 
robert.zuercher@uky.edu 
270-302-6062 
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Interview E-Mail Reminder 
 
Dear [candidate]: 
 
About a week ago, I sent you an e-mail to participate in an interview being conducted by 
researchers at the University of Kentucky.  Would you be willing to talk over the phone 
in order to enhance our understanding of your campaign experience?  If so, when would 
be a good time to contact you and at what number would be best to reach you? 
 
If you have any questions about the study you may contact me via e-mail at 
robert.zuercher@uky.edu or by phone at 270-302-6062. I will be happy to respond to any 
questions or concerns in a timely manner.   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, please contact 
the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or call 
toll free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
Thank you very much for any help you can provide to this important research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Robert “Bob” Zuercher 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Kentucky 
robert.zuercher@uky.edu 
270-302-6062 
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Informed Consent Script 
This project is being conducted solely in the interests of our academic research at the 
University of Kentucky.  The length of this interview will be approximately 30 minutes.  
If more time is needed to complete this interview, I will ask for your permission to talk 
again at another time. The purpose of this project is to increase our scholarly 
understanding of judicial campaigns, including candidates’ campaign experiences, 
relations with the media, their attempts to communicate with the public, and opinions 
about the conduct of electoral campaigns.  You will not get any personal benefit, rewards, 
or payment from taking part in the study.   I am recording this conversation so that the 
information you provide can be analyzed at a later time.  Your participation in the project 
is entirely voluntary, and you can stop the interview at any time.  Will you allow me to 
quote directly from your comments in publications that will be written from the project?  
Will you allow me to attribute the quotes to you?  If you do not wish for me to attribute 
them to you, please tell me and I will comply with your wishes.  Before agreeing to 
participate in the study, do you have any questions for me?  If you have questions for me 
after the interview, you may contact me by phone at 270-302-6062 or through my UK e-
mail address, robert.zuercher@uky.edu.  If you have questions for my institution, the 
University of Kentucky, about this research, you may call the Office of Research 
Integrity, (859) 257-9428, or toll-free at (866) 400-9428.  Do you agree to participate? 
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Interview Guide 
 
1. Could you tell me a little bit about the election you were involved in?  
2. What was it like campaigning for office? 
 
News Coverage 
3. How important was the news media in your campaign?   
4. Why do you believe your campaign received the type of coverage that it did? 
5. How did you go about trying to generate news coverage?  
6. How would you describe your relationship with the media? 
7. Why do you think judicial campaigns and elections often receive less coverage than 
other contests? 
 
Campaigning 
8. How did you go about selecting what campaign communication methods you used?  
9. How did you go about choosing what messages to emphasize in your campaign?  Did 
you discuss any issue positions? Why did you choose to avoid/include issue 
positions? 
10. In what ways were political parties active in the election? How do you feel about their 
involvement in judicial elections in general? 
11. In what ways were interest groups active in the election? How do you feel about their 
involvement in judicial elections in general? 
12. Were you ever misrepresented or mischaracterized during the election? How did you 
respond?   
13. What did including a paid campaign consultant/staff member add to your campaign?  
14. Looking back, is there anything you would have changed about your campaign?  Is 
there anything you would have done differently? 
 
Reform Proposals 
15. How do you feel about the regulations that apply to judicial candidates?  
16. Within the past decade, states have moved toward loosening the restrictions on 
judicial candidate speech.  What do you feel the result of this has been?  What do you 
see as the future for existing speech regulations?   
17. How would you describe the current state of judicial selection in your state and why 
do you see it that way? 
18. Could you describe any judicial election reforms that you strongly support or oppose?  
Why? 
 
Consequences of Campaigning 
19. What influenced the results of the election you were in? 
20. What do you believe influenced voter knowledge concerning your candidacy? 
21. What did you find most personally rewarding about running for office? 
22. What would you say your campaign accomplished? 
23. What did you find most difficult or upsetting about running for office? 
 
Closing Question 
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24. Is there anything else you’d like to add about your experience campaigning? 
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